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ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with lawyers and their clients in the 
north Indian district of Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. Its aim 
is to examine the informal aspects of the formal legal system, 
the hypothesis being that an informal dimension is especially 
important where the formal institutional structure is weak.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first is 
concerned with the aims of the thesis, with the general social 
features of the district, with methodology and with a 
description of the fieldwork methods. All lawyers who were 
regular practitioners in the district courts (kachahri) of 
Muzaffarnagar city, have been included in the study sample. The 
second chapter deals with the definition of a profession, in 
particular that of 'legal profession' and with the various 
approaches to the study of a profession. Then the thesis looks 
at the history of the Muzaffarnagar district Bar, the social 
background of its lawyers and with the question why people join 
this profession. Chapter Four is concerned with the bases and 
patterns of the linkages between lawyers and clients, and in 
particular with the roles of the para-professional men such as 
touts and brokers as middlemen and the qualities such as 
primordial ties; with how lawyers become leading lawyers; with the 
question of the degree to which the lawyers in Muzaffarnagar 
conform to the criteria of the 'professional man1; and with the 
issue of the public image of the legal profession. In Chapter 
Five I analyse factional politics in the district Bar, in order 
to examine the bases of grouping among lawyers and with the 
question of 'unprofessionality' in their associational behaviour.
Chapter Six is concerned with the relationship of the traditional 
panchayat system to the modern legal system in the context of 
ideas held about the provision of justice.
In the final chapter the conclusion is drawn that primordial 
ties are of great importance to the operation of the legal 
system, that social background influences professional behaviour, 
that lawyers are profit-oriented rather than service-oriented, 
and that the difference betwen 'occupation' and 'profession' is 
a matter of degree.
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
1. Aims of the thesis
This study is concerned with lawyers (vakil) and their clients 
(mowaakil) in the north Indian district of Muzaffarnagar, UP.
The aims of the thesis are twofold.
The first covers the question of extending our knowledge 
about Indian society, in particular the legal profession. The 
relationship between law and society has been an important 
concern of both sociological and anthropological investigation, 
but scholars have largely ignored the subject of the legal 
profession itself. This is in spite of the fact that profession­
alism has become a corollary of modern industrial society.
Where lawyers were studied theywere not treated as professional 
men and the method used by the American sociologists and 
scholars of law who did attempt to study the legal profession 
used mainly secondary sources, interviews and questionnaires. 
However, they missed using the crucial anthropological method of 
participant observation and limited themselves to an examination 
of lawyers' social backgrounds and their field of specialisation. 
More specifically, studies on the Indian legal profession - 
despite lawyers' importance in Indian society - have been 
neglected by all branches of the social sciences.
The first effort to study the Indian legal profession was 
made by American scholars at a conference held in Chicago in 1967. 
However, few of the papers contributed looked at the lawyer-client 
relationship, and the conference participants agreed that the 
Indian legal profession in all its aspects should be studied
since India had the highest number of lawyers in the world (at 
present some 100,000) second only to that of the United States, 
with a corresponding importance. From the initiation of the 
profession during the British period, lawyers in India played a key 
role in the movement for Independence. They not only maintained 
but even improved their prominence in Indian public life 
after the end of British rule, as can be seen from the fact 
that in 1982 the percentage of lawyers in the central minis­
terial Cabinet was 74 per cent (see Ooman 1983:5).
The first aim of this thesis then is to examine lawyers as 
a profession in India and provide a firm ethnographic basis 
for understanding them.
At the same time there is the whole question of the nature 
of the legal profession and its relation to other forms of 
legal activity. Here my second aim is to examine the formal and 
informal dimensions of the legal system - which in part demands 
a comparison of the concept of professionalism with the way 
people observe professional standards and how the relationships 
between people in the profession correspond to the ideal 
demanded of them. One hypothesis presented is that a formal 
organisation or bureaucratic organisation may not always be able 
to operate without an informal dimension, particularly when the 
formal organisation did not originate in the society concerned.
The modern legal system in India was introduced in the 18th 
century by the British. This was totally different to the 
traditional panchayat system. In India, primordial ties such 
as caste, kinship, religion and so on, play as great a role in 
'formal' organisations as in 'informal' groups. In contrasting 
the principles of professionalism which are identified with formal
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organisations with what goes on in India in order to understand 
legal 'professionalism' as it actually operates there, the 
significance of the network approach as one way of studying the 
informal process within the formal one will be assessed.
To cover the above aims, the thesis is divided into the 
following chapters. Chapter Two reviews definitions, the difference 
between an 'occupation' and a 'profession', and the attributes 
of the concept 'profession' given in the literature. I shall 
then draw my working definition of the term 'profession'. Then I 
put forward my view on the conceptual framework to be used in 
analysing the interaction process among the lawyers, their 
clients and the mediators who go between them.
Three main approaches - the processual, the conflict, and 
the structural-functional approach - have been used in the 
sociological and anthropological literature. I find that these 
three approaches are inadequate to deal with such questions as 
to whether the social background of lawyers affects the. structure 
and interactive aspects of the lawyer's relationship with clients, 
para-professionals and others in the legal system; or how the 
relationship between lawyers and clients began and how it was 
maintained or was changed; or how a lawyer can become a leading 
lawyer. It will be suggested that the network approach is more 
useful is exploring the type of question as mentioned above, but 
that it needs some modification to give the answers we are 
looking for. This stems from the fact that in general scholars 
have used this approach in the context of the whole social field 
of ego rather than in a more specific field of activity. In this 
present study I am mainly concerned with the study of ego's (lawyer) 
linkage with that of alter (the client) in a specific field of
activity (legal) and not in all social contexts. In other words,
I am only concerned with a part of ego’s network. Two new 
concepts will therefore be introduced - that of the 'professional 
recruitment-set' and the 'clientage-bank'. The professional 
recruitment-set refers to the bases on which a professional 
man (here a lawyer) gets his clients and the people who have 
been clients and who could be clients in the future. I will 
call these'Clients of the lawyer his 'clientage-bank'.
To explain the nature and the bases of lawyers' professional 
recruitment-sets, it is necessary to know first their socio­
cultural background. As Mayer (1961) and Boissevain (1973:125-48) 
observed, the environment, both socio-cultural and physical, 
influences the composition and structure of a person's social 
network. Therefore Chapter Three will be concerned with the 
socio-cultural background of lawyers, classified in terms of 
their caste, age, religion, education, rural-urban origins, nature 
of the family and so on. The chapter will explore how these 
factors affect their professional behaviour and their relationship 
with their clients and colleagues as well as the reasons why 
people join or do not join the legal profession. These socio­
cultural factors are not the only ones affecting social inter­
actions amongst lawyers, clients and others associated with the 
Indian legal system. The physical structure of the kachahri 
(court compound) where all lawyers have their offices and all 
district courts are situated will be described to show how the 
physical setting plays its part in this too.
The thesis will then examine how the socio-cultural 
background of lawyers influences their professional behaviour and
the bases and patterns of the linkage among the lawyers, clients 
and mediators. More specifically, Chapter Four will discuss 
four -topics. The first will look at the main bases of the linkages 
between the lawyers and clients and how a client engages a 
particular lawyer. These linkage bases can be divided into two 
categories: (i) That of the persons involved who act as go-
betweens - the munshis (lawyers' clerks), touts, chronic litigants, 
government officials, experienced litigants and witnesses and 
so on; and (ii) The quality of links that are formed - caste, 
kinship, religion, region, family and political ties, reciprocity, 
profit and so on. The second question asks how a lawyer becomes 
a 'leading' lawyer. The third one asks to what degree do the 
lawyers of Muzaffarnagar kachahri follow the 'ideal-type' image 
of the profession or, in other words, what might be the relation­
ship between the ideology of the profession and the actual 
behaviour of these professional men. Finally I would like to 
discuss the issue of whether the prestige (or standing) of the 
legal profession is declining in India, as it has been said to 
be doing. Chapter Four in effect analyses the informal socio- 
legal process as it actually operates from the lawyer's (ego) 
as well as the client's (alter) side in the formal legal process. 
Rarely has any study attempted to relate the social background 
of lawyers to their role performances. Gandhi's study (1982) 
seems to befthe only exception, but this paid more attention to 
only one aspect, that of the touts.
Chapter Five will be concerned with the politics of the 
district Bar - how different types of informal group emerged 
and operated. I was able to identify three types of informal 
groups, that is, the 'clique', the 'caste-faction', and the
'coalition', among the lawyers. I will deal with the operation 
of these informal groups in connection with the Bar election 
which took place in March 1984 during my field-research. Indeed, 
this election provided me with a good opportunity to get a clear 
picture of informal socio-political relationships among the 
Bar members. In the analysis of Bar politics I am mainly 
concerned with the issue of 'unprofessionality' (sometimes called 
non-professionalism) in the lawyers' Association as it is one of my 
main aims to examine the difference between the ideal image of 
the profession and actual behaviour.
Chapter Six will look at the relationship between the 
traditional panchayat system (customary law) and the modern legal 
system (lawyer's law). Before my visit to the field I did not 
have any intention to look at this issue but when I noticed that 
at the same time my respondants were settling the disputes 
through panchayats as well and that roughly one third of the 
disputes were never brought to the courts from the rural areas,
I naturally became interested in the connection between the 
two different legal systems, I will discuss briefly three inter­
connected questions. First, the nature of the relationship 
between panchayats and the modern courts - are they opposed or 
complementary in respect of ideas about the provision of justice? 
Second, who the people are who prefer to take their disputes to 
court rather, than to a panchayat and who do not, and, third, 
in what situations and with what values does a litigant prefer 
a particular type of system, ie, traditional panchayat or the 
modern legal system ?
The rationale for studying the legal profession at district 
level is that a district headquarters town in India provides the
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complex of law courts and government offices, and with respect 
to social change it represents an intermediary position between 
village and city. In the district town we can observe intensive 
interaction between traditional and modern values or, in Singh's 
(1973) words, interaction between particularistic and univer- 
salistic values. The selection of the district town Muzaffarnagar 
in western Uttar Pradesh state was mainly due to my familiarity 
with the people, the place, and its local dialect and culture, 
as I am a native resident of the district.
The next section of this introductory chapter will provide 
a general picture of the Muzaffarnagar district, its physical 
setting and historical background with special attention being 
paid to its contemporary economic, political, socio-cultural, 
administrative and legal structure as well as its communication 
network. These aspects are connected to the legal profession 
and system, litigation and the litigants, as can be seen from the 
way lawyers play the leading role in the party politics of the 
district or when the prosperity of local agriculture enables 
the farmers to send their children to the cities for education. 
Subsequently many of the children then join the profession and 
together with the access to financial resources enables the 
farmers to be more litigious. The extension of transport and 
other means, of communication are an important factor in bringing 
more disputes to the courts from the villages rather than having them 
settled by the traditional panchayats, thus they are part of the 
means whereby modern legal culture is spread in the villages.
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D/Sm/CT: MUZAFFARNAGAR I? i
2. The setting of Muzaffarnagar district
In this section I will present a general picture of the Muzaffar­
nagar district concentrating on its topography and its historical 
background. Special attention will be paid to its contemporary 
economic, political, socio-cultural, administrative and legal 
system as well as its transport and communication network.
The physical setting
The administrative district of Muzaffarnagar is one of the 
most prosperous districts of India, although it does not possess 
any striking physical feature - just being a part of the fertile 
Gangetic plain. It is situated in the duaab (fertile land between 
two rivers) of the Gangaa and Yamunaa rivers, between the district 
of Meerutin the south and Saharanpur in the north. In the west 
the Yamunaa river separates it from the Karnal district of 
Haryana state, and in the east the river Gangaa forms the 
boundary between this district and the Bijnor district. It is 
roughly rectangular in shape. At its longest, from east to 
west, it is 98 km and at its widest, north to south, it is 58 km.
The total area is 4245 sq km (Nevill 1920; Ismaarikaa 1983).
During the major part of the year the climate of the district 
is largely influenced by the prevailing dry continental air, 
the summer being intensively hot (approximately 31° to 37°C) and the 
winter cold (about 10° to 15°C). It is only during the monsoon
f
month, from the last week of June, that air of oceanic origin 
reaches the district, bringing with it increased humidity, cloud 
and rain. The year may be divided into four seasons: the winter, 
from October to February, followed by the summer season which 
continues till about the end of June when the south-west
monsoon arrives. The monsoon season (the rainy season) lasts 
till September. The average annual rainfall of the district is 
30 ins. and the pattern of annual rainfall in the district as a 
whole is uniform (see Prakasha Rao 1976:20; Statistical Diary,
UP, 1982).
Looking at the entire area in terms of its physical features 
we find it consists of four clear tracts. On the extreme east, 
the riverain tract of the Gangaa valley contains the whole area of 
Gordhanpur and parts of Bhukarhari and Bumaa-Samabalhara. The 
next tract is between the Gangaa and the western side of the river 
Kalinadi, through which runs the Gangaa Canal. To the west 
of this tract there is the duaab of the Kalinadi and Hindon 
rivers. Lastly, the fourth tract comprises that portion of the 
district which extends from the Hindon to the Yamunaa river, the 
eastern half of which is traversed by the Yamunaa Canal. The 
first and fourth tracts are less fertile than the other two.
The majority of the cases of cattle-lifting occur in the first 
and fourth tract because those who carry out this activity can 
easily cross the river to the other districts with the cattle.
In the fourth tract live the Bauriya, a tribal community, noted 
for their reputation as burglars throughout the country.
According to the 1981 census, the total population of the 
district was 2,274,487, the urban population accounting for 21.6 
per cent of?this and on the increase. The number of inhabited 
villages is 927. The population density was 548 per sq km. The 
average size of a village was 2,000 inhabitants and of the seven 
towns was 25,000 inhabitants. The population of Muzaffarnagar 
city in 1971 was 114,783 (Census of India, 1971).
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The history of the region
The history of the district is obscure up to the period 
beginning several hundred years after the Muslim invasion. It 
may be conjectured that it formed part of the Pandayaa kingdom 
which had its capital at Hastinapur in the adjoining district of 
Meerut, Another historical version includes it in the dominions 
of Pritwiraj Chauhan, the ruler of Delhi. Documented history 
first tells us of the country around Muzaffarnagar at the time of 
the Muslim conquest in the 13th century. This remained a 
dependancy of the various dynasties which ruled at Delhi until 
the final dissolution of the Moghal empire. The earliest colonists 
probably consisted of Aryan settler, Brahman and Rajput. They 
were succeeded by the Jats, who occupied the whole southern 
portion of the district, where their descendants still form the 
main landowning class. At a later date the Gujars took 
possession of the poorer tracts which the Jats had left 
unoccupied, and they, too, are still to be found as big land­
lords. Finally, with the Muslim incursions, bodies of Sheikhs, 
Saiyids and Pathans entered this region and parcelled out among 
themselves the remainder of the territory.
According to Persian histories, Tamur paid one of his 
violent visits to the district in 1399 AD when all the infidel 
inhabitants whom he could capture were mercilessly put to the 
sword. Under Akbar, Muzaffarnagar was included in the government 
(sarkaar) of Saharanpur district. During the 17th century, the 
Saiyid family of Barha (now known as Baghra village) rose to 
great eminence and filled many important offices about the court. 
The ancestors of the Baghra family are said to have settled in
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Muzaffarnagar district about the year 1350, and to have enjoyed 
the patronage of the Saiyid dynasty, which ruled at Delhi in 
the succeeding century. In 1414 AD, Sultan Khizr Khan conferred 
the control of Saharanpur on Saiyid Salim, the chief of their 
fraternity, and from that time on they rose rapidly to regional 
power and had great influence at Court. One physician (hakim) 
of King Jahangeer was from a family of Baghra village. Under 
Akbar and his successors, various branches of the Barha Saiyid families 
became the leading landowners in the province. They were 
celebrated as daring military leaders being employed by the 
emperors on all dangerous ventures, from the Indus to the 
Narbada. It was mainly through their aid that victory near
Agra was won in 1707 by which Bahadurshah made good his claim
to the imperial title. The part which they bore in the 
revolution of 1712, when Farrukh Siyar was elevated to the throne, 
belongs to the general history of India. As a reward for the 
important services rendered on that occasion Saiyid Husain Ali 
(from Baghra village) was made commander in chief. One of his 
descendants, Saiyid Muzaffar Khan Khanjahan started to build a 
new town on lands taken from Surju (now 'Sujdu'), Sarwat and Kheraa 
villages. This was completed by his son, who named it Muzaffar­
nagar in honour of his father who died in 1645 AD. The
descendants of all four Saiyid families who ruled Muzaffarnagar 
district are ■■still living in different parts of the district.
After some raids by Sikhs from the Panjab, the district fell 
into the hands of Marathas in 1788 and after the fall of 
Aligarh in 1803 the whole of this region came under British 
rule. (Sources: Nevill 1920:157-203; Imperial Gazetteer of 
India, Vol XVIII:85-7.)
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Economic structure
The economy of the district is dominated by the agricultural 
sector which, together with allied activities, forms the most 
important source of employment and revenue. Over 73 per cent of 
the total land is under cultivation (Parkhasa Rao 1976:21-2).
The majority of cases that are settled in district courts 
relate to agricultural land disputes and also the majority of 
the litigants come from villages, and are usually farmers.
The plain of the upper Gangaa is one of the most highly irrigated 
agricultural regions of India and irrigation has played a 
dominant role in boosting its agricultural prosperity, 
particularly during the last hundred years. The eight rivers 
and five canals and their tributaries (rajhwahaa) cover the 
whole of this district for irrigation. The village farmers' 
desire for profit is tempered by their reluctance to take risks 
and this is mainly responsible for the unchanging cropping 
pattern, dominated by sugar-cane, wheat and paddy, and the 
general rotation sequence of cash crops for market. Maize, 
cotton, tobacco, chillies, lintals (dais), and seasonal 
vegetables, mainly for domestic consumption, and for local 
markets, are also grown. Over the last fifty years sugar-cane 
especially has, as a cash crop, brought many changes in the 
village life and has also led to the growth of industry 
(particularly those sugar-cane related ones), banking facilities, 
towns, market centres, and education institutes. It has 
raised the standard of living in general. The prosperity of 
the farmers is the main reason that, in the distrcit and tehsil 
Bars, the farmers' sons dominate, numerically speaking,
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because the farmers can now easily afford to send their 
children to higher education in the cities. I noticed that even 
the fluctuations in the price of sugar-cane affected whether or 
not there were more or less court cases and the size of the 
lawyers' fees. Using a questionnaire (see Appendix A) I asked 
lawyers if they thought that the rise and fall of the sugar-cane 
price controlled the number of court cases in the district 
courts. Eighty-six per cent out of the total number replied 
'yes', but I was unable to confirm this with the court records 
due to the fact that only those for the last two years had 
been kept. It is confirmed, however, that whenever the price of 
sugar-cane rises lawyers' fees also increase - and sometimes 
farmers say in the event of a dispute: 1 Ik bigha gannaa iss naam 
kaa hee sahee1 (I keep one fifth of an acre (bigha) of sugar­
cane for this litigation). In towns, markets also depend on the 
purchasing capacity of farmers in the district.
The local sugar-cane products market (mandi) is reputedly 
the biggest one in Asia (Hindustan, 17 June 1984, Delhi). Nearly 
1,000 market labourers have been recruited by sugar traders 
from the nearby states of Rajsthan and Haryana to the district 
and nearly the same number of market labourers have migrated 
to the Panjab due to the higher wages there. Industrial 
development in this district has taken place over the last
f
thirty years and has taken the form of some iron and steel 
rolling mills and sugar factories. Hand-made blankets, bullock 
or buffalo-driven carts (buggi) with rubber tyres and calico 
printing are the main cottage industries in the district. The 
main social feature of Muzaffarnagar1s industrial development 
is that almost all industries are in the private sector and are
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owned by members of the local trading castes. The majority of 
industrial labourers are from the vicinity. Disputes relating 
to the industrial set-up hardly ever arise in courts here since 
the labour unions are still very weak.
Transport and communication
The city of Muzaffarnagar is situated on the Delhi-Dehradun 
national highway at a distance of 72 miles from Delhi to the north. 
The spatial distribution of transport in the district is 
determined by the parallel and north-south alignment of the rivers 
Yamunaa and Gangaa. This district of Meerut in the south and 
Saharanpur district in the north, connected by train and road 
routes, almost intertwine each other and pass through Meerut, 
Khatauli, Muzaffarnagar and Deoband (in the district of 
Saharanpur) and pass the towns of Shamli and Thanaabhawan. Cutting 
almost at right angles to the two north-south routes, the east- 
west road runs through the centre of the district, linking Panipat 
town (in Haryana state) on the west of the Yamunaa and Gangaa which 
function as boundaries between districts and states [see map].
The villages and towns (kasbaa) of the district have been 
connected with metalled (paccaa) and unmetalled (kachhaa) roads. 
More than 50 per cent of the villages of the district are 
within one mile of a road and there.is no village which is more 
than five miles from any metalled road (Source: Praksha Rao 
1976:133). The buses are the main transport to carry passengers 
..within the district from one place to another and these buses 
are run by government and private services. On average a bus 
goes to Delhi, the capital city of India, every half an hour. At 
present a litigant can come to the district courts in Muzaffar­
nagar city and go back to his village the same day. This was
formerly difficult due to lack of transport facilities; seme old villagers from 
border villages told me that their walk to the district courts 
used to take eight to ten hours in the past, and usually they 
used to stay overnight at the residences of their lawyers. Since 
trade has increased and communications have improved, the 
towns have grown large and are more in contact with the villages. 
The extension of transport and communication is an important 
factor in bringing more litigations (mukadmah) to the courts 
which were settled in the past by traditional panchayats in the 
villages because modern communication methods and other means 
of transport have helped to spread the modern legal culture in the 
vilages.
Overall the communication and information network is not bad 
compared with other districts of the state. Some twenty-five 
Hindi and Urdu daily newspapers are published from the various 
urban centres. The most popular ones, Muzaffarnagar Bulletin 
and Danik Dehaat, are both published in Hindi.
Political structure
factionalism and ties of caste and kinship play the main 
role in the politics of the district (zila). The main politic­
ally active parties are Congress (I), Lokdal, Bharatyia Janta 
Party (BJP), Democratic-Socialist Party (DCP) and Janta Party. 
These parties are all directed from national level. The Communist
t
parties have very little influence in public life. There are 
two member of Parliament (MP) seats and nine seats for the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA). The majority of the Jats follow 
Lokdal, whereas the trading castes (Bania, Jain, Khatri) and 
refugees from Pakistan follow BJP. The Brahmans, Tyagi,
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backward castes and scheduled castes (Harijans) fallow Congress 
(I), and the rest are divided on the basis of caste or community. 
For instance, Muslims support Muslim candidates without considera­
tion for party affiliation.
The above political alignments are clearly reflected among 
lawyers. The majority of the Jat lawyers support Lokdal, while 
the lawyers of Brahman, Tyagi, backward castes and scheduled 
castes support Congress (I) and those of a business background 
support BJP. During my fieldwork both the MPs and the three 
MLAs were from Lokdal and six MLAs were from Congress (I)
Party. One MLA from Congress (I), an industrialist from the 
city of Muzaffarnagar, was a minister of cabinet rank and one 
MLA from Lokdal, who was also a leading lawyer specialising 
in criminal law, was chairman of the UP Public Accounts Committee. 
Rural-urban differences appear to be irrelevant in the elections.
The majority of lawyers actively participate in district 
politics. For instance, during fieldwork I found that the 
president and the two secretaries of Lokdal were lawyers and the 
president of the Janta Party and the DCP were also lawyers.
One general secretary and two joint-secretaries were lawyers in 
Congress (I). In fact, the executive committees of all the 
parties are dominated by district Bar members. In the past all 
ministers (except one) who were selected from this district 
were lawyers by profession. One successful lawyer in the 
district Bar, who had been deputy Chief Minister of the State 
during the Janta Party's regime in 1979, gave up his legal 
practice to follow his old family occupation of agriculture.
When I asked him why he had left his practice at the Bar, he 
replied that, although he had lost Rs.4000 worth of earnings in
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a month from practice, he had enjoyed one of the highest posts 
at the State level, and it would therefore be an insult for him 
to sit again with his former colleagues in the kachahri (court 
compound). Some other lawyers who gave up their practice in 
this manner had the same feeling. For instance, another lawyer 
who had been director of the Co-operative Bank and chairman of 
the same for many terms (and during my stay in the field was 
director of the State Bank of India and the UP Financial 
Committee [UPFC]) had given up his practice. One day, during 
my fieldwork, Mr Charan Singh, president of Lokdal at national 
level and ex-Prime Minister, visited Muzaffarnagar city 
campaigning for his party. Out of sixty-six members who joined 
■his party after the campaign visit fifteen were lawyers. There 
also took place seventeen demonstrations in the city while I 
was there - and all of them were led by lawyers. So, as we 
can see, lawyers have a strong grip on the socio-political 
development of the district. I noticed that the main issue of 
discussion among Bar members at the Bar Association building 
during lunch was district politics. Mr Charan Singh had a lot 
of support in this district, particularly among his own Jat 
community.
Village politics is mainly based on lineage (khaandaan), 
caste and factionalism. In the remote villages of the district 
traditional panchayats like caste, village and ganwaand ( a group 
of neighbouring villages having regular social intercourse) 
panchayats are still functional in the legal as well as political 
sense (see Pradhan (1976) for a study of the panchayats in the 
district).
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Socio-cultural structure
There are twenty-one main Hindu castes and nearly the same 
number of Muslim castes in the district. The Jat, Rajput,
Gujar, Tyagi, Saini and Rood are the main Hindu peasant castes 
and the trading castes are the Bania, Jain, and Khatri. The 
main Hindu service castes, that is, the Nai (barber), Kumhaar 
(potter), Dobhi (washerman), Teli (oil-presser), Badiye 
(carpenter.), Lohaar (blacksmith), Sonaar (goldsmith), Chudaa 
(sweeper), Chamar (leather worker and agricultural labourer), 
and Kahaar or Dinwaar (water carrier) are also very much part 
of the village social system. The majority of Brahmans are 
peasants in this* district. The Muslims are also divided in a 
manner very similar to the Hindu caste system since the majority 
of the Muslim population had been converted from Hinduism during 
the Moghal period. They still follow some of the Hindu customs 
and the calling of their original Hindu castes. They even 
maintain the brotherhood (bhaicharaa) in their counterpart 
to the caste system (Pradhan 1966:53). The peasant castes, 
socially, politically and economically, are dominant in the 
villages, although it is the Chamaar caste that predominates 
numerically. Each caste is still associated with a particular 
occupation (pesaa; kaam; dhandaa) but this does not mean, 
however, that all the members of a caste - or even a majority 
of them - do, in fact always follow their traditional occupation. 
Even when they do follow this they need not do so to the exclusion 
of another occupation. Some of the service castes have more 
than one traditional occupation regardless of their differing 
ones and are also engaged in agriculture in one capacity or 
another.
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The jajmaani relationship (exchange of services) still 
exists in the villages. The service castes get faslanaa (a 
certain quantity of grain at harvest time) from their jajmaan 
(landlord) for their services. But now the tendency is for 
these service castes to give up their traditionally associated 
occupations and they prefer payment in cash and not in kind. 
Those new occupations and professions, introduced by the impact 
of Westernisation or modernisation, are in general preferred 
by all castes.
In the district the religions exist in the fallowing 
proportions: 70 per cent Hindu, 29 per cent Muslim, 1 per cent 
Christian, 0.2 per cent Sikh and 0.7 per cent the remainder. The 
•total percentage of scheduled castes and tribes was 14.8 per 
cent. The ratio of female per thousand males was 844 (Census 
of India, 1971). Many cases for harrasment and insult were 
brought in the district courts by the peasant and lower castes 
against each other.
The family structure is dominated by patrilineal, exogamous 
and joint family concepts. The division of labour in the family 
and the society of Muzaffarnagar is based on gender. The age of 
marriage differs from caste to caste and marriages are arranged 
by parents. Generally the head of the family will be the last 
male member of the family. It is customary in rural areas for 
the married yeoman not to show her face to the elders of her 
family, other elders of the village and outsiders. Neither 
should she show her face to her husband in a public place or 
call her husband by his name. Marriage within the father's clan 
(gotraa) and mother's clan is customarily prohibited. Family
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disputes about marriage, divorce and property are not generally 
brought before the courts, and potential litigants would be 
advised by lawyers and judges to withdraw. The legal age of 
marriage is eighteen years for a girl and twenty-one years 
for a boy, but many take place where the participants are under 
this minimum age although they would not be registered at court.
Two main classes of people are migrating to the urban 
centres, npt only in this district but in the whole of India.
The labour class for better jobs - or just simply for jobs - 
and the rich farmers for better education, health facilities, 
and so on, for their children. In the district of Muzaffarnagar 
I noticed that the main feature of this migration was that 
.these migrants tended to be more rural than urban orientated 
in their way of life.
Administrative structure: History
At the time of the .Mughal emperor Akbar, the whole area of 
Muzaffarnagar belonged to the government of Saharanpur, with 
the exception of Khandhla province (parganaa) which lay within 
the boundaries of the government of Delhi. At that time the 
province of Muzaffarnagar was known as 'Sarwat', the name being 
changed to Muzaffarnagar during the reign of Emperor Shahjahan 
in about 1633 (Nevill 1920:124).
After the British conquest in 1803, the district was 
attached to Moradabad and in 1804 it was assigned to the district 
of Saharanpur, which then extended from the Siwalik hills as 
far south as the northern provinces of Bulandshahr district (then 
a part of Aligarh district). The district was administered 
by the Resident of Delhi for the two years before 1806.
It became the headquarters of the sub-collectorship of Saharanpur
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district in 1824 with Mr W Dundas as the first sub-collector. Two years 
later, in 1826, he was succeeded by Mr Franco during whose 
administration it became a fully fledged district (Nevill ibid:125) 
In the above context it is important to mention that during 
the first two years of British rule, the government followed 
the existing arrangements. Large tracts of country were then 
held by the great mugarraridars. A Gujar raja, Ramdayal of 
Landhouraa, held the greater portion of the Purchhpar province 
and some estates beyond its borders. Nain Singh, the Gujar 
chieftain of Bahsuma, remained in charge of Bhuma, while the 
Muslim family of Marhal retained possession of the greater part 
of Muzaffarnagar city, Soaran and Charthaawal, which they had 
formerly held in Jagir for the support of troops. The provinces 
of Banat and Bagraa were held on a similar tenure by Najabatali 
Khan. The descendants of Khanjahan (founder of Muzaffarnagar 
city) held nearly all of Khatauli in detached estates, and the 
remainder was in the possession of a Rajput mugurraridar. The
great part of Jauli-Jansath was held by the Saiyid families and
Bhukarheri and Sambaleraa were shared between the Gujar chiefs 
and small mugharraridars. Till May 1805, the collector 
performed the duties of magistrate and collector for both 
divisions of Saharanpur (Nevill ibid:127-8). The above-mentioned 
families had the right to collect revenue and had magisterial 
power. The -interesting feature about them is that their 
descendants are still living in the district, but after 
Independance they lost all their power and public influence.
After the British moved into the district, from 1803, its 
boundaries were changed, with villages being transferred 
between it and neighbouring districts as well as the alteration
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of its internal divisions...
In 1903, the district of Muzaffarnagar was divided into four 
tehsils and seventeen provinces for administrative and revenue 
collection purposes. The executive staff of the administration 
of the district had consisted of a collector, four fully 
empowered magistrates of whom one was usually1' a covenanted 
civilian, four tehsildars with magisterial powers, a district 
superintendent of police, a civil surgeon who was usually an 
assistant surgeon in charge, and a deputy inspector of 
schools (Nevill ibid:123).
Administrative structure: The present
After Indian Independance in 1947, the Indian government 
also maintained the same administrative structure with some minor 
changes (see Figure 1). At present the district is the most 
important single unit of administration and from this point of 
view contact between government and people the collector is 
head of the district administration and it is he who also acts 
as district magistrate. When he functions as head of the 
revenue organisation he is called the collector and when he 
exercises his magisterial powers he is called the district mag­
istrate (DM). He is eith’er a member of the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) or a senior member of the State Civil Service (PCS) 
who may have been specially selected for this appointment. The DM 
represents the government in the district in practically all 
spheres. The collector is assisted by a number of deputy col­
lectors belongingto the PCS. When these deputy collectors use 
their magisterial powers they are called sub-divisional magistrates 
(SDM). They may also be put in charge of sub-divisions of the
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district or work as additional district magistrate (ADM) in a 
big city under the supervision of the DM. The duties and 
functions of the SDMs are similar to those of the collector or 
DM, though of a lesser degree and confined to the sub-division.
These SDMs also supervise and inspect the work of tehsildars.
At the tehsil level the tehsildar is the chief administra­
tor, revenue officer and magistrate. His main function is to 
collect land revenue. Under him are the Naib tehsildar and Kanungo 
who only have revenue collecting powers. The government 
formulates policies and passes orders to the collector who pass 
them through the SDMs to the tehsildars with appropriate directions, 
and it is at the tehsil level that orders are actually executed. 
■Beneath the tehsils, at village level, the land record keeper 
(patwaari) is the revenue officer and he maintains the village 
map (shafira), index to the map (khasraa), record of proprietary 
rights (khewat), and the record of rights for the tenants (khetauni)4 
At this level we also find the chief of the village (pradhaan). 
who is the chief officer and who is elected by villagers for a 
five year term.
In Muzaffarnagar district there is one collector and 
district magistrate and under him an ADM, four SDMs, one special 
magistrate for Muzaffarnagar city, and two to three additional 
SDMs. The office of the collector is known as the 'Collectorate1.
The collectopate-officer and his court, as well as that of the 
DM, are located in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city. The 
district of Muzaffarnagar is divided into four tehsils of 
Budhanaa, Kairnaa, Morenaa, and Sadar (chief).
Figure 1. The district administrative structure
The district administrative structure
District magistrate 
and Collector
Assistant district magistrate
Sub-divisional magistrate
Tehsildar
Naib-tehsildar 
(only revenue work)
Kanungo 
(only revenue work)
Pardhaan & Patwari 
(only revenue work)
District superintendent 
of police
Deputy superintendent 
of police
Inspector of police
Sub-inspector of police
Head constable
Constable
Chaukidaar
(Civil administration) (Police administration)
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Police administration
The superintendent of police (SP) is the executive head 
of the district police force. He is responsible for the efficiency 
and the discipline of the force and for ensuring the maintenance 
of peace. He keeps in contact with the people of the district and 
has to maintain awareness of all events in his jurisdiction.
There are under him four deputy superintendents of police (DSP), 
circle inspectors, public prosecutors, revenue inspectors, sub­
inspectors, assistant public prosecutors, head constables and 
constables (see Figure 1). The district of Muzaffarnagar is 
divided into four police circles comprising on average four to 
five police stations and the charge of the circle is held by a 
deputy superintendent. There are two types of police station - 
urban and rural. These are further subdivided into first and 
second category. Circle inspectors .are in charge of important 
police stations whereas other urban and rural police stations 
are under the charge of sub-inspectors. Both inspectors and 
sub-inspectors in charge of police stations are assisted by 
other sub-inspectors, head constables and constables. In every 
village a village guard (chaukidaar), who is a part-time employee, 
is the only police agent; he is appointed by the district 
magistrate. His primary duties include watch and ward, carrying 
of messages and general assistance to the police.
The legal structure
The legal system of ancient India derived from the classical 
Hindu textbooks, mainly the Pharma sastras and Manusmrti, and was 
based on the notion that punishments were differentiated according 
to caste ranking and social status - hence there was no separation
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between the legal, political and social systems. The raja was the 
guardian of the system. Most cases were settled at village 
level by different types of panchayats. Disputes within a 
village were settled by the village panchayat. Disputes within 
a caste were settled by the caste panchayat, whilst those between 
villages were handled by the ganwaand panchayat. The panches 
(judges) of these panchayats were recruited partly on the basis 
of heredity, sometimes on their reputation for integrity. The 
panches or council members sitting in a panchayat meeting to 
determine cases were considered to be equivalent to five gods 
imbued with qualities such as justice and impartiality. Usually 
these five or more panches were appointed. The ideal panch,
,1Panch Parmeshwar', epitomised the ethos of the village society. 
Dissatisfied litigants could appear directly to the king. It is 
a debatable issue as to whether a legal profession as we know 
it existed in ancient India. However, it is obvious from the 
old Hindu textbooks that the friends, relatives and neighbours 
could plead cases on behalf of the litigant in panchayats or the 
raja1s court (see Srinivas 1935:18, Cohn 1959:79-93; Derrett 1968: 
80,102; Rocher 1968-69:383-402; Singh 1973:94-7; Pradhan 1966).
During the Muslim period this system continued unchanged.
As Calkins (1968-69:403-4) has pointed out, most disputes were 
settled outside the Muslim rulers' courts maintained by the 
regional ruling groups. The mughal kings and Jagirdars intervened 
only in those cases where there had been a considerable breach 
of the peace or where the village revenue had not been paid.
There was little need for the Mughals to establish any other 
type of legal system. In northern India political power was 
often exercised at the ganwaand level by lineages, and members of
-38-
the dominant lineages would be called upon to settle village and 
other disputes that could not be resolved at the village level. 
Pradhan (1966:96-8), who conducted his field study in the 
Muzaffarnagar district, found a mandate (firman) of the Emperor 
Akbar addressed to the heads (choudharyies) of the lineage 
panchayat in the region'of Muzaffarnagar district. His translation 
from Persian to English of a mandate is as follows:
’’By the present firman, certain community 
councils in India which charged certain 
taxes, are now being excused. Each community 
council has my permission and is free to 
carry on its traditional functions in my region.
Both Hindu and Muslims are one in my eyes, so 
I give freedom (of action) to these councils.
They are exempt from the payment of jazia 
(religious tax) and other royal taxes.'
(Issued in the region of Emperor of India,
Emperor Akhbar, 11th Ramzan 989, Hizri (AD 1580).)
According to another mandate of the Emperor Akbar:
’Every community and the khaps [clan's geograph­
ical area] of the Jats of the duaab have the 
freedom to carry out their functions according 
to their ancient customs and laws within their 
respective councils, under the reign of 
Shanshah Akbar, for example, 1. Khap Baliyan Jat,
2. Khap Solakain Jat, 3. Khap Kalaslian Gujar,
4. Daiya Khap Jat, 5. Gathwala Khap Jat.
The rules and regulations apply to the Khaps 
which may unite in one group and live in peace 
with each other.' (8th Ramzan 987 Hizri (AD 1578), 
Emperor Akbar; Raja Todarmal).
'Note: This mandate [is] for Choudhary 
Pacchumal, Shoran, and Choudhary Lai Singh,
Sisauli.'
Such royal mandates were issued to the different khaps of 
Meerut division and in Haryana state from time to time by 
various Mughal emperors till the reign of Muhammad Shah. These 
mandates are still preserved by the families of the hereditary 
secretaries (wazirs) to these panchayats at Soran village, some 
fifteen miles from Muzaffarnagar city.
It appears then, at least at province level and below,
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that Mughal justice was much less significant than customary law 
and local methods of settling disputes.
With the establishment of British rule in India there came 
a turning point in the legal system. Many legal innovations 
were introduced by the British government. The main feature 
of this new legal system was that it was antagonistic to the 
Hindu legal tradition because it was based on universal equality 
and rationality and not on particularistic differences. The 
foundation of this new judicial system was laid down by Warren 
Hastings, Governor of Bengal. He supported a decentralised 
system of law courts to conduct criminal and civil justice. There 
were company courts and a supreme court, all deriving from the 
company's (ie, the East India Company) authority in every 
Presidency city, Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay. By the provisions 
of the Regulating Act 1773, the British Parliament separated the
Supreme Court from those of the East India Company, so as to
control its activities. This dual system was abolished in 
1861 when the enactment of the Indian Penal Code and the Codes 
of Civil and Criminal Procedure made it possible to systematically 
control the lower courts. In every province a high court 
empowered to hear appeals from the lower courts was established. 
The high court in Uttar Pradesh state (UP) was set up in 1861
at Agra ancj, it was known as the high court of 'the northern
western provinces' and shifted to Allahabad in 1866.
The legal system at present
After Independence, the legal system which was adopted by 
the Indian government was based on the British legal system. 
However, the system has been modified to the needs of India,
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including the incorporation of the personal law of Hindus and 
Muslims in matters of succession, marriage, divorce, guardianship, 
etc. At present at the apex is one Supreme Court (located at 
Delhi) and then eighteen high courts, seventeen of which are 
located in different states, and one of which is located at 
Delhi. The seven union territories come under the jurisdiction 
of the nearest high court. High courts are independent of the 
executive .part of the government administration.
The high court of UP governs all criminal and civil courts 
(faujdaari and diwaani-adaalats) in the state, but its jurisd­
iction in some revenue matters is barred. For revenue matters 
the highest court is the Board of Revenue. A Bench of the high 
court has been functioning at Lucknow city where some of the 
high court judges dispose of cases arising in the nearby twelve 
districts of the State. The high court has powers of super­
intendence over all courts in the State. It makes rules, civil 
and criminal, calls for a number of returns and issues other 
instructions regarding practices and proceedings of courts and 
also determines the manner and form on which books, entries and 
accounts will be kept. Apart from this administrative authority 
it constitutes the highest court of appeal on the civil and 
criminal law and has also some original jurisdiction which means 
its judgement will be final in some cases. The high court has 
power within, the State concerned to issue to any person or 
authority orders or visits for the enforcement of rights con­
ferred by the constitution on the citizens of India and for any 
other purpose. The high court is also responsible for the 
posting and transfers of subordinate court judges.
Like the high court, the judicial administration in a
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district is also fairly uniform throughout India and variations 
are only minor(see Figure 2). The highest judicial authority 
in the district is the district and session judge (DJ). He 
combines both civil (as district judge) and criminal (as sessions 
judge) powers. In UP, below the district and session judge are 
civil and session judges (CJ) who perform both civil and criminal 
judicial functions. Where work justifies, there may be an 
additional.district and session judge. Below are the subordinate 
judges. At this level there is a bifurcation: additional sessions 
judges and assistant sessions judges functioning on the 
criminal side and civil judges of various grades functioning 
on the civil side. The criminal courts, that is to say, the 
•district and sessions judge, additional sessions judges and 
assistant sessions judges, decide serious criminal cases which 
are committed to them by magistrates. They also hear appeals 
from the 1st class and 2nd class magistrates' decision. Civil 
courts are usually divided into a number of ranks. Courts of 
the higher ranks, ie, district judge and civil judges of the 
senior division have unlimited original jurisdiction in civil 
suits and are also the appellate courts for decisions from lower 
rank civil courts. The lower rank civil courts have limited 
jurisdiction and usually by suits up to the valuation of Rs.5000. 
Besides hearing suits properly so-called, the civil courts 
exercise jurisdiction over such matters as guardianship, marriage 
and divorce. An appeal from the district judge and the civil 
judges of the senior ranks lies to the high court; on the 
criminal side an appeal from the sessions courts lies to the 
same court.
There are small case courts presided over by senior civil
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judges and dealing with small suits but pronouncing final orders; 
a reference to the high court can only be made on a point of law.
The district and sessions judge has general control over 
all the civil courts and sessions courts and their establish­
ments within the district; he inspects the proceedings of all 
courts subordinate to him and gives such directions with 
respect to the matters not provided for by law as he may think 
necessary.’ There is considerable administrative work with him 
in regard to the control of the establishment attached to courts. 
The district magistrate and other magistrates are not sub­
ordinate to the district and sessions judge but the latter 
hears appeals from their criminal judicial decisions. (Sources: 
Kurian 1982:845; Zaheer & Gupta 1970: Chap V; Singh 1976:17- 
26; Shukla 1976:189-93).
In the district of Muzaffarnagar, all the district courts are 
located at the headquarters in the premises of the kachahri in 
Muzaffarnagar city. During my field research there was one 
district and sessions judge who combined both criminal and civil 
powers and was the head of the district judiciary. Below this 
were six additional district judges (ADJ), three on the criminal 
side and three on the civil side (as Figure 2 shows). Below them 
there was a special additional district judge who dealt with 
civil and criminal cases. Below him there was one chief 
judicial magistrate (CJM) who dealt only with criminal cases and 
had the responsibility to distribute the cases in different 
courts on behalf of the district and sessions judge. Below the 
CJM were nine munsif magistrates who had power only on the civil 
side. Among these nine munsifs, two sat at Kairana tehsil for a 
few days a month. At the bottom of the district judiciary,
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Figure 2. The judicial organisation in Muzaffarnagar 
district in ranked order
High court 
(at state level)
District courts 
(at district level)
Post & No. Jurisdiction
District & Session Judge (1) Civil & Criminal Side
Add. District Judges (6) (Three on the Civil 
& three on the Crim­
inal side)
Special Add. District 
Judge (1)
Civil and Criminal 
side
Chief Judicial Magistrate 
(1)
Criminal side
Munsif Magistrates with 
various grades (9)
On the Civil side; 
two have courts at 
tehsil level
Judicial Magistrates (2) One on the Civil 
& one on the 
Criminal side
The chart is based on the information given by 
the head clerk of the District & Session Judge 
of Muzaffarnagar district
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there were two judicial magistrates, on the civil side and on 
the criminal side (Source: The Record office of the District & 
Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar city).
The constitution, powers and procedures of the courts 
dealing with criminal cases are governed by the provisions of 
the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. PC) and the procedure of the 
civil courts is regulated by the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
I attempted to collect information about the total number 
of court cases in the different courts but some judges did not 
allow me this facility. However, I could collect some 
information related to this from some courts for the years 1977- 
78 and 1980-81, which is as follows:
Table 1. The nature and the total number of law cases in 
some district courts during 1977-78 and 1980-81.
Year Total No. of cases Nature of cases
1977-78 817 Criminal
1980-81 926 n
1977-78 149 Marriage petitions
1980-81 311 it it
1977-78 836 Civil cases of the
1980-81 998 district judge
1977-78 1952 Civil cases of munsif
1980-81 > 1980 magistrate courts
To sum up, where the district and session judge is the head of 
the district judiciary, the district magistrate is the head of 
the district administration and both parts are independent, just 
as the high court is independent of the State government. However,
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the district magistrate has both executive and judicial powers 
and the district judge has only judicial power. Appeals from 
the suits which are originally decided by higher civil courts 
in the district lie to the high court.
3. Research methodology
The field research was carried out over a period of about 
eight months, from August 1983 to April 1984, in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar (UP). This district is where I myself come from 
and I have spent nearly twenty years there. It is my view that 
to study one's own society has both its advantages and its dis­
advantages. As a member of the society which is under research,
.a researcher is able to collect more in-depth information, more 
reliable data, it is easier to establish rapport and an 
understanding of the 'real meaning' of the people's behaviour is 
more likely to happen. On the negative side, there is the 
strong possibility that one is subjective, due to one's member­
ship of the same society or group. Second, one can sometimes 
overlook data due to its familiarity but which is still of 
significance for the research. However, in this regard, it is 
my opinion that this will depend on the training of the researcher 
and his or her personality.
I had no problem in establishing rapport because of my 
knowledge of,the local language (Hindi) and culture. I used a 
mixture of sociological and anthropological techniques and tools 
to collect field data. I collected primary data through 
participant and non-participant observation, a questionnaire 
(for lawyers only), and unstructured interviews with lawyers,
court officials, clients, munshis, touts and relevant government
officials. The secondary data was collected mainly from the 
district judicial and executive courts and from the district 
information office, district statistical office, superintendent 
of police office, the DBA and Civil Bar. Also information was 
gathered from different libraries, mainly the Indian Law 
Institute Library (New Delhi), the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (London), Senate House library at the University 
of London, and the Institute of Legal Studies (London), as well 
as from newspapers published in Muzaffarnagar city.
Although I have doubts about the use of questionnaires in 
collecting data, I did so for the following reasons.
-It was a quick way to collect data about the 
lawyers' social backgrounds, eg, age, religion, 
caste, class, education, rural-urban, specialisa­
tion of law practice, family structure, etc.
I assumed that on these points they would not give 
false information, an assumption which 
bore further checking out.
-I wanted to draw a small representative, 
stratified sample from the larger sample of 
lawyers for a more intensive study and it was 
more convenient to draw this up on the basis 
of the questionnaire list.
-I wanted to find a group of twenty to twenty- 
five lawyers who would not hesitate to answer 
truthfully about their profession and who had 
the time after their work at court to talk to 
me. It was difficult to learn about them 
without personal contact and getting their 
responses to the questionnaire permitted this.
-Through the questionnaire I was able to find 
the five leading lawyers (as named by their 
peers) in the response of Q.23 (see Appendix A).
The sample
I confined the questionnaire largely to the kachahri, where 
the district judicial and executive courts and district
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administrative offices were situated, and where all lawyers 
who practised civil, criminal and revenue law in the district 
courts had their chambers. I got the lists of the District Bar 
Association (DBA) and the District Civil Bar Association (DCBA) 
members from the secretaries of these two Bars. However, I 
found this inadequate to make up the investigation of respondents 
because some members had given up their practice, some did not 
come regularly to the kachahri and some worked at the tehsil.
I therefore conducted my study only of those lawyers who came 
regularly without consideration of their membership in either the 
DBA or the DCBA; and these numbered some 510. I excluded 
taxation lawyers, who had their offices in a different part of 
the city, although I visited some of their offices and the 
office of their Association to collect general information 
about them. After having complete the 510 questionnaires I 
then drew a small representative sample of eight lawyers on the 
basis of their replies about religion, education, age, the 
nature and-length of their practice, and their rural-urban 
origin and so on, for■intensive study of their life histories 
and attitudes about their profession. I also made a study of 
about five clients from each lawyer's 'clientage-bank'.
The administration of and nature of the questionnaire
I personally administered the questionnaires to the lawyers 
and if any one of them felt uncomfortable about filling it out 
I would do it for them. The respondents usually took about half 
an hour to complete the questionnaire and some new facts came 
to my notice during this process. Thus, I found that there 
seemed to be some connection between the way the questionnaire
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was filled up and the social background of the respondant.
Some lawyers hesitated in their response to certain questions.
Who were they? This proved an important question. For instance, 
I observed that those lawyers with a business family background
did not like to give their responses to Q.6, 'Do you have an
income from other sources also?' The Muslim lawyers preferred 
to put down their religion in the column for caste, while they 
were divided in the caste system. Mostly lawyers from the 
lower castes were suspicious about filling in the question­
naires. A Chamar at first left his chamber to avoid me whenever 
I visited it. It was only after having been convinced by his 
colleagues that he did so.
I remained in the kachahri from 10am to 5pm on weekdays
where I usually completed ten to twelve questionnaires. At 
lunchtime I went to the DBA's common room and canteen where I 
had an opportunity for group participation observation and some­
times for non-participant observation. This situation enabled 
me to gain access to the opinions and views of the Bar members 
on a variety of issues, especially on politics and the district 
judiciary. Sometimes, while the courts were in session I 
attended them also. In the evening I visited the residences of 
lawyers, court officials and munshis for interviews. At weekends 
and during holidays I visited different villages to contact 
the clients. Most of the clients were from villages and were 
non-literate so it was impossible to use a questionnaire with 
them. Neither did I use a tape-recorder or take notes when I 
was with them since this would only have made them suspicious 
of me. Instead I interviewed them in an unstructured and 
informal way and wrote up the interviews in my daily note diary
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after the meeting. In the beginning when I found that my Western 
dress also influenced the replies of the village clients I 
started to wear the local dress (kurtaa and pajamaa). I was also 
able to speak the local dialect of the Hindi language. To such 
clients the kind of questions asked were: 'Who was (is) your 
lawyer?', 'How did you find him?', 'How do they decide their 
fees?', 'Are you satisfied with your lawyer's service or have 
you been cheated?', 'Do you maintain a relationship with him 
after the judgement on your case has been passed?', and 'Do you 
think that the modern legal system is better than the traditional 
panchayat system?'
Depending on the situation at the time I used a camera and 
a micro-cassette tape recorder and maintained a daily diary, and 
these were used as the basis for my field notes which I wrote up 
every evening. I attended all the Bar meetings where the lawyers 
could be found and it was fortunate that during the time I was 
in the field a DBA election took place, thus enabling me to 
get a clear picture of factionalism at work in Bar politics and 
the nature of the relationship between colleagues which would 
have been difficult to collect in other ways. I struck up a 
friendship with a young boy who acted as a professional tout 
in the kachahri and sometimes offered him 'imported' cigarettes 
and breakfast. Through him I met his other friends among the touts
r
and was thus able to observe toutism as practised in the kachahri.
Already, before my fieldwork, I knew most of the lawyers and 
their munshis, their social backgrounds and personalities.
However, I designed some questions for the questionnaire which 
would cross-check the replies given to other questions. To some 
extent some of the statements made by the respondents could be
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easily matched with their observed behaviour in the kachahri, 
courts and public meetings. It was also very easy to ask their 
neighbours, friends, colleagues and those less well disposed 
toward’ them about them. Munshis were also important sources 
about their activities. I took one precaution when talking to 
the munshis never to interview them in the presence of their 
employers. For verification of data I used a camera and tape 
recorder as incontrovertible proof. As can be seen, therefore, 
many techniques were used to ensure that I had as faithful a 
picture as was possible of the Muzaffarnagar kachahri. For 
statistical tabulation and correlation I employed the SSPS 
Computer Analysis System (Nie et^  a_l 1975) at the University of 
London Computer Centre.
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CHAPTER ONE: Note
1. An Indian lawyer is called vakil (vakeel; wakil). But the use 
of this term did not previously signify any specific profession. 
v^kil is an Urdu word meaning 'agent1. It was first used in 
Muslim law books in connection with marriage settlement. In the 
early British period vakil meant a personal representative from 
a governor or general to the court of a Nawab or Roya. It was 
also used for the agents of the district collector, zamindar, 
or high official - either Indian or English. With respect to 
the district courts under the Nawabs, vakil also meant an agent 
who represented a party in a law court. After the regulation 
■ establishing pleading as a profession for Indians, vakil meant 
a pleader with legal training, and a licence authorising him to 
practise was necessary.
After the establishment of the high courts in 1862, vakil 
meant a person who had studied law in a university and had pas­
sed the high court vakil's examination. Later it came to mean 
the graduate of a university with an LL.B degree who as a fully- 
fledged advocate can handle work without the assistance of a 
counsel. Under The Advocate Act, 1961, the official term for 
vskil has been accepted as 'advocate'. According to this Act, 
two classes of advocates have been recognised, namely 'senior 
advocates' and 'other advocates'. An advocate designated as 
senior advocate of the Supreme Court or a high court has the 
opinion that by virtue of his/her ability, he is deserving of such 
distinction. However, people still generally use the term vakil 
for a lawyer throughout India. (See Misra 1961:162-3; 
Schmitthener 1968-69:350; The Advocate Act 1961)
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CHAPTER TWO
The definition of and approaches to the study of professions
In this chapter I will deal with the definition of 'profession' and 
the various sociological and anthropological approaches to the 
subject; and then I will put forward my view on the conceptual 
framework to be used in analysing the activities of lawyers in 
Muzaffarnagar.'
1• Towards a definition of profession
A review of the literature written by sociologists and anthropologists 
over the last few decades shows that many definitions of 'profession' 
have been attempted but with little agreement except in the 
description and analysis of the attributes of the role which 
distinguish it from 'non-profession' or 'occupation'. For example, 
Spencer (1885, Col I, Chp VII) included not only lawyers and physicians 
in his list of professions but also dancers, actors, biographers 
and philosophers.
Marshall (1971:310) wrote that 'The idea of a "profession" can 
be traced back to the ancient world, to the Greek image of "the good 
life" and the occupations and activities consistent with it, and to 
the Roman conception of the "liberal arts".' Under this latter 
heading were included mathematics, music, astronomy, and so on (Mayer, 
personal communication). But from this we cannot deduce the current 
definition of the word which can then be applied to all societies.
The definition of the word 'profession' according to Webster's 
New World Dictionary (1972:1134) is a 'vocation or occupation, 
requiring advanced education and training and involving intellectual 
skills, as medicine, law, theology, engineering and teaching, etc.'
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It clearly shows that the word refers to a loosely defined group of 
occupations and that the criteria according to which various occupations 
are included in the category are not very clear - since according to 
this definition we can also include dancers, distillers, car 
mechanics, and so on.
Carr-Saunders (1928:3-13) in his classical work on professions 
wrote that it may be defined as an occupation, based upon specialised 
intellectual training the purpose of which is to supply skilled 
service or advice to others for a set fee or salary. Thus specialised 
intellectual training is one of the criteria for 'profession' and 
definite remuneration another. They added that some features, like 
codes of ethics, are common to all professions and a universal rule 
is the prohibition of self-advertisement. Advertising amongst the 
professions is seen to be an attempt to gain custom by other than the 
legitimate means of proficiency in the profession, by skill and through 
success in dealing with clients. Another universal rule is that which 
aims at making the fee or salary paid by service rendered the sole 
remuneration or advantage which a practitioner receives. He should 
not accept any commission, discounts, allowances or indirect profit.
However, in practice we can see that many professional groups 
accept commissions, discounts and allowances from different agencies, 
and they advertise their skills and recommend to their patients 
those medicines and pharmacies in return for commission in cash or 
kind from the respective drug companies or medicine dealers. American 
lawyers and English engineers also advertise their profession 
services and fees. The Law Society in England has just allowed 
solicitors to advertise themselves. Thus both rules mentioned by 
Carr-Saunders are not justified in practice, perhaps because he had 
in mind only contemporary British society when he wrote.
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The definition of the term profession and its attributes is 
recognisably an 'ideal type', since in actual practice the picture 
always differs. But actual and ideal image are interacting factors 
which I will analyse in the following chapters with reference to the 
professional behaviour of lawyers at district level in the north 
Indian district of Muzaffarnagar, U.P.
Parsons (1954:372) defined profession in sociological terms:
'A profession is a cluster of occupational roles, that is, roles 
in which the incumbents perform certain functions valued in the 
society in general and by these activities typically "earn a living" 
at a "full-time job".' He added that they should have formal training 
and 'technical expertise' in their specific field and for this reason 
they enjoy their professional authority in their field.
But it is not necessary that a professional should be engaged 
in his or her profession full-time and to earn a living. Many 
scientists and professors perform their duty part-time and/or without 
remuneration. Parsons disagrees with the differentiation of 
professions and businessmen on the basis of 'altruistic' and 'egoistic' 
values, a view to which Ritzer (1971:61) also subscribes. Parsons 
(ib:34-42) mentioned that both professionals and businessmen were 
equally acquisitive and altruistic, and that they had three basic 
characteristics in common - rationality, functional specificity, and 
a universalistic character. Both also played their social roles 
within institutionally defined limits. So, according to Parsons, it 
is very difficult to distinguish between the two since in many 
situations businessmen also become service oriented (altruistic) as, 
for example, when they provide denoted property to poor people or for 
any social service. In this way the contrast between them lies not 
in the motivation but in the 'definition of the situation' which is
institutionally provided for their respective members. As he also 
pointed out (ib:42), 'The institutional pattern governing professional 
activity does not, in the same sense, sanction the pursuit of self 
interest as the corresponding one does in the case of business.'
Though I agree with Parsons' arguments, the same problem we had 
with Carr-Saunders also applies to him. Parsons is only concerned with 
American society, particularly the American legal profession, and it 
is difficult to apply his arguments to all societies and professions. 
For instance, the American lawyer's role is different in many 
respects to that of the British lawyer (see Berle 1963:340-55,
Morrison 1982:101).
Barber (1963:671) mentioned four essential attributes of a 
profession: (i) A high degree of generalised and systematic know­
ledge; (ii) Primary orientation to the community interest rather than 
to individual self-interest; (iii) A high degree of self-control of 
behaviour through codes of ethic internalised in the process of work 
socialisation and through voluntary associations organised and operated 
by the work specialists themselves; and (iv) A system of rewards 
(monetary and honorary) that is primarily a set of symbols of work 
achievement and thus ends in themselves, not means to some end of 
individual self-interest. After a review of sociological literature 
on occupations, Greenwoord (1957:45-55) also identified five common 
features of a profession: (i) Systematic theory; (ii) Authority;
(iii) Community sanction; (iv) Ethical codes; and (v) a Culture.
The following is a brief resume of these attributes:
(i) A body of systematic theory: A systematic theoretical background
serves as a base in terms of which the professional rationalises his 
operations in concrete situation. Thus the preparation for a profes­
sion involves considerable pre-occupation with systematic theory, and
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this feature is virtually absent in the training of a non-professional. 
Orientation in theory can be achieved best through formal education 
in the academic setting. Theoretical knowledge is more difficult to 
master than operational procedures. For example it is easier to 
learn to repair an automobile than to learn the principles of the 
internal combustion engine. The theoretical background develops 
rationality in the behaviour of professionals (Greenwood 1957).
(ii) The professional authority: In the relationship of shop­
keeper and customer, the customer determines what services or 
commodities he wants, and he has to judge for himself what he needs.
In the doctor-patient or lawyer-client relationship, however, the 
professional dictates what is good or bad for the patient or clients, who 
has no choice but to accede to professional judgement because clients 
have no theoretical knowledge and licence and the client derives a 
sense of security from the professional's assumption of authority.
Parsons (1954:42) calls this professional authority 'functional 
specificity'. It means he has a specific role in the society which
not everyone can do. In Weberian terms we can say professional 
authority is 'legitimate authority'. The professionals possess this 
authority due to their formal training.
(iii) Community sanction: Anybody can claim that he or she is 
a carpenter or sweeper, but nobody can say that they are a doctor or 
a lawyer. For a profession some qualifications are necessary and 
these may have either formal or informal privileges attached to them. 
Therefore, when an occupation strikes towards professional status one 
of its prime objectives is to acquire this monopoly or community 
sanction. It is important, I believe, to distinguish profession from 
occupation, since in every modern society there exists a hierarchy
of occupations. In this context Turner and Hodge (1970:30) say that 
a direct method of attempting to measure the degree of public recog-
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nition is to ask representative samples of people. This will mean 
probing for the ways in which people classify and categorise occupations, 
the images they have of these occupations or professions, their view 
of the value and utility of the latter, their overall rating of the 
occupations and their experience of contact with occupational or 
professional personnel. I believe we will find that ranking by people 
or professions or occupations will differ according to their culture.
(iv) The ethical codes: The professional ethical codes, partly
formal and partly informal, largely define the appropriate professional 
behaviour with respect to their clients, colleagues and society.
Greenwood (1957:45-55) pointed out that through its written and 
unwritten ethical codes the profession's commitment to social welfare 
becomes a matter of public records, thereby ensuring for itself the 
continued confidence of the community without which the profession 
could not retain its monopoly. Self-regulative codes are characteristic 
of all occupations, as well as professional ones. However, a 
professional code is perhaps more explicitly systematic, it 
certainly possesses more altruistic values and is more concerned 
about public welfare. Towards the client the professional must assume 
an emotional neutrality or objectivity. He must provide service to 
whomever requests it, irrespective of the requesting client's age, 
sex, caste, class, race, kinship, social status, and so on. He 
should follow a rational and humanitarian outlook. Parsons (ib:41) 
calls this elements in professional conduct 'universalism', and gives 
the example of a heart specialist who has to decide whether a given 
person who comes to his office is eligible for a relatively permanent 
relationship with him as his patient. So far as the decision is 
taken on technical professional grounds the relevant questions do not 
relate to whom the patient is but to what the matter is with him. The 
basis of the decision will be 'universalistic', ie, the considsration
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of whether he has symptoms which indicate a pathological condition 
of the heart rather than whose son, husband, or friend he is in this 
context. The professional must not use his position of authority 
to exploit or cheat his clients or patients for personal benefit, and 
he should not discuss the competence of his colleagues with clients 
or patients. Greenwood (1957) and Marshall (1971:312) mention 
that the colleague relationship among professionals should be based 
on positive supportive, co-operative and egalitarian values. Any new 
information of relevance to that profession should be commicated 
amongst them or to the professionals' association. Self discipline 
is also considered a necessity, with mutual respect between senior 
and junior members. If a lawyer or doctor refers his client or 
patient to any of his colleagues due to lack of time or skill he 
should not charge any fee or commission from either for this. They 
should follow their association's rules and regulations.
So, in contrast to the non-professional, the professionals 
are seen to be motivated less by self-interest and more by the 
impulse to perform their role to the best of their ability - they must 
be prepared to render their services upon request, even at the 
expense of personal convenience.
(v) The professional culture: What distinguishes one profession
from another? or from an occupation? Greenwood (1957) suggests that 
each may be viewed as a 'sub-culture'. Given that each profession 
has its own values, norms and symbols we can consider it a culture, 
which with respect to the culture of the society becomes a 'sub-culture'. 
Greenwood considers the unquestioned premises of the professional 
group its 'social values', which can primarily be said to be its 
consideration of the service it offers the community as unique and 
absolutely necessary to the latter's welfare and progress and also to 
the value of rationality - this is its 'commitment to objectivity' and 
refusal to allow either theory or technique to be 'sacred and unchal-
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lengeable' . According to Ritzer (1975:633) Weber regarded profes- 
sionalisation as an aspect of the process of rationalisation. The 
effect of these values is to put the profession in a position in 
which it sees itself as infinitely wiser and more capable in dealing 
with its subject matter than the public.
The professional culture's norms are how the members should 
behave in social situations. The guidelines refer to intra-professional 
relationships, daily routine in acquiring or dealing with clients, 
the ways of entering, moving through and leaving the profession and so 
on. Norms also refer to the way the group deals with changing its 
techniques and theories.
For the third characteristic of a professional sub-culture, its 
symbols, Greenwood includes its insignias, emblems, dress, history, 
folklore, heroes and villains, and its stereotypes of not only itself 
but also those with whom it reacts - the clients and the layman.
The values, norms and symbols of non-professional occupations 
are not, however, clear enough to allow each to be separately 
classified as a sub-culture. Durkheim (1957:14) also said that 
without morality a group cannot function and the sanction of 
society for any moral rule is essential. How does a newcomer into 
a profession begin his career? There are certain rules and norms 
for the socialisation of the professional man, therefore the trans­
formation of a newcomer into a professional is essentially an 
acculturation process wherein he or she internalises the professional 
culture. The idea of a 'career' is, as a rule, also an important 
part of a profession's culture, the main point in the professional 
career is a certain attitude towards work which is peculiarly prof­
essional. Greenwood (ibid) mentioned that a 'career' is basically 
a calling, a life devoted to 'good work' for the professional, and,
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in a sense, his work is his life.
Thus, after examining the different definitions of profession 
and associated attributes, I have come to the following conclusion.
With respect to each of the attributes, the true difference between 
a profession and a non-professional occupation will be shown to be not 
a qualitative but a quantitative one. In other words, they are not 
the exclusive monopoly of the professionals since non-professional 
occupations also possess them but to a lesser degree. For instance, 
Goode (1965:902-3) and Barber (1963:637) have suggested that two 
main features of a profession are prolonged specialised training in 
a body of abstract knowledge and a collective or service orientation. 
But occupations may rank high on one of these and low on the other.
For instance, nursing ranks high on the variable of service orientation 
but has been unable to demonstrate that its training is more than 
a lower level of medical education. Correspondingly, various 
occupations have been steadily moving upwards on both dimensions. For 
example, social work, public accountancy and librarianship, etc.
Etzioni (1969) categorises such occupations as 'semi-professions' and 
Barber (1963:676) calls them 'marginal professions'. So the dividing 
line between 'occupation' and 'profession' is hazy and it varies 
between cultures and over time. However, it is true that at present 
usually lawyers, doctors, engineers and professors are classified as 
professions in all countries. In ancient time in Europe, the vocations 
which we call professions never formed distinct social groups and 
they were not in a dependent position. Even in medieval times they 
were under the dominance of the church. So the church was the only 
occupation before the industrial revolution in Europe which gave 
people without unearned income the opportunity to make a living which 
did not entail commerce or manual work (see Carr-Saunders & Wilson 
1933:470-880).
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In the 'hierarchy of occupation' of a particular society, those 
occupations which have high status are usually considered professions 
by the people and those with low status are categorised as occupations. 
For example, in England nursing is a profession but in India it has 
a low status. During the first years of the film industry in India 
acting was considered a low status occupation, but now people consider 
it as a profession since it has gained a high status, although in India 
formal training or a degree is not a necessary qualification for an 
acting career.
In the Indian context, when we look at the traditional occu­
pational structure, it is indeed difficult to separate the term 
profession from occupation since in Hindi the terms yayasay, kaam, 
dhandaa or pesaa all mean 'job' and all have similar connotations. 
However, chakari is used for those who do a lowly job for their
employer. The terms dhandaa and pesaa are used in a bad sense also
(eg, for prostitution). Those people who are not familiar with the 
English term 'profession' use pesaa or dhandaa when referring to the 
legal, medical or acting professions. The term naukari (in the sense 
of 'service'), when it is linked to a high status and does not involve 
manual labour, can be held to mean profession in the same sense as 
in Europe. Singer (1971:1) rightly pointed out that occupations in 
South Asian countries are more than just jobs, they are ways of life, 
or, we can say, 'occupational cultures'. That is, they have 
distinctive sets of values, beliefs and social institutions that have 
become associated with the practice of a particular occupation. In
India specialisation of work and division of labour are still 
de-limited by family, caste, religious sect or region, and the ranked 
hierarchy of occupations in terms of ritual, prestige and power. In 
contemporary India professions, in the Western cultural sense of the
-62-
term, were established over the last two centuries. But this new 
professional culture was not supplanted wholesale, the Indian version 
was that produced by the interaction with the traditional occupational 
culture.
In conclusion, it is difficult to give any definition of 
'profession' at this stage. Even Harries-Jenkins (1970:50-9) noted 
twenty-two attributes of a profession. However, the following 
constitutes my own 'ideal type' working definition: 'The professions
are semi-autonomous, self-organised occupational groups which possess 
high status in society, a culture of their own, systematic training 
and rationality in their roles, and a commitment to society's general 
welfare.'
I will examine this ideal type and its associated attibutes in 
the 'actual' behaviour of lawyers with specific reference to the 
lawyer-client relationship in the Indian context. That is, I will 
look at to what degree the Indian lawyers are ideal professionals 
and how far they differ from this.
2. Different approaches to the study of professions 
In both sociological and anthropological literature three main 
paradigms or approaches have been used to study professions: the 
processual paradigm, the power paradigm, and the structural-functional 
paradigm. Although most scholars treat these paradigms as mutually 
exclusive, they are basically complementary. Together they provide us 
with a comprehensive understanding of professions.
The processual paradigm was followed mainly by the sociologists 
of the Chicago school, with the major work produced by Hughes (1958). 
It focuses on the historical stages giving rise to professionalisation 
as well as the ongoing process that characterises contemporary 
professionalism. This approach identifies the processes an occupation
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undergoes as it becomes professionalised and has been further developed 
in recent writing.
Goode (1965:902-14) pointed out that when an occupation 
becomes more professionalised it acquires the traits of a profession 
and more sociological characteristics:
i) The profession determines its own standards of 
education and training, 
ii) The professional student goes through a more far-
reaching adult socialisation which is more expensive 
than for other occupations,
iii) The professional practice is often legally recognised 
by some form of licence, 
iv) The licensing and admission boards are composed of 
highly qualified members of the profession concerned.
v) Legislation concerned with the profession is 
shaped by that profession.
vi) The income, power and prestige of a profession 
determines the quality of recruitment.
.vii) The practitioner is relatively free of lay evaluation 
and control.
viii) The norms of practice are formed by the profession
and are more stringent than legal control,
ix) The members are more strongly identified with and 
attached to the profession than are members of other 
occupations with theirs.
x) The profession is more likely to be a terminal
occupation, members do not care to leave it, and a 
higher profession asserts that if they had to leave 
it they are entitled to re-enter it again.
Goode added that these characteristics are closely inter-related. 
So one important part of the process by which an occupation becomes 
a profession is the gradual institutionalisation of various role 
relationships between itself and other parts of society.
Four main areas of analysis which should be pursued to develop
useful insights'into the process of professionalisation were also
suggested by Turner and Hodge (1970:24). These were
i) The degree of independent existing theory and 
techniques in the practising of professional or 
semi-professional activities.
ii) The degree of monopoly claimed by professional or 
semi-professional activities,
iii) The degree of external recognition of the 
profession or semi-professions.
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iv) The degree of organisation of a profession or semi­
profession.
Wilensky (1964:141) also described very similar steps. This 
four-fold scheme is important to understand the character of a 
movement in America and other European countries whereby several 
occupational associations lay claim to professional status. However, 
in the Indian context most so-called professions did not develop from 
occupations. There were for instance doctors (hakim or vaidh) in 
ancient India and these still exist, but they do not possess profes­
sional characteristics - for example, it is not necessary for them 
to have a formal training or a degree. For the legal profession the 
administration of justice in ancient India was purely the concern of 
the raja and anybody could enter the raja's court to give evidence or 
arguments. The relatives and friends could defend the plaintiff and 
the same prevailed during the Mughal period. This history of the 
modern legal profession in India can be said to have begun in 1872, when 
the British government established the first court in Bombay.
The processual approach is limited in the understanding it can 
provide in the Indian context, professions here having emerged in a 
different way. However, it can be applied to the recent past since 
their development has tended to follow along Western lines.
In the power paradigm the main focus is on the use of power by 
the profession to gain and retain its privileged position in the 
society. Marxists scholars follow this approach and they see 
professions as a privileged class of society enjoying resources at 
the expense of the depressed classes (see, for example, Mills 1951, 
Bottomore 1965, Freidson 1970, Sharma 1982a, Misra 1961, Rowe 1968-9, 
Ben-David 1964, Schumpeter 1951, and Illich et al 1977).
Misra and Rowe consider that lawyers constitute a 'new middle
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class' in India and some call it the 'white-collar class' which emerged 
during the British period. Nevertheless, at present it is difficult 
to consider them as part of the class system, as these Marxists would 
suggest, if we take class as a property relation. They form the 
professional status group under the wider category of the occupational 
structure of the society because they enjoy their high status due 
to their professional authority. Marshall (1950) and Carr-Saunders 
and Wilson (1933) take the same view. To be considered professional as 
a status group Weber (1947:428) mentioned four main criteria for a 
'social status group', which rests on one or more of the following 
bases: their mode of living, the formal process of education which 
may consist in empirical or rational training and the acquisition of the 
corresponding modes of life,' and, lastly, the prestige of birth or of 
an occupation. The lawyer's professional authority (his power) is 
based on rational grounds. Carr-Saunders and Wilson saw in the 
professions a sign of the emergence of a new type of occupational 
structure exempted from the capitalist relationships of production and 
regulated by collective control rather than individual competition for 
profit - as exemplified by the rise of the managerial class. Relation­
ships between clients and professional are conceived as primarily 
co-operative rather than competitive exchange, but it is also true that 
in actual practice some professional groups individuals exploit the 
clients or patients in some situations and in some societies, as I will 
explain in the context of the Indian lawyer-client relationship in the 
following chapters.
In the third paradigm, that which uses the structural-functional 
mode of explanation, professionals are seen as distinct from other 
occupational groups in terms of specific attributes, value orientations, 
specialised knowledge, service, ethic and in emphasising the importance
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of the colleague relationship and control over their activities.
Here the focus is on the structure and function of the professional 
group, which distinguishes the profession from all other occupations.
For example, Parsons (1954) viewed the professional organisation, 
behaviour, ethic and ideology as (positively) 'functional' for the 
maintenance of orderly social relationships. Parsons's analysis 
still relates professions to the total social structure. He writes 
in regard of the legal profession, 'The sociologist must regard the 
activities of the legal profession as one of the very important 
mechanisms by which a relative balance of stability is maintained in 
a dynamic and rather precariously balanced society1 (1954:385). So 
lawyers through legal codes maintain the total social order of the 
society.
Most of the studies on professions have been conducted on the 
basis of the structural-functional paradigm. This approach emphasises 
the internal structure of the role and its relationship to individual 
or organisational behaviour. Merton's (1957:368) role-set analysis 
shows that role performance is a response to different and often 
conflicting expections, systematised and made explicit. Role analysis 
seems to be a particularly useful tool for the description and analysis 
of socialisation into the professions.
Ritzer (1975) and Greenwood (1957) stated that there is a 
professional continuum with occupations at the professional end of 
the continuum having more of the defining characteristics than those 
occupations that stand at the non-professional end. In this way they 
combined the processual and structural-functional paradigms. Ritzer 
(1975:627-37) claims that Weber was the first sociologist who 
understood that a professional group must be viewed from the structural, 
processual and power perspectives combined. However, this is inaccurate
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Weber (1968:425) considered the priesthood as the ideal-typical 
profession and this does not fit into the category of 'profession' as 
used in contemporary society.
In the context of my study the structural-functional paradigm 
fails to solve the question of how a lawyer recruits his clients for 
practice ('business') or how a client chooses a particular lawyer.
A role-based approach though can deal with this question. It can show, 
for instance, how both parts of the 'action set' interact within the 
formal organisation of the legal system and how the lawyer's behaviour 
becomes increasingly 'non-professional' and lowers the prestige of 
the profession. I believe a formal organisation may not always be 
able to operate without informal groups and, moreover, that such ties 
would prove especially functional in such situations where the formal 
institutions are less structured, especially at the peripheral parts of 
the social system. This is certainly so within the Asian context.
In India we would find that the roles of caste, kinship, religion, and 
region are very important in making up informal groups within the 
functioning of the formal organisation or bureaucratic structure.
Blau (1956;1964) also rejected Weber's ideal treatment of bureaucracy 
as a formal organisation and he pointed out that actual activities (of 
people in formal organisations) do not exactly follow the formal 
blueprint. So to understand how bureaucracy functions we must 
observe it in action.
In short, the static structural-functional paradigm does not 
work at the level at which real people interact. Boissevain (1974:5) 
writes that through the structural-functional paradigm we can under­
stand the pattern of social relations and how they are maintained, but 
we cannot understand how such patterns emerge and how they change.
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The 'network' approach
In this context the use of 'social network' as a conceptual tool 
of analysis has emerged in sociology and social anthropology as a 
response to a growing doubt as to the adequacy of the structural- 
functional approach, particularly in the study of complex societies, 
during the last three decades.
Barnes's study (1954) on class and committees in the Norwegian 
island of Brerrnes is just such an example. The term 'network' was 
in fact first used by Radcliffe-Brown (1952:190-200) when he 
mentioned that the social structure was a 'network of actually 
existing social relations’ and it was maintained by a convergence 
of interests or at least a 'limitation of conflicts' which arise 
from a divergence of interests. In some cases the structure (the 
relationship of different parts) could be defined by a single criteria, 
as for instance in an Australian tribe, where the whole social 
structure is based on a 'network' of such relations of person to 
person (on the basis of genealogy). Boissevain (1973:viii) wrote that 
'the basic postulate of the network approach is that people are 
viewed as interacting with others, some of whom in their turn interact 
with each other and yet others, and that the whole network of 
relations so formed is in a state of flux. The approach makes no 
explicit assumptions about the nature of the interactions (linkages), 
though those who use this concept are constantly seeking patterns 
and formulating and testing hypothes© regarding such patterns and 
their effects on behaviour'. Kapferer (1973:84) also gave a definition 
for the term 'network'. He saw it as a set of points (individuals) 
defined in relation to an initial point of focus (ego) and linked by 
lines (relationships), either directly or indirectly, to this initial 
point of focus.
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In fact, the main attraction of the network approach, 
particularly amongst social anthropologists, is that it promises a 
way of explaining social process and change.
Barnes (1954) was the first person who used the social network 
approach in a systematic way in his study of the Norwegian island 
parish of Bremnes. His main interest was in the analysis of social 
class and he identified three types of social relationship in the 
people of the parish. The concepts he used were that of social 
network and set. He classified two types of social network, the 
'unbounded' social network, which centred on a single person, ego, and 
the 'bounded' social network which he called a 'set'. He wrote that 
for the people of the island the first type of social relationship 
was.exemplified by their working relationships within the industrial 
system. The second type of social relationship they were involved 
in was by dint of their occupying a place in a territorial system of 
relationships. But in addition to these there was a set of personal 
relationships which interfused and cross-cut the set of relationships 
in the industrial and territorial systems. This third type of social 
relationship was based on friendship, kinship and the neighbourhood, 
and the most important feature about them was that they were likely 
to be distinctive for each person in the community, being based on 
the personal choice of the individual concerned.
Bott (1957) conducted her study using the conceptual framework 
of Barnes in thepcontext of families in London. She attempted to 
relate variations in conjugal roles to different kinds of network and 
distinguished between 'close-knit' and 'loose-knit' networks. A close- 
knit network is defined as one in which there are many relationships 
between its component units: in a family which has a close-knit 
network many of its friends, neighbours and kin will know one another
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and such a network has a high degree of connectedness. By contrast 
a loose-knit network exists where friends, neighbours and kin are 
not know to each other and the degree of connectedness is therefore 
slight.
Epstein (1969:110) found this classification inadequate when 
applied to his Rhodesian field data. His finding suggested that it was 
not necessary for every link in the network to possess the same
density. Thus it may not be connected in its totality, but could
still be highly connected in its parts. He classified (1969:77-116) 
two types of social network: the 'effective' network and the 
'extended' network. According to him the effective network was made 
up of those people known to ego who are also known to each other. In 
the extended network he included people who were known to ego but not to 
other members of ego's network and who in turn knew other people. In 
this way Epstein discussed the question of variation in different 
parts of a network according to the amount of interaction. But when
he mentioned (ibid:111) that in the effective network the nature of
relationships is for status differentiation to be minimised and in the 
extended network interaction takes place between approximate social 
equals, this is not necessarily true. The nature of relationships 
will be governed by the group's or society's stratification system. 
Wheeldon (1969) also used Epstein's typology of networks in his 
study. He added (p.132) that people with whom ego has a relationship 
in which may be distinguished three or more strands (a multiplex 
relationship) were also his effective network. But people with whom 
ego has a relationship based on only one or two strands were included 
in his extended network.
Two types of social network were suggested by Trouwort (1973: 
113-23) within the exchange theory framework. One is based on
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horizontal ties (the beer and food exchange among the Burundi people) 
and the second is based on the vertical relationship (the client-patron 
relationship) in which the gift of a cow establishes a lasting 
relationship between the person who gives the cow - the patron - and 
the person who receives the gift - the client; and a man can be both patron 
and client at the same time in relation to different people. He saw 
both types of network forming the basis for the recruitment of an 
action-set, but did not explain which type of relationship (horizontal 
or vertical) would be more important for an ego in recruiting members
for his action set or network.
On the basis of the interaction framework Boissevain (1968:542-56) 
distinguished three zones of a network - the intimate, effective, and 
extended zones. In the intimate zone he included the persons with whom 
ego is on intimate terms; the effective network is composed of those 
people with whom ego has less intimate relationships; and in the 
extended network were those whom ego does not know personally but who 
he could contact if he wanted to through other intermediaries or zones. 
Boissevain (1973:125-50) compared the personal networks of a 
townsman and someone from the countryside to trace the impact of the 
macro-environment (both socio-cultural and physical) via this structure 
on their behaviour and personality. He found a difference of environmental
effect between the two in their behaviour and social relationships with
others. In other words, he examined the interaction between small- 
scale society and large-scale society through the network approach 
based on interaction theory.
Mitchell (1973:15-35) identified three types of relationship 
with which he suggested we could explain our field data. These were,
(a) 'The structural order', which.means the behaviour of 
people is explained in terms of actions appropriate to the position
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they occupy in an ordered set of positions, for instance, in a 
factory, a family, and in -a political party, and so on;
(b) 'The categorical order' of relationships, in which the 
behaviour of people in an unstructured situation may be interpreted 
in terms of social stereotypes such as class, race, ethnicity and 
so on; and
(c) 'The personal order' of relationships, in which the behaviour 
of people in -either structured or unstructured situations may be 
explained in terms of the personal links individuals have with
a set of people and the relationships these people have in turn amongst 
themselves and with others, such as the social network.
He mentioned that these three types of social relationships 
are not three different types of actual behaviour, however, but rather 
three different ways of making abstractions from the same actual
behaviour. Further, he suggested that in a social network three
kinds of links - contents - can be observed and from these contents 
we can in turn also distinguish social networks. These contents he 
distinguished as follows: communication, exchange and normative. In
social networks contents are all incorporated together in real 
social institutions, for all social interaction involves communication, 
some exchange and evaluation of behaviour in the sense of social 
norms. So whichever aspect we choose to emphasise in our analysis it
will depend upon the nature of the problems in which we are interested.
In the context of the idea of a social network, Mitchell 
(1974:281) raised a question as to whether there was a network theory 
or whether it was simply a tool for data collection. It was his 
personal contention that this approach emerged as a reaction against 
the over-formalisation of the structural-functional approach by 
anthropologists who were studying in complex societies and who
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originally developed their findings within the framework of a compact 
institutional analysis typical of the static structural-functional 
paradigm. Whitten and Wolfe (1974) also argued that there are 
several modifications to this dissatisfaction with the structural- 
functional approach and these may be classified as two main types.
First there are some scholars who have seen the solution to the 
inadequacy of structural theories in modifying the existing concepts 
like role and role-relationships, for example, Merton's work (1957) 
and Nadel (1957). The second group of scholars are called transac­
tional theorists and they emphasise individual behaviour. There are 
several different types of transactional theorist. Some, like 
Wolfe (1966:16), Barth (1966) and Paine (1971), stressed dyadic, 
patron-client and brokerage relationships. Others, like Trouwborst 
(1973), Homans (1951) and Blau (1964), developed the social exhcnage 
approach. All transactional theorists are mainly concerned with the 
way in which individuals manipulate their social relationships to 
achieve their ends. These sorts of studies have mainly been conducted 
in the political field. Mitchell calls them 'action theorists', but 
Cohen (1974, and confirmed personally) does not distinguish the two, ie, 
action and transactional theorists. I believe both overlap. Barnes 
(1972:3) and Kapferer (1969:182) also comment that because the concept 
of network and other associated concepts have recently become 
popular the terminological confusion has greatly increased. Kapferer 
used the term 'reticulum' instead of the term 'network'.
To sum up, the social network approach has been used in two ways: 
as a system of relations which impinges upon individuals and influences 
their behaviour, and as a series of relations through which people 
achieve their ends. Barnes (1971) and Bott (1957) agree that the 
idea of a network can be used in many conceptual frameworks.
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Kapferer (1973:108) also argues that the notion of a social network 
is simply a technique of data collection and analysis. He himself 
followed exchange theory as the basis for network analysis. Wolfe 
(1970:226-44) also mentioned that, 'it is with exchange and action 
theory the notion of network would appear quite abstract, divorced 
from the realities of human life, in a specific social and cultural 
setting'. But Wolfe and Whitten elsewhere (1974) argued that role 
theory may possibly provide the basis upon which propositions may 
be set up in terms of networks, although they themselves did not 
attempt to do this exercise. Mitchell (1974:283) sees the debate as 
being more about words than reality. My personal view is that the 
term social network is confusing simply because there is no consensus 
on its meaning. It is based on well established theories, and 
different field research workers have used it in their framework of 
study, but surely the network approach provides a bridge between 
sociological interpretation of human behaviour and the personal or 
motivational aspect. It is my belief that these scholars have mainly 
been influenced by Weberian action theory and Blau's exchange theory.
Indeed, those social anthropologists or sociologists who have used 
the network approach used it in the context of the whole social field 
of ego. It is difficult, however, to study ego's behaviour in 
any specific field of activity through the network concept. In 
regard of this present study I am mainly concerned with the study of 
ego's (lawyer) linkage with that of alter (the client) in a specific 
field of activity (legal) and not in all social contexts. In other 
words, I am only concerned with a part of ego's network. Thus the 
term network will not be useful here. In this respect, Mayer 
(1966), who analysed the political process in a municipal election 
in central India, used the 'action-set' concept. He saw a 'set' as
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being different in form from the network, for it was centred on 
a single person - ego - and consisted of the people classified by 
him according to a certain criterion. So these people only formed part
of the network - that part which ego recognised as being contained in
the set. He associated the notion of action-set with the concept 
of a quasi-group. This concept has been criticised by Harries-Jones 
(1969:297-347) and Boissevain (1971:468-472). The main basis of 
criticism is that the criteria which are essential to define a quasi- 
group are already contained in the concept of personal network and 
action-set, so there is nothing to add to our understanding of social 
behaviour by identifying the quasi-group. In addition to this 
criticism I would add a criticism of my own to Mayer's classification 
of two types of quasi-group.
Mayer distinguished (1966:97) the classificatory and the interactive 
quasi-group. He mentioned that in the classificatory group all 
members have common interests, but in the interactive group members 
interact on different interests. However, I believe that we cannot 
classify a quasi-group on the basis of interest because in this kind 
of group we can observe some common interests and some different ones 
of the persons who are acting within it. Mayer used the term action-set
for an interactive quasi-group which is made up of a series of
action-sets. Nevertheless he (ibid:99) also wrote that both types of 
set (classificatory and interactive) are similar in that they are 
ego-centred and may contain intermediaries between ego and the terminal 
individuals. Barnes (1954:43) also used the term 'set' with network, 
as I mentioned earlier. He wrote, 'I find it convenient to talk of a 
social field of this kind as a network. The image I have is of a 'set1 
of points, some of which are joined by lines. The points of the image 
are people or sometimes groups and the lines indicate which people 
interact with each other.... (A) network of this kind has no external
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boundary'. In this analysis Barnes used set in the sense of nodes of 
a network and Mayer rightly pointed out that Barnes used the word 
in an indefinite way. So the bounded and unbounded entitites of the 
action-set are not clear in Barnes's analysis and these sets can 
therefore be categorised as classificatory sets.
Mayer (ibid) used action-set for the way in which a candidate 
(ego) mobilised support to win the election through a variety of 
relationships and the action-set of an ego had a known boundary. Thus 
he used the action-set in a specific context of an activity (political) 
which provided the terms of ego's purpose in forming linkages. Some 
of the features of an action-set that he mentioned were as follows:
i) At any given time the component units of a set have a 
known boundary, because each is known to each other 
either directly or through an intermediary;
ii) There are many bases of linkages, eg, kinship, caste, 
religion, political, and so on. It may even be based - 
though not always - on group membership;
iii) Those people who have a direct link with ego constitute 
the simple action-set and the term complex action-set 
is used for people who are linked to intermediaries 
who are themselves in direct contact with ego;
iv) The action-set is a bounded entity. However, it is
not a group and the action-set could not exist without 
the ego around whom it is formed; and
v) The action-set is a temporary phenomenon, not like a 
group, although the 'outward' aspect are those of 
continuing role-relationships. For example, caste, 
village membership, and so on. And the 'inward' 
aspect is that of a linkage based on a specific 
purposive impulse which is created from ego. He 
added that in the future some people can remain in 
the action-set or some can leave it.
Barnes's criticisms do not hold when he writes (1969:69) 
that some of the characteristics of action-sets which Mayer deduced 
may not be found in all possible action-sets. Holmstrom (1976:93) found 
the action-set approach useful in his study of a municipal election in 
south India. He commented that, 'if links in an action-set have 
both an ideological and a transactional component, why not build both
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into our model?1 He analysed the role of ideology in linkages of 
action-sets. I also think we should consider ideological aspects of 
linkages when we are dealing with structure and interactional aspects 
of an action-set.
In the context of the present study this approach appears to be 
useful for understanding informal aspects of the legal system. Does 
the social background of lawyers affect the structure (ie, size, 
composition, field of activity, etc) and interaction aspects of their 
'professional recruitment set'? What are the bases of linkage between 
lawyers and client? How does a lawyer maintain his relationship with 
clients? What roles do the values of tradition and modernity play in 
their relationships? To answer such questions I will use the above- 
mentioned approach, but it needs some modification to give the answers 
we are looking for. It is true that in the lawyer's (ego's) professional 
recruitment-set both parties are known to each other directly and they 
may be in contact through intermediaries (for example, touts, brokers, 
kin, etc), so this type of set has a known boundary. A lawyer may 
recruit his clients on many different bases, for example, caste, 
region, religion, kinship, friendship, and so on, and sometimes the 
linkage can be based on group membership, for example, the lawyer 
and client may belong to the same political party or club. The 
nature of the lawyer's 'recruitment-set' can be simple or complex, and 
the lawyer's relationship with his client is normally temporary, 
although it can sometimes extend into the future. My modification to 
the concept of 'action-set' is therefore as follows.
Normally it is deemed to have formed at a specific time, and 
when ego's purpose is accomplished, for example after winning the 
election or performing a religious ceremony, the relationship is 
broken. However, in the lawyer's case the lawyer recruits his clients
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for a specific purpose (to get business) but not at any single time.
He continues to recruit his clients throughout his whole professional 
life. So Mayer's concept of the action-set is not helpful in explaining 
how ego (the lawyer) maintains his relationships with clients and 
in what situations they break them. To deal with such types of questions 
I will use the 'professional recruitment-set' concept. I would like 
to analyse this process in two ways, from the point of view of ego 
(the lawyer) and from the view of alter (the client). For the district 
courts of Muzaffarnagar city, UP, the bases on which the client 
chooses his lawyer I will call 'resource-set' for analytical purposes, 
to differentiate it from the lawyer's recruitment-set although 
theoretically both types of sets are the same. The main emphasis 
will be from the point of view of ego (ie, the lawyer). I will also 
look at the interaction between tradition and modernity in the 
linkage process or, as Parsons put it, the interaction between 
particularistic and universalistic values. Although I believe that 
tradition-modernity is not a dichotomy, in explaining the direction 
of social change I consider it a useful conceptual framework. It is 
especially important in relation to the Indian legal system. As 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1967:254) wrote, modernity and tradition were 
more opposed in the context of the law than they were in the context of 
social structure and political leadership in India.
Conclusion
I have attempted* in this chapter first of all to define the term 
profession and also to delineate its associated attributes. After 
a review of the literature I reached the conlcusion that the difference 
between occupation and profession is a matter of degree which varies 
between cultures and over time. The given definitions were discovered
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to be more in the nature of 'ideal type1 pictures of the professions 
which were slightly different with respect to the actual behaviour 
concerned. Second, scholars have tended to use three approaches, that 
of the processual paradigm, the power paradigm, and the structural- 
functional paradigm. But there is no single study which used 
the network approach in studying the relationship between the 
professional and his clients or patient as a process. I am making the 
present study a part of the network approach by using the notion of 
the professionals' recruitment-set. It means a set of people (the 
clients) whom ego (the lawyer) mobilises on different bases for 
his practice or business.
Mayer (1961) and Boissevain (1973:125-48) found the environment, 
both socio-cultural and physical, influences the composition and 
structure of a person's (ego's) social network. So to explain the 
structure and interactive aspects of the professional's recruitment-set 
it is necessary to know first their social background. Carlin (1966) 
also conducted a study on American lawyers and found that 
structural factors are responsible for non-ethical behaviour of the 
lawyers. In the next chapter I will therefore deal with the social 
background of lawyers at Muzaffarnagar city, classified in terms of 
their caste, age, religion, class, education, rural or urban origins, 
nature of family, and so on, and explore how it affected their 
behaviour and relationships with their clients.
CHAPTER THREE
The kachahri of Muzaffarnaqar City
This chapter looks at the physical setting of the kachahri and the 
history of the District Bar in order to show how these two factors 
influence the social interaction between the people within the 
kachahri premises. It will then examine the lawyers' social back­
ground before-asking why people joined or did not join the profession.
1. The physical setting of the kachahri
The kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city is located in the centre of 
the city. The term 'kachahri' denotes the walled-in or otherwise 
demarcated buildings of the district courts, district administrative 
offices and the bistraas (chambers)3 of the lawyers (vakil), petition- 
writers and typists and the offices of the Bar, These, in the 
kachahri of Muzaffarnagar, are the courts of the district judge, 
sessions judges and munsifs, civil judges, the chief judicial 
magistrate, the juvenile judge, the district magistrate, the sub- 
divisional magistrates (SDMs) and the offices of the district collector, 
superintendent of police, district information officer, Zila Parisad 
(District Board), district treasury officer, district consolidation 
officer, District Bar Association (DBA), and District Civil Bar 
Association (DCBA). Besides these courts and offices there are some 
ten restaurants and cigarette-betel shops, a police station, post 
office and a residential colony for the judiciary and district 
officials as well as a mosque and a Hindu temple within the boundary 
of the kachahri. In these latter two some of the litigants go to 
pray to God for the success of their cases. During lunch-time the 
Muslim lawyers and litigants go to the mosque for prayer (namaaz)
-81-
►  Q >
> t»; o
imple.
D D30 D D
oA
• CL,
I
Key
= court
0 = residence
t?- - government office
f*>pg = lawyers' offices
The sketch map of the kachahri
1. A view over the kachahri
2. A prominant lawyer, who is more than seventry years old 
going to the court
-83-
and it also serves as a meeting place for all of them. The lawyers, 
stamp-vendors, petition-writers, oath officers (notary), and typists 
sit under tin roofs in straight lines of stalls which are called 
chambers (bistra). The size of these chambers is on average about 
three by two square meters. The chambers or offices are open 
fronted without a door or window. In his office a lawyer will usually 
keep a table, a few chairs and benches (for the clients) and a very 
low table (chauki) for his munshi to sit on and one tin or wooden 
box for documents and papers. Some lawyers provide a hubble-bubble 
pipe (hukkaa) for their clients as well. The spatial location of 
these offices provides a chance for a lawyer to watch or listen to 
the conversation of the lawyers adjacent to him with their clients.
. A lawyer cannot get a chamber without being a member of the 
Bar Association, since all kachahri land belongs to the district 
collector and it is under lease to the Association. This is the main 
reason why lawyers do not make their bistras in modern officer or 
chambers. Whenever a lawyer gives up his practice or retires he 
usually sells his place to a newcomer since land is limited and the 
physical location is also important in attracting village clients.
Over the last two decades the kachahri has become crowded with 
lawyers and this practice takes place despite the fact that it 
contravenes the rules of the Bar Association. Typists and petition- 
writers tend to have their chambers in the (two) lines which exist 
in addition to the lines of the lawyers. Those typists who cannot 
afford to buy a set sit at the entrance to the lawyers' chambers and 
their payment for this is made in cash or through service (eg, free 
typing work) to the lawyer. Not every lawyer who practises in the 
kachahri has a chamber; some share one with their colleagues. The 
chamber is identified by a name-plate. These chambers are very
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similar to merchants' stalls in a bazaar - usually the lawyer sits 
on a chair surrounded by his clients and munshi. In general most 
kachahries over the whole of north India follow the same pattern,
(see Morrison's study on the courts of Ambala city in 1968-69).
In the midst of the lawyers' chambers there is a very big, 150 
year old banyan tree whose shade covers nearly 40 per cent of the 
lawyers' chambers and is very convenient during the hot summer days. 
Alongside these chambers stands the District Bar Association buildings 
which contains a canteen, one photographic studio and copier shop, 
one meeting hall, one restroom and one indoor games room. In the 
upper storey is found the Bar library. At lunchtime and during their 
spare time the lawyers sit here and gossip and play indoor games. 
However, it is only those lawyers with criminal, revenue and general 
law cases who sit in these premises - those who practise only 
civil law have their chambers nearly 100 yards away to the east, across 
the road where the District Civil Bar Association building is situated. 
Most civil lawyers sit on the verandah belonging to the Civil Bar 
building and some have their chambers under a big pipal tree (Ficus 
religosa). The Civil Bar Association building contains a small 
library, a meeting hall and a small restroom for lawyers. The premises 
are very small but similar in layout to those of the District Bar 
Association.
The scene in the kachahri is very like that of a village trade 
fair. From 10am to 5pm nearly seven thousand people enter through 
the four entrance gates every ordinary working day. The litigants 
arrive from all parts of the district in rickshaws, tongas (horse 
drawn two wheelers) and by bicycle. Others come on motorbikes, in 
jeeps and cars and by tractors. The kachahri in effect acts as a 
centre of rural-urban culture and some village leaders and chronic
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litigants (mukadmahbaaz) even come when they have no cases to attend 
but simply to convey the current affairs of their villages to 
their 'permanent' lawyers and to find out what is happening in the 
cityand about others' cases. I noticed that Hindu lawyers and 
litigants prefer to go to Hindu restaurants and Muslims likewise
prefer to go to restaurants run by Muslims.
Most of the court buildings were built before 1950 and during
my fieldwork most of the civil courts were shifted to a new modern
four-storey building. In the kachahri one also finds a social-cum- 
sports club (called the 'service' club) the members of which are 
mainly rich businessmen, officials of the judiciary, district 
administrative officers and rich urban lawyers. Lawyers join usually 
to get to know judges, who will then favour their cases. Should 
any demonstration take place in the city it pays a visit to the 
kachahri since the head of the district administration and the 
police administration have their offices there. The kachahri also 
provides a good platform for demonstrators to spread their message 
amongst the public - who represent all sections of society and 
come from different parts of the district. During fieldwork I 
witnessed seventeen political demonstrations and their common 
feature was that (as I have already mentioned) they were led by 
lawyers, though these were members of different political parties. 
Indeed, over the past two to three years there have been a number 
of demonstrations in the kachahri led by lawyers demanding the 
establishment of a branch of the high court in the western part of 
the State.
Thus the whole scene of the kachahri is like a market place, 
with its specialists in one location so that they can easily 
compete as well as pass information - just as all potters or 
blacksmiths congregate in the bazaar.
3. These rural litigants are waiting for the 
called
4. A lawyer provides a hukkaa for his clients while they 
wait in the office for him to return from court
2. The history of the Bar
Historical documents concerning the Bar were unobtainable because, 
according to officials of the Bar Association, one faction had 
stolen all documents relating to the Bar a few years before during 
elections for the Association. Any information concerning the 
history of the Bar was therefore obtained through interviews with 
retired lawyers, in particular one named Pandit Brahm Prakash who 
had been at member of the Legislative Council of the State
and who was for many years President of the District Bar Association.
When Pandit Prakash had joined the Bar in 1926 it was already 
seventeen or eighteen years old. It was then known as the 
Collectorate Bar Association and it had hardly thirty members on 
its roll since many lawyers were not concerned about joining.
The Bar room was then very small, with a small library and a main 
room ('hall') which was also occupied by members' law offices.
Other lawyers sat outside under the banyan tree, some east of 
the Bar and the rest across the road under the pipal tree on
a brick-clay platform (chabutras) or in wooden huts. People called
these three places badupuraa, pipal mandi and sepupuraa (puraa 
meaning location). The lawyers' seats (ie, offices) were scattered 
haphazardly, according to Pandit Prakash. In the judiciary there 
were some twenty-three munsifs, one civil judge, the district 
magistrate and collector, and four sub-divisional district magis­
trates (SDMs). The district judge's court was in Meerut city.
During the period of Mr 0 V Lynch, collector and district 
magistrate in 1950, the name of the Collectorate Bar Association 
was changed to that of the District Bar Association (DBA). At that 
time some Civil Bar Association members also joined the DBA. In 
1926 the Civil Bar membership stood at twenty-six, and these came 
from the wealthy families of the city and from the upper castes.
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Twenty-two of them were Banias and Jains, three were upper caste 
Muslim, and one was a Brahman (source: Founding Stone of the Bar 
Association 1926). In 1950 Mr Anokalal was made president of the 
DBA and Mr Shyam Lai was secretary (Souvenir 1983). Mr Shyam 
Lai demolished all the huts and brick-clay platforms at the inspiration 
of the collector and with the help of his colleagues, and built 
chambers (ie, offices) in straight lines of tin sheds with the 
financial help of the Collectorate. They also obtained from the 
collector a large piece of land for a'park beside the Bar building 
which was named the 'Setalvad Park' in 1953.
This name is a reminder of a more than significant event in 
the history of the DBA. In 1950 the members of the Association 
felt aggrieved at the conduct of two judicial officials. The DBA 
passed a strong resolution against those officials and copies 
of this were sent to the State Chief Minister, the Chief Secretary 
to the State government, the commissioner and the collector of the 
district. Instead of taking action to remove the complaints of 
the Bar, the government took action against the executive committee 
of the DBA instead. It filed a contempt of court case in the 
State High Court against these executive members. The High Court 
found the Bar members guilty and it asked the DBA to pay Rs.150 
(nearly £10.03) to the lawyer of the State government as his fee. 
However, the DBA went to the Supreme Court against the judgement 
(faislaa) of the State High Court and they approached Mr M C Setalvad 
who was Attorney General of India and also President of the All 
India Bar Association. He took up the case and applied for special 
leave to appeal, which was given. The bench of judges of the 
Supreme Court found the members of the DBA of Muzaffarnagar district 
not guilty. It was a case in which the entire judiciary of the
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country and the Bars exhibited interest. After the judgement the 
DBA celebrated its victory by holding a grand function to honour 
Mr S C Setalvad. Thus they named the park beside the DBA building 
'Setalvad Park'.
The second main event in the history of the Bar were the 
strikes, hunger strikes, and picketing (dharnaa), which took 
place in 1981 to get a high court bench established in western 
UP state. Every Saturday DBA members refused to go to court, A 
number were arrested in connection with the protests and at the 
time of my fieldwork a case registered by the government against 
them was still pending.
The third main event was the celebration of the DBA's platignum 
jubilee in January 1983, On this occasion they invited the 
Justice of the Supreme Court, the Ambassador of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Minister for Law (Central Government), and 
the Solicitor General of India.
3. The social background of the lawyers
The recruitment pattern of the lawyers to their 'profession' is a 
significant matter which should be investigated, since the social 
background of a professional may influence his/her professional 
role, field of specialisation, political orientation and relation­
ships with colleagues and clients (mawaakkil). This involves an 
inquiry into ’family background, caste, class, region, religion, 
kinship, rural or urban origin, educational qualifications, field 
of practice and the reasons why people enter into the legal 
profession. Most studies on lawyers have been investigated from 
this aspect (eg, Hale 1949; Janstoke ert elL 1967; Shuman 1971;
Arthus ert al 1971; Tomasic jit al 1978; Won et. al_ 1973; and Ladinsky
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1976. And in the Indian context, Morrison 1968-69; Rowe 1968-69; 
Bastedo 1968-69; Kidder 1974; Khare 1971, 1972; Sharma 1981, 1982;
Gandhi 1982; and Sathe _et al^  1983 have conducted field studies into 
this subject).
In this chapter I will sketch the socio-cultural, educational, 
and occupational background of the lawyers of the kachahri of 
Muzaffarnagar city and thus analyse its composition in terms of 
the above-mentioned concepts. The correlation betwen their age 
and caste, between rural/urban origin and the composition of their 
family, between rural/urban origin and the nature of their practice, 
and so on, will also be looked at. In addition to this the socio- 
psychological factors which motivate people to study law and join 
the profession will be outlined.
The organisation of the legal profession in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar comprises three component parts. First, some lawyers 
practise at tehsil courts of the district; second, some practise 
at taxation courts in the city; and third, some practise in the 
criminal, civil and revenue law courts in the kachahri of Muzaf­
farnagar city. The present study has been conducted only with 
respect to the third part, the lawyers who practise in 
Muzaffarnagar’s kachahri in the field of criminal, civil or revenue law 
(all these lawyers have their chambers in the kachahri itself). As 
I have said, there are two Bar Associations in the kachahri compound. 
One is the District Bar Association (DBA) and the other is the 
District Civil Bar Association (DCBA) of which those lawyers who 
practise exclusively in civil law are the members. The enrolled 
number of DCBA members was fifty-eight but only forty-two were in 
practice during my fieldwork. In the DBA the members practise 
on both criminal and revenue sides and the majority of the DCBA
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members were also members of this Bar. In fact, the DCBA was 
only nominal or, in other words, a non-active association. At 
the time of the commencement of this study there were 706 
members in the published list of the DBA and during its elections 
in March 1984 there were 601 members who paid their subscriptions.
Since those members who did not pay their subscription arrears for the 
last three months would, according to a D3A rule, have their 
membership of the Association removed, some members who do not 
practise or who have started other jobs still keep up their 
membership in order to keep their voting rights in the election 
and also for reasons of social prestige. So both lists of the 
D3A and the DCBA members were inadequate from which to select 
the total population of active lawyers for study, as I have 
already mentioned in the first chapter. During fieldwork I 
identified 510 active lawyers out of the total number from both 
Bars. This was done by using as a criteria those who came into 
kachahri regularly, without consideration of their membership 
in either of these two Bar Associations. So the data with regard 
to social background are based on 510 lawyers and were collected 
mainly through a questionnaire (given in the Appendix). This 
sample adopted for study covers the practitioners at the 
Muzaffarnagar kachahri between August 1983 and April 1984.
If we look at the total number of lawyers who practise at 
tehsil level, district level (in the kachahri) and in taxation 
in this district, the number would be roughly one thousand out 
of a population for the district of Muzaffarnagar of 2,274,487 
(Census of India 1981). We can presume that the total population of 
the district of Muzaffarnagar was roughly 2.4m in 1984 (the population 
growth rate was 25.69 per cent during the one decade 197l to 1981
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in the State; Census of India 1981). This means that in the 
district of Muzaffarnagar there was one lawyer for every 2,400 
persons compared to the all India average of 3,043 (Madhava Menen 
jet elL 1983:557) and the reasons for the higher proportion of 
lawyers in this district will be made clear over the next few pages.
Caste composition
It is evident from Table 2 that the Oat, one of the socio- 
politically dominant cultivating castes in the whole of the 
western part of Uttar Pradesh state, constituted the largest single 
group with 109 lawyers (21.4 per cent). The Bania (including 
Jains) caste, which represent the urban trading castes not only 
in this district but in the whole of India, was next with 105 
lawyers (20.6 per cent). The Muslim castes had 70 (13.7 per cent) 
and the Brahman caste, which is dominant in the legal profession 
and administrative services on the basis of its all India 
statistics, had only 55 (10.B per cent) members in the Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri. The Chamar, a lower caste, mainly engaged as farm labourers 
and leather workers in the district, had 22 representatives (4.3 
per cent). This was in spite of the numerical dominance of this 
caste in the district.
It is also clear from Table 2 that the socio-politically 
dominant cultivating castes altogether, ie, Jat, Rajput, Tyagi, 
and Gujar, hafl 40.8 per cent representation in the kachahri. Most of the 
Muslim castes' lawyers were also from the cultivating castes 
in this district. Contrary to my data, Morrison's (1972:102) and 
Gandhi's (1982:63) data, based on their field studies of the 
district courts in nearby Haryana and Panjab states (both districts 
are situated within 150 miles of Muzaffarnagar city in the north)
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revealed that the district Bars in these states were numerically 
dominated by Khatri and Bania urban trading castes, although the 
Jats in Haryana and the Jat Sikhs in the Panjab are numerically 
and socio-politically dominant castes there. Satha ert ad (1983:30-1) 
found in their survey of the Pune City Bar in Maharashtra State 
that the Brahman caste constituted the largest single group - and 
this caste was also one of the socio-politically dominant castes 
in the city. Rowe (1968-69:222) also pointed out from his study 
of four district Bars that in Puri and Sambalpur districts (Orissa 
state) Brahmans and in Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh state) and Wardha 
district (MP state) non-Brahman lawyers were in the majority at the 
district Bars.
Table 2. Distribution of lawyers by caste
Notes:
1. 'Muslim castes' 
includes all sections 
& castes of the 
people who follow the 
Islamic religion.
2. 'Refugee' includes 
all people who 
migrated from 
Pakistan either a 
little before or after 
Partition in 1947.
3. 'Others' covers 
those castes who are 
represented by less 
than eight lawyers.
It means that the numerically dominant caste at the district 
Bar differs from one place to another and there is no positive 
correlation between the numerical dominance of a caste at the Bar and 
its numerical dominance in the district. Although castewise the 
population data of the district are not available after 1951 in
Caste Number Percentage
Jat 1D9 21.4
Bania & Jain 105 20.6
Muslim castes' 70 13.7
Brahman 55 10.8
Tyagi 50 9.8
Rajput 29 5.7
Chamar 22 4.3
Gujar 20 3.9
Refugee2 18 3.5
Others3 32 6.3
Total 510 100.0
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India the general picture is known. The interesting feature with 
respect to the caste composition of the lawyers of the Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri is that it was numerically and socio-politically dominated 
by the urban trading castes of the Bania and Jain in the beginning 
but gradually the cultivating castes of this district have grown 
to dominate it from all aspects and are still growing in influence 
there (as can be seen in Table 2 above).
Religious affiliation
Table 3 shows that the majority of lawyers were Hindus, these 
forming 70 per cent of the population of the district. Next came 
the Muslims, who from 29 per cent of the population of the 
district, then the Jains and Sikhs, who form 0.2 per cent (Census 
of India 1981). The majority of Jat lawyers are followers of 
Arya Samaj, a Hindu sect, and I have included them in the Hindu 
category. There was only one Christian lawyer, and he gave up 
his practice in 1982 because he could not get enough clients due to 
his lack of a 'recruitment-set’; the Christians represent only 
0.1 per cent of the population of this district. During my field 
research the Christian lawyer was running a private English coaching 
centre in Muzaffarnagar city.
Table 3. Lawyers by religious affiliation
Religion Number Percentage
Hinduism 417 '81.8
Islam 71 13.9
Jainism 18 3.5
Sikh 4 0.8
Total 310 100.0
There are two main reasons for the under-representation of 
Muslims as lawyers. One is socio-psychological: they are not 
interested in modern education, as revealed by the fact that Muslim 
students were less than 5 per cent of the total number of students in 
educational institutions. Nor did they wish to give up their 
traditional occupations. Another reason is an economic one. The 
lower class Muslim families (usually -from the lower castes) 
cannot afford to send their children to school needing instead 
their financial support. As a result the children start their 
traditional occupations at the age of 12 to 18 years. Generally 
the parents send their children for two to three years to the 
Koranic schools (madrasas). The higher and middle castes, the 
latter the cultivating caste, give their children a modern education. 
These two above-mentioned factors are also applicable to the 
lower caste and class Hindu families, who are also under represented 
in the kachahri.
Distribution of lawyers by age
In India the minimum age for completion of law graduation 
(LL.B) and entry into the legal profession is 22 to 23 years old.
It will be seen from Table 4 that the majority of lawyers in the 
kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city were from the 31 to 40 year age 
group (41.4 per cent) and the youngest lawyers had the next 
highest percentage of 30.2 per cent. Lawyers more than 60 years 
old made up only 3.9 per cent of the total. In effect, the 
Muzaffarnagar kachahri was numerically dominated by young lawyers.
If we look at the correlation between caste and age group it is clear 
from Table 4 that there were only four Jat lawyers more than 60 
years old and Muslims, Brahmans and Tyagis were each represented
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by only two lawyers in this age range. There were no lawyers 
from the Rajput, Chamar and Gujar castes older than 60 years. The 
three refugees who were more than 60 years old were practising in 
Pakistan before the Partition of India in 1947. The Banias and 
Jains were in the majority in this age group.
Table 4. Correlation between caste and the age groups 
of the lawyers
Castes Age Grou ps (years ) Total
21-30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 -- 60 61 -
No. 0^/ONurber 0//O No. 0//O No. 0//0 No. 0'/0 No. 0'/O
Jat 36 7.1 49 9.6 13 2.5 7 1.4 4 0.8 109 21.4
Bania & Jain 23 4.5 35 6.9 12 2.4 19 3.7 16 3.1 105 20.6
Muslim castes 24 4.7 28 5.5 14 2.7 2 0.4 2 0.4 70 13.7
Brahman 16 3.1 22 4.3 11 2.2 4 0.8 2 0.4 55 10.8
Tyagi 18 3.5 22 4.3 4 0.8 4 0.8 2 0.4 50 9.8
Rajput 11 2.2 12 2.4 2 0.4 4 0.8 0 0.0 29 5.7
Chamar 7 1.4 10 2.0 4 0.8 1 0.2 0 0.0 22 4.3
Gujar 7 1.4 9 1.8 4 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 20 3.9
Refugee 2 0.4 10 2.0 3 0.6 0 0.0 3 0.6 18 3.5
Others 10 2.0 14 2.7 5 1.0 2 0.4 1 0.2 32 6.3
TOTAL 154 30.2 211 41.4 72 14.1- 43 8.3 30 5.9 510 100.0
I", is clear from the table that the cultivating castes and 
Chamars have increased their numbers in the last two decades, which 
indicates their educational and upward occupational mobility. The 
trading castes of Banias and Jains, however, still have significant 
numbers in the young age group. Gandni (1982:62) also found that 
at district level in the Panjab state the majority of lawyers 
were in the age1 group of 21 to 35 years but still the majority of 
young lawyers were coming from the Khatri and Bania trading castes 
there. In Ambala city, Haryana state, where Morrison (1968-69) conducted 
his field study, I observed that the district Bar was still 
numerically and on tha grounds of allocation of work dominated by 
the trading castes. Now, Ambala city is located only some 50 to
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60 miles from Muzaffarnagar city and in their size of population 
and its distribution castewise and their social and geographical 
features' the two places are very similar. The main differences 
are that in Ambala district Muslim representation is nominal while 
in Muzaffarnagar they represent 29 per cent of the population, and 
that Ambala is a more industrialised district than Muzaffarnagar.
The question is why in Ambala district and in the Panjab 
trading castes are still in the majority at the district Bar. I 
think the main explanation could be that in Haryana and Panjab states 
there are more opportunities for farmers’ sons to go into industry.
Many farmers have set up their agriculture-based small-scale industries. 
Second, over the last two to three decades many young men have 
migrated abroad for better jobs. The people from these two states 
also have the monopoly in the transport business throughout India.
Third, they are a more enterprising people than those of Uttar 
Pradesh state. So the process of indjstrialisation and rodernisation 
of agriculture (based on the market economy) provides the new 
occupational opportunities for villagers. Hence they do not go 
into law, which is seen as a second best occupation in these two 
states. In Muzaffarnagar district a nominal number of people 
have migrated abroad or even to other districts or states in India 
and there is less industrialisation. During my fieldwork I found 
that in Ambala district Bar there were only some 20D lawyers while 
the figures werp about three times this much for the Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri.
The lawyers’ educational background
According to the Bar Council of India a student after 
graduation in an arts or a science subject is eligible to apply for
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a three year law degree (LL.B) course, which is the minimum pres­
cribed qualification to practise in a court of law in India. Before 
1967 the duration of an LL.B course was two years and one year's 
compulsory apprenticeship. But after this the Indian Bar Council 
passed a rule for all law colleges in the country to lengthen the 
duration of the LL.B course to two years full-time and for those 
who want to practise, one more year. In other words, an apprentice­
ship is not nowadays a necessity but it is usual for beginners to be 
apprenticed under a successful or leading lawyer for a few months.
Table 5 indicates that such a minimum educational qualification 
was possessed by the overwhelming majority, ie, 73.7 per cent, of the 
lawyers and only 26.2 per cent have post-graduate degrees either in 
science subjects or in arts. Only three lawyers have post-graduate 
degrees in LL.M and eleven lawyers have diplomas in other subjects.
Table 3. Distribution of lawyers by education
Educational qualifications Number 0//0
B.A., (B.Com), LL.B 258 50.6
B.Sc., LL.B 118 23.1
M.A., LL.B 115 22.5
M.Sc., LL.B 19 3.7
Total 510 100.0
Note: Among these 
lawyers three have 
LL.M degrees and 
eleven have 
diplomas in other 
subjects
Within this classification the largest number, 30.6 per cent, were 
arts graduates and very few (3.7 per cent) possessed post-graduate 
qualifications in science subjects. In fact, hardly any science 
post-graduates like to join the legal profession. More than 
80 per cent of the lawyers had earned their LL.B degrees from the 
local post-graduate college, where most of the law staff members 
were practitioners in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar. The law
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classes were held in the early and later morning so it was easy 
for them to teach at these times and many people who were employed 
in other jobs could join the law classes. Table 6 shows that only
5.9 per cent of the lawyers had obtained their law degrees before 
1950 and most of the lawyers had obtained their degrees during the 
years 1971 to 1980.
Table 6. Distribution of lawyers by their year of law 
degree (LL.B)
Year of law degree Number Percentage
1941 - 1950 30 5.9
1951 - 1960 51 10.0
1961 - 1970 78 15.3
1971 - 1980 281 55.1
1981 - ... 70 13.7
Total 510 100.0
It is also clear from Table 7 that the majority of lawyers 
(52.6 per cent) had acquired their primary education in villages 
and 36.9 per cent in cities, mainly from Muzaffarnagar city. The 
rest, 10.6 per cent had acquired their primary education from 
small towns, mainly from seven of these in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar. The majority of the lawyers' parents were 
illiterate or only had primary education.
Table 7. Distribution of lawyers by‘their place of 
primary education
Place of primary education Number Percentage
Village 268 52.5
Town 54 10.6
City 188 36,9
Total 510 100.0
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The rural/urban background of lawyers
It is difficult to establish a dichotomy between rural 
and urban. Scholars have usually identified people as rural and 
urban on the basis of place of birth. But my opinion is that 
from the point of view of anthropology their way of life is more 
important than their place of birth.- For example, in the case of 
my study, those lawyers who were born in the villages but who 
grew up and had all their education in the cities 
were more urbanised than those who were born in the cities but 
who had permanent connections with the villages through their 
families and properties and who frequently visited the villages.
So, to go some way towards salving this classificatory problem,
I have placed in the rural category those lawyers who got their 
primary education in the villages, and those who got their primary 
education in the towns I put in the category of town lawyers.
Those who got their primary education in the cities I classed as 
city lawyers. This means that where a person got his primary 
education is where he spent his childhood, and we can presume that 
he had some idea of the way of life of that place. Tables 7 and 8
indicate that most of the lawyers, ie, 63.1 per cent, came from a
village and small town background, and that the rest, 36.9 per cent,
had city background; more than 80 per cent of the lawyers were born
in this district. The rural-urban background is an important factor 
in getting clients and this will be discussed in the next chapter.
The lawyers1 family background
Table 8 shows that 86.1 per cent of the lawyers were members 
of joint families and only 13.9 per cent belonged to nuclear 
families. If we look at the relationship between the rural or
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urban background and the family structure it can be seen that 
there is very little difference and this fact justifies the claim 
that joint family phenomena are still dominant in cities as 
well as in the villages of India.
Table 8. Correlation between rural-urban background 
and family structure
Rural-»urban
background
Family Structure
Joint Family Nuclear Family Total
timber 0'/O timber O'/0 timber O'/0
Village 231 45.3 37 7.3 268 52.5
Town 43 8.4 11 2.2 54 10.6
City 165 32.4 23 4.5 188 36.9
Total 439 (86.1) 71 13.9 510 100.0
It is clear from Table 9 that most of the lawyers weresons 
of farmers, ie, 53.5 per cent, and next in order come the sons 
of businessmen, 17.6 per cent. Next comes the group of lawyers 
who had fathers in government services, 11.4 per cent, and only 
8.2 per cent were sons of lawyers. There were six lawyers (1.2 per 
cent) whose fathers were/are homeopathic or ayurvedic (vaidh or 
hakim) doctors. None was the son of an MBBS doctor or engineer.
Table 9. Occupational background of the lawyers' fathers
Occupation timber 0//O
Farming 273 53.5
Business 90 17.6
Legal 42 8.2
Govt, service 58 11.4
Non-govt, service 15 2.9
Teaching 11 2.2
Medical 6 1.2
Engineering — —
Misc. 15 2.9
Total 510 100.0
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Bastedo (1968-69:281) also noticed in Bihar state that at district 
level 52 per cent lawyers were the sons of farmers. In the 
Muzaffarnagar kachahri 23,3 per cent of the lawyers stated that 
they had other lawyer(s) in their families. The upper class 
urban families preferred not to send their sons into law but 
into the medical and engineering professions, first and second 
class government services, or into business. The majority of the 
lawyers from cities came from middle class families, and from 
the villages they were from upper class families of the village 
society.
Practice specialisation
The legal practitioners in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar 
district practised in three main fields of law: criminal (faujdaari), 
civil (diwaani) and revenue (maal). All major and minor law 
cases which can be tried under the Indian Penal Code (latest 
revised IPC of April 1984) and/or under statutory legislation 
concerning 'law and order' objectives passed by the state and 
central governments are included in criminal law (faujdaari kaanun). 
All litigation related to any one or more of the legal aspects 
of agricultural land or such land as is charged land revenue are 
covered under the revenue law and the cases here may be related 
to partition, sale, inheritance, or revenue of agricultural land.
All cases not covered under the above two categories fall under 
civil law. This may include all types of cases in respect of 
rent disputes, issues of marriage and divorce, sale and urban 
property, as well as those included under the personal and social 
law. The revenue and civil cases are governed by the Indian 
Civil Procedure Code (ICPC) and the criminal cases are governed
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under the Indian Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC).
In connection with these three fields of law, I identified 
three categories of lawyer in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar: 
specialists, semi-specialists, and non-specialists. By 'specialist 
lawyers' I refer to those lawyers who confined themselves 
exclusively to one type of legal practice. By 'semi-specialist 
lawyers' I refer to those lawyers who mainly practised one of the 
three types of legal practice and one more as a supplementary or 
secondary specialisation. The 'non-specialist lawyers' are 
those who practise in all these types of law or in a 'mixed' 
field. In Table 10 specialist lawyers and non-specialist lawyers 
are categorised as 'mixed' for convenience's sake in analysing the 
data.
Table 10. Relationship between lawyers' rural or urban background 
and practice specialisation
Rural-urban
background
Practice specialisation
Criminal Civil Revenue Mixed Total
No. O'/0 No. 0//0 No. Q'/0 No. 0//O No. O'/O
Village 93 18.2 8 1.6 11 2.2 154 30.6 268 52.5
Town 12 2.4 12 2.4 - - 30 5.9 54 10.6
City 67 13.1 22 4.3 4 0.8 95 18.6 188 36.9
Total 172 33.7 42 8.2 15 2.9 281 55.1 510 100.0
Table 10 shows the responses of lawyers about their field of 
specialisation, with 44.8 per cent stated as 'specialists' and 
55.1 per cent semi-specialists and non-specialists (ie, mixed). 
Within this classification there were 33.7 per cent in criminal 
law, 8.2 per cent in civil law, and only 2.9 per cent in revenue 
law. If we look at their rural-urban background in connection
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with this, it is clear from the table that of those 33.7 per cent 
lawyers who were specialists in criminal law, 20.7 per cent were 
from the villages of had a town background and 13.1 per cent 
were from the city. The civil specialists, who form 8.2 per cent 
of the total number of lawyers, were mainly from the city, while 
in revenue law the majority were from villages. I found that 
there was a positive correlation between the number of specialists 
in a particular field of practice and the number of court cases 
in that particular field of law. For example, there were only 
fifteen revenue specialists out of a total 510 lawyers due to the 
fact that revenue law work has a lower caseload than criminal 
and civil law. Since the state government brought in legislation 
on 'pre-emption' and 'declaration', according to which titled 
land has been clearly defined, the disputes arising out of this 
matter have been reduced. In civil law, where only 42 specialists 
were practising, the number was less than in criminal law, 
because in civil law the majority of disputes are concerned with 
urban people and urban property. Twenty-one per cent out of the 
total population of the district were in the cities (Census of India 
1981), so the majority of lawsuits in criminal law were from villages 
and the specialists were also in a majority in criminal law.
It is also clear from Table 11 that there was a positive 
correlation between the lawyer's field of specialisation and his 
caste background. The cultivating castes - Jat, Rajput, Tyagi, 
and Gujar - represented 73 out of 172 in criminal law while, 
contrary to this ratio, the urban trading castes - Bania and 
Jain - were in the majority, 25 out of 42 in civil law. Even in 
the beginning, in 1926, there were 22 Bania and Jain specialist 
lawyers in civil law, but only three Muslims and one Brahman out
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of a total of 26 civil specialists. 1 also collected superficial 
data in connection with taxation lawyers and I found that 76 
were from the urban trading castes of Bania, Jain and Khatri, 
and only three were Jats, three were Muslims and one was from 
the goldsmith's caste (Sunaar) out of the total number of lawyers 
practising taxation law. All these .lawyers were of urban origin and 
more than 90 per cent of taxation cases concerned urban people.
Hale (1949:792) conducted a study on the legal profession in 
Chicago, USA, and noted that divorce was the principal type of 
work in which the majority of black lawyers were engaged.
Tomasic et_ al (1978:23-29) conducted a study on Sydney lawyers 
in Australia and found that the city solicitors and corporation 
lawyers were specialists in general commercial legal work, 
while rural and semi-rural lawyers were mainly specialists in 
litigation.
Table 11. Correlation between lawyers' castes and their 
practice specialisation
Caste
Practice specialisation
:ed TotalCriminal Civil Revenue Mi>
No. O'/O No. 0'/0 No. 0'/Q No. 0' j 0 No.
0'
/0
Brahman 17 3.3 4 0,8 _ _ 34 6.7 55 10.8
Jat 37 7.3 5 1.0 7 1 .4 60 11.8 109 21 .6
Bania & Jain 34 6.7 25 4.9 3 0.6 43 8.4 105 20.6
Muslim castes 19 3.7 4 0.8 2 0.4 45 8.8 70 13.7
Rajput 16 3,1 1 0.2 - - 12 2.4 29 5.7
Tyagi 15 2.9 2 0.4 1 0.2 32 6.3 50 9.8
Gujar 5 1.0 _ - 1 0.2 14 2.7 20 3.9
Chamar 9 ( 1.8 1 0.2 - - 12 2.4 22 4.3
Refugee 10 2.0 - - - - 8 1.6 18 3.5
Others 10 2.0 - - 1 0.2 21 4,1 32 6 . 3
Total 172 33.7 42 8.2 15 2.9 281 510 100.0
So the above analysis reveals that in the kachahri of Muzaf-
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farnagar city there was a positive relationship between the 
lawyers' fields of specialisation, rural-urban origin and caste- 
wise specialisation of the legal practice.
While 55.1 per cent of the lawyers called themselves non­
specialists I actually noticed through informal interviews, 
the case diaries and court records that they were mostly semi­
specialists. It means the majority of lawyers were semi-specialists 
in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city, which means that these 
lawyers work in a particular field of law predominantly but 
also have some work in other field of law. Gandhi (1982:86) also 
reported from his field study of district courts in Panjab 
state that 72 per cent of district Bar members were practising 
as semi-specialists, who he called 'semi-exclusive' lawyers; 
while Sharma's study (1982) on Jaipur city in Rajasthan state 
also supports this. But Morrison (1968-69:261) and Rowi (1968-69: 
226) suggest from their studies of district courts that most 
practices were 'mixed', ie, non-specialist at district level 
in Inida. It may be that Morrison and Rowi have tended to compare 
the relatively non-specialist Indian lawyers with the highly 
specialist lawyers of their own country. Qoman (1983:29-30) 
pointed out in this connection that it is difficult to reconcile 
these two contradictory sorts of evidence, but it is clear that 
the Indian lawyer is a 'role-specialist' in all contexts and 
at all levels,, because he plays his role mainly in dispute 
processing in the courts, whereas in America the lawyers work as 
advisors, policy-makers and negotiators also.
Gandhi (op cit:76) identified four categories of legal 
practitioners in his field study of district courts in Panjab state: 
'exclusive' (specialist), 'semi-exclusive' (semi-specialist),
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'non-exclusive' (non-specialist), and a 'satellite1 or residual 
category. However, I have found this four-fold classification of 
lawyers on the basis of legal practice to be ambiguous. In the 
fourth category Gandhi included those lawyers who did not fit 
into the first three of his classifications. He said (p.93) that 
the satellite lawyers had the attribute of pursuing mixed (non­
specialist) practice and he divided them into three sub-categories 
which he called: young strugglers, late starters, and poor 
performers. But the question is: if the 'non-exclusive' and 
satellite lawyers both do 'mixed' practice, then what is the 
difference between these two categories? The three sub-categories 
of the fourth type of lawyer could be the part of the 'non­
exclusive' (non-specialist) category.
In connection with these three sub-categories my data 
suggests that in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city young strugglers 
or beginners were also specialists or semi-specialists. Some 
even had a sub-specialisation as well. For example, a young Jat 
Sikh lawyer who had started his practice a few years before 
was dealing mainly (roughly 85 per cent) with cases concerning 
Excise Act 60(2) (the recovery of illicit liquor), because the 
majority of his clients came from his own community - one of 
whose main activities was making illicit liquor. When he began 
his practice he mainly obtained this type of work, so he decided 
to become a specialist in this field. Since two Sikh lawyers 
were already there dealing with general work, as a specialist he 
could attract clients from other castes who committed this offence 
Another young beginner was an 'expert' in cases concerning the 
Essential Commodity Act and some other young lawyers were 
specialists in passport and visa matters. Another young lawyer
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was a specialist in banking and cases involving bank employees.
He had started his practice in 1981. He told me he had become
a specialist because, as he put it,
'When I started my practice here in 1981 I 
could not find any case for the first few 
months. Then one day my maternal uncle (mamaa),
who is manager of the local bank, brought a
from his bank to me and I won it. Then he 
appointed me his bank's permanent advocate and 
after that, through the manager's friends 
and due to my hard work and success in the 
cases, I now have four banks as my clients 
and many bank employees also engage me on 
their cases, concerning their employers.'
With regard to 'late starters', Gandhi (op cit:96) found three 
such lawyers in a district Bar, and all these lawyers were 
practising as non-exclusives (non-specialists). But in the case 
of my field study I found that 'late starters' were mostly 
specialists. For example, some public prosecutors (PP) or 
government counsels (GC) who had joined the profession after 
their retirement or resignation were specialists in those fields of 
law in which they had worked as PPs and GCs. One late starter, 
who had been head clerk in a local college, started legal practice 
as a specialist lawyer in the cases of educational institutions 
after terminating his job at the age of forty. Another late 
starter was a specialist in the cases of a life insurance 
corporation (a government organisation) and its employees because 
he had been an employee in this organisation for 20 years. It 
was true in the case of my study, however, that 'poor performers' 
were for the most part non-specialist lawyers.
Gandhi (op cit:76) pointed out on the basis of his data 
that there was a strong and positive relationship between degree 
of specialisation, degree of professional achievement in careers
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and lifestyle. In other words, he did not find any difference 
between leading lawyers and exclusive (specialist) lawyers and 
those who had a high standard of living. Although he did not 
use the actual phrase 'leading lawyer' it is clear from his 
analysis on 'exclusive' lawyers that he was talking about leading 
lawyers. For instance, one characteristic of an exclusive lawyer 
that he gave (p.78) was that the legal business was his monopoly 
and (p.83) that 'All the exclusive lawyers except the Jat Sikh 
were of sixty years of age or more.... The Jat Sikh was fifty-two 
years old. From this it appears that a minimum of twenty-five to 
thirty years of practice is a prerequisite for a lawyer to reach 
the top layer of the professional hierarchy at a District Court 
Bar', and all the exclusive lawyers owned costly landed properties, 
and posh bungalows (p.82). In addition, all the lawyers with the 
exception of one were drawn from an urban background.
I found the above-mentioned features applicable to leading 
lawyers rather than specialist lawyers (ie, exclusive). In other 
words, my data from the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city suggest 
that all leading lawyers were specialists but not all specialist 
lawyers were leading lawyers, and all leading lawyers had landed 
property and a high standard of living but many non-exclusive 
lawyers had also the same or.even a better living standard than 
the leading specialist lawyers because these non-specialists had 
sufficient epough income from other sources. Even 59.8 per cent 
of the total number of lawyers themselves accpeted that they had an 
income from other sources in addition to their income from legal 
work. I identified some beginners who had come from rich farming 
and business families and they maintained as good a standard of 
living as the leading lawyers. The latter will be discussed in
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more detail in the next chapter.
Gandhi (1982) does not explain how a lawyer becomes a 
specialist lawyer. From what I observed in the kachahri of 
Muzaffarnagar city the main reasons were as follows.
When starting a practice in a specific field of law, lawyers 
first of all considered which type of client they could easily 
get. For example, lawyers with a rural background did not 
usually begin a practice in civil law since, as I mentioned earlier, 
this involves mainly clients from an urban background. Second, 
their field of specialisation depends on their apprenticeship, 
that is, under what type of specialists they first trained. If a 
lawyer to whom a beginner is apprenticed is a specialist in 
civil law, it is extremely likely that the trainee would start his 
own practice in the same field. Third, it depends upon what 
type of case they get after beginning their practice. Only a few 
lawyers stated that they had chosen a particular field of law 
because of their interest in that field. Certainly the majority 
of sons of lawyers chose their fathers' field of specialisation 
because they got a ready-made 'clientage bank' from their fathers.
It is clear from the above discussion that the lawyers' fields 
of specialisation also were related to their relationship with the 
clients.
4. Why they became lawyers
It is important to know why people entered the legal profession 
since their reasons for joining it also influenced their prof­
essional behaviour, their relationship with clients, their 
political orientation and their competence to deal with cases and 
clients. In the following pages I will also discuss the more 
general motivational factors which encourage and discourage
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people to join this profession.
Most of the lawyers of the Muzaffarnagar kachahri had had 
some other profession as their first preference, namely, medicine, 
engineering, and administrative government service. Only after 
their failure to get into these professions did they choose the 
legal profession, especially in the case of those who had an 
urban background and graduate or post-graduate degrees in 
science subjects. Kidder (1974:17) also noticed this in his 
study of Bangalore city. When I asked them whether they had tried 
any other profession or occupation, 44.3 per cent of the lawyers 
themselves actually responded in the questionnaire that before 
entering the legal profession they had tried for other jobs. It 
is easy for a student to get admission on an LL.B course because 
there are no hard and fast rules for admission. Moreover, there 
is no pre-entry competitive test for admission to LL.B as in the 
case of medicine, engineering and first and second class 
government service. Moreover, it was easy for students to 
attend morning or evening classes in law at the local college in 
Muzaffarnagar city; most cities in India have this facility.
It is mainly these two factors which are responsible for the 
entry of inferior quality students into legal education (see for 
details Von Mehren 1964-65). One other interesting point here is 
that it is not only in India that second class students enter into 
the legal profession, but the same applies to some other Asian 
countries - as some participants pointed out at the Conference on 
the Comparative Study of the Legal Profession with special 
reference to India at the University of Chicago in 1967. Contrary 
to this, Zelan (1967:47) found in a survey of American lawyers
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in 1961 that those students with high levels of academic performance 
were more likely to choose law than those of lesser ability.
As I mentioned earlier, the legal profession in Muzaffarnagar 
district was numerically dominated by agriculturist castes 
because in the last two to three decades the 'green revolution', 
decentralisation of political power and the extension of educational 
and communication facilities have provided them with the 
possibility, of upward occupational mobility. It is an excellent 
channel of social mobility for village farmers to send their 
children to the city for modern education and to learn new 
occupations and professions; they have the feeling that urban 
life is far better than village life. In comparison with 
medicine and engineering and government jobs it is easy for them 
to enter into the legal profession, although they also try to 
get admission into these professions and the percentage of 
farmers' sons in medical, engineering and government jobs is 
increasing gradually. The legal profession is still a more 
prestigious profession for village people than teaching in a 
college or a university. It is also not difficult for a lawyer 
with a village background to get sufficient business (clientage) 
because the majority of clients also come from villages. In 
starting a practice, for two to three years or more a village- 
based lawyer is supported by his joint family. Many lawyers of 
rural origin actually get financial support from their 
family for the whole of their lives as a share from their joint 
landed properties. Of course some lawyers also support their 
families in villages. In fact, village families frequently have a 
family member in the city who can take care of family problems 
and when their children are sent to the city for education they
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then stay with the family member residing there.
When starting to practise most lawyers buy the prescribed 
black coat, white trousers and other clothes befitting the 
profession, at least one chair, one table and one bench (for 
clients), some reference books and other office stationery. They 
also pay a registration fee to the State Bar Council. This may 
come to a few thousand rupees (some £200.00). If in addition a 
lawyer needs to construct or buy his own chamber in the kachahri 
he will have to spend an additional minimum of Rs.2000 (about 
£150.00). Usually these initial costs are borne by their families 
and the rich farmers can easily afford it.
I identified some young lawyers with a rural background and 
who had no clientage or just a nominal one. They came into the 
kachahri only occasionally for gossip and the latest news about 
district politics. Even so they still had their permanent chambers 
in the kachahri while they did not bother about the business 
(practice) itself. Usually they referred their clients to their 
colleagues, with or without commission. When I asked them why 
they came to the kachahri, the general response was that to 
become a lawyer was only a social status symbol for them, which 
enabled them to deal with the problems of their families, 
relatives and friends with the district authorities and police 
officials without any hesitation. Most of these lawyers were from 
well-to-do families. In this profession they also had the 
opportunity to participate in party politics, an activity forbidden 
to those in government jobs.
Most lawyers with urban backgrounds did not want to join 
the legal profession, but when they found no success in trying to 
gain admission to medical, engineering or administrative jobs, and
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had not enough money and experience to start a business, they 
then entered law in the hope that there would be here at least some 
chance in becoming successful. Second, they would be their 
own 'boss'. Third, there would not be the need to transfer from 
one place to another since in other jobs the red-tape and other 
difficulties involved in moving encouraged (and encourages) 
corruption within the Indian bureaucracy. Sometimes, after they 
had been pushed into the legal profession they developed an 
interest in it, either through ambition or competition and so on. 
It was mostly the younger urban lawyers who used the kachahri 
as a 'waiting room' for joining other professions. They appeared 
in the competitive examinations for government jobs. The 
beginners even wanted to become 'bank clerks' where they thought 
there were good working conditions and a good salary. They took 
the judiciary examinations as well. Won jrt ad (1973:248-58) 
also found in their study of the Korean lawyers that the younger 
lawyers were more interested in becoming judges or prosecutors 
than staying in private practice.
To the question which asked if they were happy being 
lawyers, 69 per cent of the lawyers stated 'yes' and 31 per cent 
'no'. Kidder's (1974:18) study of law students in Bangalore 
city also revealed that not more than two per cent of them 
expressed both enthusiasm for the practice of law and a definite 
intention to practise. Madhava Menon (1979:25), on the basis of 
an all India survey, showed that only 10 per cent of law students 
enrolled even in well reputed universities intending to practise 
law. On the other hand Rowe (1968-69:225), in his study of 
district courts, found that most of the lawyers said that they 
were happy being lawyers, and Sathe et al (1983:58) pointed out
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in the study of Pune city Bar that 42.79 per cent of the lawyers said 
they were satisfied with their profession. In response to the question as to whether they 
would like their sons to become lawyers, 72,7 per cent of them 
in the Muzaffarnagar kachahri stated their unwillingness and only 
27.3 per cent replied 'yes'. Sathe et_ _al (1983:58) also reported 
that 48.14 per cent of the lawyers in the Pune city Bar stated 
their 'willingness' to send their sons into the legal profession.
Here I would like to make clear one point, that in some situations 
or on some questions there was a contradiction between the 
respondents' statements and what the fieldworker observed. For 
instance, in the case of the above questions I observed through 
informal interviews that the majority of lawyers were not willing 
to send their sons into the legal profession which they did not 
themselves even like. However, they did not like to express 
their unwillingness; they had no alternative of joining other 
professions due to their age. I noticed that the only lawyers 
who wished their sons to be in the legal profession were those 
who thought or found their sons had poor educational ability 
or those who had only one son, because it would be easy for their 
sons to get a ready-made clientage bank and recruitment-set 
from their fathers. Even the leading lawyers preferred to send 
their sons into other professions. Rowe (1968-69:324) and Kidder 
(1974:11-37) also pointed out that lawyers tended to put their 
sons into the other higher professions.
If we look at the correlation between different age groups 
and job satisfaction, ie, what age group felt most satisfied 
or dissatisfied with being a lawyer, Table 12 shows that there was 
very little variation amongst the age groups. But with regard to 
those lawyers who stated being 'unhappy' at being a lawyer, I
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found through informal interviews with them that the reasons were 
different between younger lawyers and older ones. Most of the 
old lawyers complained that nowadays their profession had become 
overcrowded, corruption had increased in the kachahri and they did 
not have a sufficient clientage, and the newcomers had little 
knowledge of law. They blamed all of these things on the younger 
lawyers and, in all, they felt frustrated about the state of 
their profession. On the other hand, with the younger lawyers 
who were mostly 'unsatisfied' with the profession the general 
feeling they had was that most of the legal casework was in the 
hands of a few old leading lawyers and their seniors did not like 
to give them a proper training nor professional support. They 
accepted petty cases also. They felt themselves to be a burden 
on their families because they took financial support from the 
latter which they themselves did not like at all. The relation­
ship between junior and senior lawyers will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.
Table 12. The correlation between age groups and job satisfaction
Age group 
(in years)
Age groups & job satisf.
Total
Yes No
No. 0//a No. 0^/O No. 0/✓0
21-30 91 17.8 63 12.4 154 30.2
o
i 144 28.2 67 13.1 211 41 .4
41-50 56 11.0 16 3.1 72 14.1
51-60 33 6.5 10 2.0 43 8.4
61. . .' 28 5.5 2 0.4 30 5.9
Total 352 69.0 158 31.0 510 100.0
On the question 'Who decided you should become a lawyer?'
34,9 per cent of the lawyers said that their parents or other kin
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had taken the decision, 1.2 per cent stated that their friends 
or well wishers had suggested it to them and 63.9 per cent stated 
that they had decided for themselves. But what I understood 
through my observations was that in the main students sought 
and took the advice of their guardians, following it to go 
into any occupation or profession. I could not identify any 
single lawyer in the kachahri who had joined this profession 
because it was his vocation to or due to his 'service orientation'. 
Even on the question, 'Do you think a lawyer's services are 
meant for society?', 20.8 per cent said that they did not think 
that this profession had any role in the welfare of society. My 
general impression was that most of the lawyers had no idea of 
'service orientation' in their profession. I will discuss this 
issue in more detail later on.
The legal profession is male dominated, not only in the 
Muzaffarnagar district but in the whole of India. I found only 
two female lawyers in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city out of 
the total number of 510. One female lawyer was from the Jat 
caste and another was from the Brahman caste. Both of them 
were in the thirty-one to forty year age group, and both had an 
urban background. The Jat female lawyer's husband was a doctor 
and the Brahman's husband was an engineer, and both husbands were 
in government service. The Jat had a post-graduate degree in 
law (LL.M), wlpich out of all the others in the kachahri only two 
other younger male lawyers possessed. When I asked them why they 
had decided to become legal practitioners both of them replied 
that they belonged to modern families and they felt bored at home 
while their husbands were outside the city on official business; 
neither husband had objected to their decision to become lawyers.
-118-
I found that these two female lawyers had insufficient clients due 
to lack of a recruitment-set and to being female. They were also 
very cautious and did not mix in with their colleagues' gossip 
groups. However, over the last two decades the ratio of female 
law students has increased, and I think there are two main 
reasons behind this. One is that they are filling up the time 
before marriage, since in the last few years the age of marriage 
has increased and whenever they marry they give up their study, 
and the other is that for future security (mainly on the death 
of a husband or in the case of divorce) they can support their 
children and themselves. All female law students were from an 
urban background in the local law college. The local culture 
does not easily permit a female to become a lawyer. It is very 
difficult to deal with criminal clients and with corrupt court 
officials. The local culture has only changed insofar as it 
allows a female to become a doctor but not take up jobs like 
nursing or engineering. Every upper class families do not allow 
as yet their female members to teach in schools - only in 
universities or affiliated colleges.
Conclusion
In sum, the lawyers' social background can be said to influence 
their joining the profession and their field of practice. The 
kachahri of Muzaffarnagar, which was dominated by urban Bania 
castes in the beginning, is at present dominated by peasant 
castes. These two segments entered into this profession with 
different 'world views', different possibilities (ie, village 
lawyers have a greater chance in entering politics) and 
different aspirations, but both agreed though that law is not a
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a vocation it is a second best. This may be the reason why younger 
lawyers are not committed to high moral-ethical standards. The 
recruitment pattern into the profession was based mainly on 
'particularistic' values rather than 'universalitic' ones, as was 
their specialisation.
The next chapter will concern itself with how the social 
background of lawyers influences their professional behaviour 
and with the bases and patterns of the linkages between lawyers 
and clients. In particular, it will look at the roles of such 
para-professional men as lawyer's clerks, touts, and so on, 
the role of primordial ties, and how lawyers become leading 
lawyers. Finally, the issue of whether the prestige of the legal 
profession is on the decline will also be discussed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The bases and pattern of lawyers' professional recruitment-sets
In this chapter on the Muzaffarnagar kachahri I will discuss 
four questions. First, what were the main bases of the linkage 
between lawyers and clients (mowaakkil) ? That is to say, how 
did lawyers recruit and retain their clients in their 'clientage-
bank' and how did clients contact particular lawyers through
\
their 'resource-set'? I shall use as the 'bank', people who 
have been clients and who could be clients in the future, and 
'resource-set' for those people who could be used by a person 
or some persons, particularly when they were unable to obtain 
that which they wanted by themselves alone. Both lawyers and clients 
needed resource-sets, the lawyers to get business (clients) and 
the clients to get to know 'suitable lawyers' and sometimes 
other para-legal functionaries (eg, touts, munshis, brokers, and 
so on) to make their views known and finally to win cases. For 
analytical purposes, to differentiate the client's resource-set 
from the lawyer's resource-set I will use the term 'professional 
recruitment-set' for the latter, as I discussed in Chapter Two. 
Secondly, I will deal with how a lawyer became a 'leading' or 
successful lawyer. Thirdly I will examine the questions as to what 
degree the lawyers of Muzaffarnagar kachahri differed from the 
ideal type of'the professional. In other words, what was the 
relationship between the ideology of the profession and the 
actual behaviour of these professional men. Finally I will discuss 
the issue of whether the prestige of the legal profession is 
declining in India. I will also describe (in Appendix B) a small 
representative sample of eight lawyers to make the picture of the
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Muzaffarnagar kachahri clearer.
In short, in this chapter I am going to analyse the informal 
social process as it actually operates from the lawyers' as well 
as the clients' side in the formal legal process. Abel (1980:805) 
rightly pointed out that the question - what do the majority of 
lawyers do for their clients on a day-to-day basis - was 
neglected by almost all scholars. There are two main weaknesses 
in the studies which have been conducted on the Indian legal 
profession. The first is that field researchers did not focus 
on lawyers as professional men and the second is that they treated 
their social background attributes and their professional 
behaviour as separate objects of investigation, ignoring their 
inter-connections. Sharma (1982:528-47) also indicated these 
points in his article. Not one single study has attempted 
to relate the social background of lawyers to their role- 
performance. Gandhi's study (1982) seems to be the only exception 
but he paid more attention to only one aspect, ie, the touts.
It is clear from the studies which have been conducted on 
the Indian legal profession that primordial ties such as caste, 
religion, kinship, family and regional ties play a crucial role 
in the linkage between lawyers and their clients, particularly at 
district level and tehsil level courts. For example, Cohn (1965) 
Morrison (1968-69, 1972), Khare (1972), Gandhi (1982) and more 
recently Sathe _et al_ (1983) observed this fact in their field 
studies. However, Rowe (1968-69:223) and Kidder (1974:19) 
reported a contradictory fact: from their studies at district 
level courts the clients did not choose their lawyers on the basis 
of caste and kinship. On the other hand, I found in the Muzaffar­
nagar city kachahri that the primordial ties were the main bases
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of linkage between lawyers and clients. The main reason for this 
is that the 'legal literacy' of Indian society is very poor, due 
to the lack of formal legal-aid agencies. However, the 
interesting point here is that in American society, which 
represents a modern industrial society and where many formal legal- 
aid agencies exist for making contacts between lawyers and 
clients, there even some degree of advertising by lawyers is 
permitted. But there primordial ties also play a main role in 
establishing contact between lawyers and clients, especially at 
lower court level, as Hale (1949), Johnstoke et_ rd (1967) and 
Ladinsky (1976) noticed. Ladinsky (ibid:207) said that in 
American courts clients rely heavily upon informal contact 
networks and influencial intermediaries.
In the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city the main bases of 
lawyers' professional recruitment-sets as well as clients' resource- 
sets were as follows: caste, kinship, religion, regional ties,
political allegiances, reciprocity, profit and para-professionals 
(eg, munshi, tout, chronic litigants, experienced litigants and 
witnesses, government functionaries, court functionaries and so 
on). We can divide these linkage bases into two categories: that 
of the personnel involved who acted as go-betweens- the munshis, 
touts, chronic litigants, government officials, court functionaries 
and experienced litigants and witnesses and so on; and the quality 
of links that were formed - caste, kinship, religion, family, 
regional and political ties, reciprocity, profit, and so on.
I will first discuss the roles of the persons who acted as 
linkage points between clients and lawyers, keeping the qualities 
of the links in mind, then I will deal with the second set in later 
sections, first of all I will discuss the role and recruitment
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of munshis (lawyers' clerks) in the lawyers' professional recruit- 
ment-sets.
1. The munshi as a para-professional man
The munshi (lawyer's clerk) has been described as a 'para-profes­
sional man1 (see Morrison 1972, 1974) who provides role-support 
and help for recruiting and retaining the clients in the lawyer's 
professional recruitment-set. In the following discussion I will 
use the vernacular term munshi rather than the English term 'clerk', 
because he performs not only an official service but also domestic 
and other services for his employer. So a munshi is on the 
borderline between a clerical assistant and a domestic peon, as 
it will be made clear in the following pages.
The munshi's occupation does not exist in the Indian 
Advocate Act or in the rules of the Bar Council of India and its 
sub-bodies, the State Bar Councils and the District Bar Associations. 
Except for a few leading lawyers' munshis, most of them had very 
low incomes. The total number of munshis nearly equalled the 
number of lawyers in the kachahri because almost all lawyers 
employed them. There were no part-time munshis, although Morrison 
(1972, 1974) and Gandhi (1982) noticed in their studies of the 
district Bars in Haryana and Panjab states that some lawyers 
employed these. Moreover, in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city 
some leading and successful lawyers due to workload had two to 
three m u n s h i s Some munshis also employed assistant(s) due to 
this and they gave in turn a commission to the latter from their 
own commission. Only a few beginner lawyers did not employ 
munshis individually due to their small clientage. They could not 
afford to employ munshis, neither could they afford to buy offices.
A munshi coaching a female Muslim client in his employer 
’home office' prior to her appearance in court
In that situation a munshi and office were shared by two friends 
who were beginner lawyers, but their businesses were run separately. 
On the other hand, some beginner lawyers who also had a small 
clientage but who could afford munshis employed one for ’impression 
management' and for the munshi’s expertise in court procedures 
and their resource-sets for bringing in the clients.
The recruitment of munshis
There Was much heterogeneity of occupational background, 
caste, religion, age and education among the munshis. It was 
confirmed that most of them had an education between primary to 
high school (ie, fifth to tenth grade) and that they came from 
low-income families who could not afford further education due 
to poverty and family responsibilities. They were mostly from 
the villages of this district as were the lawyers. As no formal 
educational qualifications or professional training was prescribed 
for the munshis, they acquired their skills as apprentices under 
experienced senior munshis for a few months. There was not one 
illiterate munshi but five to six of the older munshis had a 
knowledge of reading and writing Urdu and English or only Urdu, 
while almost all courtwork was done in Devnaqri script. The 
lawyers employed their munshis mainly on two criteria: first,
competence to deal with court functionaries (ie, readers (peshkaars), 
peons, and clerks) and clients; and, second, on the basis of their 
resource-sets'for bringing the clients to their employers. The 
munshis tended to join the lawyer who had a large number of 
clients in his clientage-bank or, in other words, who had a good 
income. Morrison (1972, 1974) found that in Ambala city Bar there 
was competition over munshis among lawyers, particularly among
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leading lawyers for 'leading' munshis. But in the Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri there was little competition for munshis among the lawyers.
Usually a munshi stayed for a long time with his employer.
Some munshis had even worked for two to three generations of a 
lawyer's family (and vice-versa). There was one unusual case of 
a Bania-caste munshi and his employer being brothers. Their 
assymetrical relationship indicated that the caste factor here 
was not of relevance since the social norm is that a person should 
not take a job as a subordinate to any of his immediate kin.
The munshis did not have any formal association since they 
were totally dependent on their employers. Hence they could not 
take the risk of suggesting opposition through identifying 
separate interests.
The munshi's role
The daily work of a munshi was to safeguard all documents, 
complete applications to courts, maintain the lawyer's 'home 
office' and 'court office', get medical and office aid for clients, 
copies of opposite clients' lawsuits from the courts, and 'coach' 
or 'teach' and bargain with clients and court officials. For 
nearly two hours in the morning and two to three hours at night 
he worked in the lawyer's home office at his residence also; 
and he had to reach the lawyer's court office earlier than his 
employer and leave later. Some munshis also performed domestic 
services for their employers, particularly if they felt insecure 
in their jobs. Gandhi (1982:138) noted from his study that a 
lawyer's munshi undertook three main duties: routine maintenance, 
tactical manouvering and business promotion. The munshis gave 
bribes (riswat) and 'tips' (inaam or sukrianaa) to the appropriate
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court officials on behalf of their lawyers and clients, because 
neither the professional image nor the professional ethic and law 
permitted a lawyer to take on these jobs directly. The lawyers 
captured some clients through their munshis1 personal resource-sets, 
the munshi playing the role of public relations and information 
officer on behalf of his employer. In some cases at some stages 
of the litigation the munshi ’coached' or ’instructed' the clients 
and witnesses before their court appearance. Sometimes the lawyers 
discussed the litigation (mukadmah) with their munshis and if the 
munshi had more experience of the court procedures sought their 
suggestions.
The munshis also played the personal communicator role for 
their employers. As Gandhi (1982:140) indicated too, sometimes 
lawyers wanted to explore the possibility of settling a case 
(faislaa) outside the court (particularly when the lawyer thought 
that he could lose the case) between their clients and the opposing 
clients. With or without the explicit consent of their clients 
they could try to discover a judge's attitude on a certain case 
by using their munshis as a link between them and the court 
officials, or they might want to know in advance through some 
informant the next move that the opposing client was likely to 
make. All such activities could not be seen to be done by a 
lawyer for fear of damaging his professional image and neither 
were they allowed by the rules of their Bar Association. Hence he 
used his munshi for the 'un-ethical' work.
The munshis tried their best to recruit and retain clients 
in their employer's clientage-bank, because both he and the lawyer 
benefited by this. Strain and tension was not uncommon in the 
lawyer-client relationship and at that stage the munshi could
function as a mediating agent. Sometime, if a case had had an 
unfavourable outcome a munshi tried to keep the clients calm. 
Usually they told them that the outcome of the case had had 
nothing to do with the lawyer's competence but was unfortunately 
due to the poor evidence or opposite party (mukhaalif party) 
having obliged the judge or magistrate with money or other favours. 
Gandhi (1982:141) quoted a statement by one leading district 
lawyer from the Panjab state on munshis:
'I make no secret of the fact that I have 
rarely employed a munshi without considering 
his ability in bringing business.... All of 
• them have always had their due from me....
'H ' has been very successful to me as a munshi.
He has been with me for the last 18 years.
He is an important man in and around his 
native village and has brought me scores 
cases from his friends and acquaintances....
They all trust him.1
This statement was also true in the case of the Muzaffarnagar city 
kachahri.
Through observation it was obvious that some munshis had 
enough independence in their work. Occasionally they would render 
services to the clients without asking their employers. Old 
experienced munshis sometimes played a greater role in the 
lawyer-munshi-client triad than the lawyers, particularly when 
he was very skilled in court-work and when his own resource-set 
was larger than his employer's professional recruitment-set.
During fieldwork I identified six munshis who were so skilled 
in courtwork and had such large resource-sets that they employed 
or hired beginner lawyers on the basis of a commission of 30 
to 40 per cent, with the object of fulfilling the necessary 
conditions prescribed in the Advocate Act. The rest of the work 
they did themselves. So in this situation the nature of the
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relationship between a lawyer and munshi was reversed, ie, the 
munshi was superior to the lawyer. Among these six 'expert' 
munshis one maintained his 'court-office' and 'home-office' in 
the same manner as did the lawyers for impression-management 
towards the clients. He hired lawyers according to the nature of 
the litigation. Some munshis told me that they knew more about 
law and court procedure than many beginner lawyers.
If a munshi and a lawyer had had a long relationship and 
the lawyer retired or died and was replaced by his son, respect 
would automatically be conveyed to the munshi by the lawyer. In 
the relationship between the lawyers and munshis the age factor 
had importance. A young lawyer would not speak casually towards 
an old munshi in the same way as he might to his young munshi.
The relationship between a lawyer and his munshi was also a 
business partnership: the munshi was paid a fixed share of the 
lawyer's fee (mehantaanaa), usually 20 per cent of the total fee 
of the lawyer which was known by the local term munshiyahaa (mushi's
fee). Some munshis got more commission if the client came to
their lawyer through them. Apart from commission munshis did not 
get any extra money from the lawyers; Morrison (1972, 1974) and
Gandhi (1982) found in district Bars of Haryana and Panjab states
that lawyers paid also a small salary to the munshis in addition 
to the 10 per cent commission the latter got there from their 
lawyer's total income. After winning the case a munshi expected an 
additional tip (sukrianaa, from sukria or thanks) from the client.
In some cases a lawyer also got this additional tip (in this case 
called inaam), although contingent fees for lawyers are 
prohibited by the Advocate Act and the Bar Council of India.
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Tension and instability in the relationship
Income distribution was the main basis on which mistrust and 
suspicion emerged between a lawyer and his munshi and this mis­
trust could lead to the break-up of the relationship (see Morrison 
1972:309-28; 1974:39-61 and Gandhi 1982:146-7). This happened 
in two main situations: when the lawyer suspected that his munshi 
for a higher commission had referred the client to another lawyer 
or when a munshi suspected that his employer had charged the 
client a higher fee than that charged in his presence or of 
which he had been told by the lawyer. Sometimes a lawyer could 
deprive his munshi of the fee by claiming that a particular 
client was his kin or a very close friend and that no fee was 
being charged, then the lawyer appropriated the munshiyanaa.
The situation might also be reversed. The munshi might be used 
by the employer to put pressure on relatives (rishtedaar) or those 
close to them, or to the lawyer's family members and to whom the 
lawyer for that reason felt awkward about asking for fees directly. 
In that situation they would assure the clients that they were not 
taking any fee except that of the munshi's and other 
necessary stamps, typing and court expenses, but added under the 
name of these items were the lawyer's own fees.
When the lawyer-munshi relationship was in dispute and this 
dispute led to them separating, the client usually followed the 
person (ie, lawyer or munshi) whom he had most confidence in.
For example, in such situations where the client had more 
confidence in the munshi he would automatically acquire a new 
lawyer for his case or, in other words, when a munshi moved from 
one lawyer to another he shifted his 'own clients' too to the 
new employer's clientage-bank. Low-income munshis could earn
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extra income during the holidays and weekends in the kachahri by 
seeking out illiterate village clients, who had come to the city 
the day before or had arrived on the day the kachahri was closed 
to find a 'suitable' lawyer for their cases, and then the munshis 
would offer them to those lawyers who were prepared to pay the 
most commission (usually 50 per cent). Thus in this way some 
munshis worked also as touts. I observed that on weekends and 
holidays nearly ten to fifteen munshis sat with other regular 
touts in the kachahri to 'catch' the village litigants for those 
lawyers who were ready to pay maximum commission, further 
discussion about the munshi's role as a tout will be dealt with 
in the next section of this chapter.
Most of the clients had the feeling that both lawyers and 
their munshis cheated them with regard to fees. In this they 
were right, for when a munshi accompanied a client to help him 
with typing work, coping with case lists, adjourning the hearing 
date or buying the court's stamps, etc, he often overcharged him. 
In most cases clients were aware of what was happening but they 
did not want to cause problems between themselves and the lawyer 
and his munshi; and almost all lawyers were aware of this 
practice between their munshi and the clients. There was a 
mutual consensus between lawyers and their munshis about this 
practice, but only if a lawyer thought that it was going to harm 
his business did he forbid his munshi to do this. In such a case 
it was possible that after some two to three warnings the 
lawyer would sack his munshi. So the lawyer usually set the 
limit to which a client could be overcharged: but then they 
also overcharged the clients themselves. This issue will be 
discussed in the last section of this chapter in more detail.
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How ever , the well-established lawyers and their munshis were 
more mutually dependent on each other and the question of mistrust 
rarely rose between them.
To sum up, we can say that the munshi did not carry out 
only clerical work for his employer but performed multiple 
roles for the latter and the whole legal system. For instance, he 
functioned as manager, public-relations officer, information 
officer, communicator, business supporter, and so on, and even, 
in some cases, he acted as a domestic servant too. So in many 
ways he was a role discharger for his employer. In the following 
section I will examine the role of touts and brokers in the 
lawyer-client relationship.
2. Touts as a linkaqe-node
Touts played an important role in the recruiting of clients to 
a lawyer's clientage-bank in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city. 
They provided one kind of link between the clients and lawyers.
I use the term 'tout' here to refer to a person used by a lawyer 
to obtain clients in return for a share of the fee received from 
the client. In their research Sathe et ail (1983:70) found that 
in the Pune city Bar touts took money from both, the clients 
as well as the lawyers. This is an exceptional case. I will 
employ the term 'broker' in the following discussion for a 
person who mediated between the client and lawyer without any fee 
or commission from either. In north India, the local Hindi term 
for tout is dalaal, which denotes a person who takes a commission 
or fee from one side or both sides when he renders service in any 
sphere of activity, for example in a market transaction between 
buyer and seller or between wholesaler and retailer, or in the
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kachahri between lawyers and clients. The term bichaulia 
(mediator) is used for both 'tout' and 'broker'. Morrison (1974:
47) and Koppell (1968-69:428) rightly pointed out that inter­
mediation is not limited only to some spheres of activity of the 
Indian people but extends to their whole social life. In the 
marriage settlements the broker (here also called bichaulia) has a 
very important role and people call him a bichaulia, not a dalaal
(tout), because he does not receive any money as fee or commission
from any side. Due to a confusion of these local terms I shall, 
for convenience's sake, use the English terms 'tout' and 'broker'.
Both touts and brokers perform the same function for the
legal system and for the two different groups (ie, the clients 
and lawyers). The difference between touts and brokers is that 
the role of a broker is known to both lawyer and client while 
that of tout remains concealed from the client. The second 
difference is that a tout.is paid by the lawyer to bring him 
clients while brokers do not gain financially (see Gandhi 1982:105).
The practice of toutism is not a new phenomenon in the 
Indian courts. It started at the same time as the British legal 
system was established in the country, as Ooman (1983:32),
Morrison (1972:327), Buckee (1972), and Gandhi (1982:106) pointed 
out. The existence of touts was officially taken cognizance of 
in India as early as 1879 when the Legal Practitioners Act 
mentioned 'this evil'. In 1924-25 the Civil Justice Committee 
suggested measures for the elimination of toutism. Even Mahatma 
Gandhi (1962:21) noted in his autobiography that when he started 
his practice in the Bombay high court, 'I was told that I should 
pay commission to touts otherwise I could not successed in practice 
and it was common there. I emphatically declined.' More recently,
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the Indian Law Commission of 1958 (see Vol 1:555-82) recommended 
stringent measures against lawyers who sought the help of touts 
to get clients. Needless to say toutism is mentioned as illegal 
and unethical in the Advocate Act 1961 and the rules of the Bar
Council of India (Section 49(1) of the Act).
In spite of this, toutism exists in almost all Indian courts 
with the touts 'serving' both lawyers and clients as the evidence 
from the field studies show (Rowe (1968-69) in Orissa, Madhya 
Pradesh and Karnataka states; Cohn (1965) and Khare (1972) in 
Uttar Pradesh; Kidder (1974) in Karhataka, a south Indian state; 
Sharma (1982) in Rajasthan; Gandhi (1982) in the Panjab; and 
Sathe et_ al_ (1983) in Maharashtra state). Morrison is the only 
scholar who could not find touts at the Ambala city Bar in Haryana 
state and he cautioned against imposing Western categories like 
'tout' on the Indian legal system (1968-69:428; 1974:48). I 
suppose his view may have been due to the small number of lawyers 
in the Bar - he reported that during his fieldwork in 1967 
there were only 96 lawyers; or he may have been unable to identify 
them because people usually do not divulge information about touts. 
However, I suspect that while touts probably did exist in this 
Bar in the period of his fieldwork they were fewer than in the 
other districts of India.
The degree of toutism varies from region to region and with
the status of,the court. For instance, I found toutism was 
practised in the Muzaffarnagar kachahri but not to such an extent 
as Cohn (1965:106) and Khare (1972:91) noticed for the eastern 
part of the state, when they mentioned that touts waited in 
the morning for village litigants at the bus and railways 
stations. I was generally told, and my respondents confirmed, 
that toutism was greater at the high court in Allahabad city than at
6. Villages sitting on the verandah floor of one court are
waiting to attend their cases. The two young touts standing 
by them (extreme left and right) had just turned to overhear 
the conversation to find out how best they could attract 
the villagers to get their custom for a lawyer
-136-
district level. In the high court in Delhi it was also present 
(Rocher 1968-69:229; Hindustan 22 February, 1984), but at the 
Supreme Court level it was rarely in evidence. The reason for 
these variations from one level of court to another and from 
place to place is that where the knowledge about modern legal 
culture or legal literacy is greater among clients, there is 
a lower degree of toutism. This is confirmed from Gandhi's (1982: 
108) statement that, 'other things being equal, the greater 
the gap betwen the cultural systems [used for 'rural' and 'urban'] 
of clients and that of the lawyers, the greater would be the 
reliance upon intermediaries on the part of clients'. Ooman 
(1983:31) also expressed the same view when he wrote that the 
need for touts arises from the cultural gap between the client and 
the lawyer. In all probability the tout-client interaction 
becomes inevitable when the client has one or more of the following 
features: he is rural, of lower caste, lower class, and a novice 
to the court system. To such clients, the lawyer's law (the 
modern legal system) is culturally distant and thus touts appear 
on the scene. To say that this practice exists in Indian courts 
due to a lack of formal legal-aid agencies is false, for we find 
it also in American courts where the formal legal-aid agencies 
do exist, as Hale (1949:284), Johnstoke et_ al (1967) and Carlin 
(1962:87) found in their studies.
At the Muzaffarnagar kachahri touts fall into two categories. 
The first are those who had their field of activities within the 
kachahri premises and the second are those who operated outside 
the kachahri, mainly in the villages. The city people did not 
usually need the 'services' of touts due to their familiarity with 
modern legal culture and the functionaries of the legal system.
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These two categories of touts can be divided into two sub-catego­
ries: the regular touts (peshawar-dalaal, from pesha, occupation,
and dalaal, tout) and occasional touts. A regular tout is a 
person who has this job as his primary occupation and main source 
of income, while the occasional touts have other main occupations, 
although whenever they get the chance they also bring clients to 
lawyers for a commission. Before further discussion of toutism 
in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city I would like to make clear 
here that most of the clients were brought to the lawyers by 
brokers on the basis of reciprocity (ie, as a favour), not by 
touts. My estimate is that less than 20 per cent of the clients 
were brought by touts in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar. The public 
image of touts is very bad in all of north India and due to this 
they did not like having this name applied to them.
I will now discuss the role of regular and occasional touts 
who discharged their roles within the kachahri.
Touts within the kachahri
During fieldwork I could identify sixteen touts who came 
regularly to the kachahri. It was very difficult to recognise 
them because neither touts nor lawyers would admit to this kind 
of activity or identify others as touts, and the clients were not 
in a position know them. I was, however, able to acguire an intro- 
ducation to two young touts of twenty-two and twenty-six years 
old through the help of a peon who was employed by a judge who 
was a friend of mine, and I told them the purpose of my enquiry. 
After that I struck up a friendship with one of these two touts 
and he introduced me to his other tout friends. These regular 
touts had schooling of fifth to tenth grade and they came from low
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income family groups. Other factors such as caste, age, rural/ 
urban, religion and so on were not important. In this case there 
does not appear to be any connection between toutism and the 
set of 'qualities', and this will be discussed later.
The regular touts reached the kachahri about one hour before 
the courts opened and left about one hour after closing time in 
order to catch clients. While the courts were in session, from 
10am to 5pm, they walked around the kachahri, stood in the streets 
or sat under the shadow of the trees. The relationship between 
tout and client was of a temporary nature but it had many phases. 
When the tout first met a litigant he gave him the impression 
that his presence in the kachahri was for his own court work or 
that he worked as clerk in the court or government office, or as 
a munshi. If a litigant had realised what his real occupation was, 
he would never have followed the tout's advice to engage the 
lawyer suggested to him. When I asked the tout I had befriended 
how clients were caught, he told me:
'We can identify our flying birds [clients].
First of all we can identify by their dress 
whether they are from the villages or the 
cities. The city litigants do not fall into 
our hands because they already know 
lawyers in the kachahri. We get only those 
illiterate village clients who do not know 
any lawyer personally.'
The touts asked the villagers who were passing by (guessing from 
their dress, speech or activity) whether they were in search of 
a lawyer. Sometimes these touts stood by them, trying to 
overhear their conversation in order to find out how best to get 
the villagers' custom for a lawyer. If they found that a litigant 
was in search of a lawyer they would say to the litigant, 'Don't 
worry, I know of a "suitable" lawyer who is very competent and he
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charges a reasonable fee', and then give a detailed description 
of the lawyer's professional competence. In this way the tout 
established friendly relations with the litigant within a few 
minutes and put himself in such a position of trust that the 
latter acted according to his advice and would engage the lawyer 
suggested by him. During all this time the litigant was unaware 
of his real job. This kind of situation is not so unusual when 
one remembers that in India it is very common for a passing 
stranger to give advice without having been asked to by a person 
with a problem, and the latter usually pays attention to this.
In general a tout took the client to his 'pet' lawyer with 
whom he already had a business pact. But in some situations, for 
instance when specialist knowledge was needed or another lawyer 
had offered greater commission than the favoured lawyer, he could 
refer the clients to any .lawyer. Normally a tout got 50 per cent 
commission out of the total fee the lawyer charged, but sometimes 
this would vary with the nature of the case and on the tout's 
relationship with the lawyer. The regular touts got their major 
business in bail cases, for when police took an accused person 
under custody from the police station or jail to the court the 
accused had no chance to contact a lawyer himself, so at that moment 
the tout appeared and offered to get the accused released on bail. 
The tout then contacted the lawyer and asked him to make an 
application in court for bail. Some lawyers even provided fake 
sureties and witnesses, although this was obviously illegal and 
against the rules of the Bar Council.
As well as these regular touts the typists, police and court 
functionaries, stamp-vendors, notories, deed writers and 
government officials who had their offices in the kachahri
premises, and even tea shopkeepers and some munshis and lawyers, 
worked as 'occasional' touts whenever they got the opportunity.
For instance, this might happen when a litigant contacted someone 
he knew such as a typist or court clerk in the hope that the 
latter would suggest a suitable lawyer due to his familiarity with 
the kachahri. One day I was sitting in a deed writer's office 
and a litigant came who was his neighbour asked the deed writer 
for a 'suitable1 lawyer. The deed writer told the litigant not 
to worry, that he knew of a Mr Z who was a good lawyer and an 
expert handling such cases as his (ie, the litigant). 'If you are 
ready,' he ended, 'I can ask him.' After the litigant had agreed, 
he went to Mr Z's office, discussed the case with him and his 
commission (which I confirmed later), and returned to his office, 
telling the litigant that he had engaged Mr Z for him.
Usually when a lawyer got a client through a tout he charged 
higher fees than usual because he had to give the latter commission. 
When I asked the lawyers whether they thought some lawyers used 
touts or brokers (see Appendix A), out of the total number of 
lawyers 79.8 per cent stated 'yes', 12.9 per cent 'no' and 7.3 per 
cent replied 'no comment' or 'don't know'. When I asked them 
informally if they used touts or brokers themselves all respondants, 
except two young beginners, replied in the negative. Some 
lawyers, particularly those who were young, non-specialist and 
unsuccessful, could do occasional touting among their fellow 
professional members, especially when they found themselves 
incompetent to handle a case outside their own field of specialisation 
or were sometimes hard pressed for lack of time. They referred 
their clients to more competent or specialist lawyers with whom 
they had an understanding of this sort and they got a commission
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from the referred-to lawyer ranging from one-third to one-halt of 
the total fee charged from the clients.
I observed that when a litigant went to appeal in the high 
court against the judgement of the district court, or a 
victorious litigant to defend himself against the opponent's 
appeal case, they were often advised by their district lawyer as 
to whom they should engage as a competent lawyer at the high 
court. In this situation the district lawyer received a commission 
of approximately one fourth of the fee from the high court lawyer 
through a money order. I noticed that not only beginners and 
unsuccessful lawyers engaged in this practice but a few successful 
lawyers also had this sort of business understanding with the high 
court lawyers. So a lawyer, due to his influence on a client, 
could tout between one level of courts and another. The other 
types of tout could do their business only at the one level of 
court.
Touts and brokers outside the kachahri
The discussion here centres on the role of the touts and 
brokers who had their field of activity outside the kachahri; and 
since urban litigants did not need the 'help' of touts or brokers
I shall therefore concentrate on the village.
Most of the field researchers who conducted their studies of 
district courts in India found that the chronic litigant (see 
Morrison 1974)*, or 'sea lawyer' (Cohn 1965:106; Khare 1972), or 
court's 'bird' (Kidder 1974:23) is a very important para-professional 
man who brings the clients to the lawyers and spreads the modern 
legal culture at village level. Morrison (1974:49) wrote that a 
chronic litigant was one who had acquired the reputation of being 
litigious and was involved in the prosecution of cases as an end
A mukadmah-baz (centre) sitting on the lawn in the kachahri. 
He is turning his experiences to account in advising an 
illiterate couple how to pursue their cases and which lawyer 
to choose.
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in itself. Sometimes people called him 'addicted' to litigation, 
or he was compared to a gambler who could not resist the temptation 
of cards. He acquired this reputation in the first place in his 
own village; later he became well known to the lawyers for his 
persistence, for the complexity of his cases, or for his sequential 
retention of many lawyers. He might speak of himself as 'known 
to everyone' or as 'knowing everyone', and he could indulge in 
toutism. My, thesis here is that the chronic litigant often went 
to litigants to give advice as to how to pursue a lawsuit and 
engage a suitable lawyer without being asked. But litigants did 
not like to follow his advice, although they did not openly 
reject it, because of his reputation for being 'addicted' to 
litigation in Indian villages. As Khare (1972:78) noted, 'legal 
fighting is basically immoral because it is always considered to 
be a display of personal or familial economic pride (abhimaan) and 
is a result of "short-sightedness"'.
The characteristics of the 'sea-lawyer' have been described 
by Cohn (1965:106) and Khare (1972:87) in respect of the eastern 
part of Uttar Pradesh state. I found very few such people in 
the western part of the state, although Morrison (1974:55) found 
many sea-lawyers, of the sort Khare described, in the villages 
of Haryana state. Morrison called them the netaaji (political 
leader). Khare (1972:87-89) described the common features of the 
sea-lawyers fr,om Gopalpur village, UP, where five litigants of 
various castes were known to be experienced, though without law 
degrees, and shared certain features - they were literate, sometimes 
college-educated, and had legal, business and kinship contacts in 
neighbouring towns. Either the sea-lawyers themselves or their 
families had brought an action in the courts and they had thus
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been exposed to city legal specialists. They frequently talked of 
and about lawyer's law and legal organisations. They walked from 
hamlet to hamlet in the locality to give advice on pending and 
forthcoming cases. They gathered facts and explained meanings 
and always propounded the view that 'what a person is called, 
what a person is empowered to do and what he can do if properly 
approached are extremely varied in the lawyers world'. The sea- 
lawyer, Khare said, always began as an arbitrator of disputes and 
if mediation proved unsuccessful then much time was spent in 
counselling and conjecturing and a decision 'to win at court' was 
reached. They often visited in search of a suitable lawyer the 
city's kachahri, and the litigant concerned paid for 
their travel and gave presents to them on suitable occasions 
during their visits, or just after. The experience and knowledge 
of a sea-lawyer in legal matters was tested against the actual 
outcome of the court case. If the result was in favour, the sea- 
lawyer enhanced his prestige and received some gifts as a token 
of gratitude. However, if the case was lost, the sea-lawyer and 
all of those legal agents introduced by him would also lose the 
litigant's confidence, unless there was a very strong and plausible 
explanation of what had happened and what actually went wrong; 
losing a court case was not only a defeat for the litigant but for 
the sea-lawyer also.
In the villages of western Uttar Pradesh I observed that 
village litigants sought advice and help from those fellow 
villagers who frequently visited the cities for any purpose or, in 
other words, those who had 'modern contacts' with the outside 
world. These were usually local government officials such as 
land record-keepers (patwaaris), official village social workers
(graamsewaks), doctors, the chief judge of the village nyaaya 
panchayat (sarpanch), the elected head of the village council 
(pradhaan), experienced litigants and witnesses (qavaah), netaas, 
and so on. Here I would like to make two points clear. First, 
an experienced litigant is not the same as a chronic litigant and, 
second, the experienced witnesses had the same importance as the 
experienced litigants in giving advice to their fellow villagers. 
This fact has not previously been noted by other field researchers.
Among all these village level legal advisors or, as Morrison 
called them, 'para-professionals', some worked as regular or 
occasional touts when they sent or went with the litigants to a 
particular lawyer with whom they had a touting agreement. To 
illustrate this I quote an example from a field observation. One 
day I was sitting in the kachahri in the office of a successful 
lawyer of criminal law while he and his munshi were in court. A 
villager entered and I started to chat with him. During our 
conversation he mentioned that,
'You know how times have changed. Today 
I came here for the fourth time to collect 
my money [commission] from the lawyer. I 
have sent two cases from my village and 
every time the lawyer made promises, and 
today he is still not here. Seven years 
ago I worked for Mr 1P 1 [a leading criminal 
lawyer], and he always paid regularly without 
any delay'.
Some permanent clients of a lawyer also acted as touts and 
often as brokers, and I noticed they were encouraged to do this 
by their own lawyer. I observed that among the village legal 
advisors the village political leaders were the main intermediaries 
between, the client and lawyers. Generally these netaas had to 
wear handloom cotton cloths - kurtaa, payjama or dhoti - a sign 
of political leadership in India, Sometimes these netaas also
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held official positions such as pradhaan, sarpanch, and so on, in 
the villages, and had contacts with police functionaries and other 
government officials at tehsil level and at district level.
They frequently visited the district headquarters at Muzaffarnagar 
city and brought information about what was going on in the 
districts to the villagers. As one informant told Morrison (1974: 
56) about his village netaa in Haryana village, 'They are our 
village newspapers'.
These village leaders depicted themselves as helpers of all 
needy people or just 'social workers' in the villages. I found 
in the north Indian villages that the term netaa was referred 
to in both 'good' and 'bad' senses. If a netaa really helped the 
people and had political contacts outside the village then people 
used the term in a positive sense. But the village netaa who 
engaged in toutism with lawyers and other police and government 
officials and who tended to create disputes in the village was 
called netaa in a negative sense, and in this sense also it might 
also be used for chronic litigant. So a 'good' netaa worked for 
his pet lawyer as a broker and a 'bad' netaa worked as a tout from 
the point of view of the people.
As far as government functionaries outside the kachahri were 
concerned, the police officials were the main recruiting agents 
for clients for lawyers, particularly in criminal cases. Many 
lawyers became successful due to their connections with police 
officials. The police officials' position of power over the 
accused put them in a situation when they could offer clients to 
lawyers. When the police arrested a person for a criminal offence 
they could harass him in many ways, for example, they could 
assault him and/or charge him with having committed a greater
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offence. Some police regularly touted for their lawyer friends 
and many worked as brokers for return favours. I found that some 
lawyers in criminal law had permanent contacts with particular 
police stations for their business. Gandhi (1982:114) also noticed 
in the Panjab that most of the accused under police custody at a 
particular police station were subtly directed to a particular 
lawyer and the commission was collected from the lawyer by one 
of the junior police officials and then divided amongst them.
The practice of toutism, especially by police officials, 
exists not only in the Indian courts. It was reported as 
happening in the American court system also, as Carlin (1962:87) 
and Hale (1949:284) noticed in their field studies of the Chicago 
Bar. They mentioned that stylish expression employed both for 
lawyers and touts operating on the criminal side in America is 
'ambulance chasers', ie, they could chase an injured person right 
from the scene of an accident to the hospital in order to book him 
or her as a client. To quote Hale (1949:284),
'One woman, who along with her sister had 
been injured in a taxicab wreck, reported on 
the activities of the police who appeared at 
the scene of the accident. "The police took 
us to 'X' hospital and before we got in their 
car, they were giving us lawyers' cards and 
telling us not to talk to anybody. But they 
did not let us stay in 'X' hospital because 
I guess it is not a co-operative hospital 
and do not allow these chasers in there. The 
police came back and got us all the way about 
'do not talk to anybody, yes, we know you are 
in the right, everybody saw it. This lawyer 
will take care of you', and all that kind of 
stuff."'
A police officer told Hale (Ibid),
'"In most cases a lawyer can make a deal with 
a policeman; when we arrest a man we 'charge' 
him according to regulations and 'book' him,
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but we can book him for a lesser or a greater 
charge. It is like the difference in being 
charged with manslaughter instead of murder.
In both cases you have killed someone, but 
there is a helluva lot of difference in the 
punishment; lawyers often get policemen to 
book a man on a lesser charge. Then when it
gets to court the judge askes the policeman
what happened and the way he tells the story 
may make all the difference in the world. I 
arrested some fellows for disturbing the 
peace and one got real nasty and I planend 
to have him up on an assault charge, which 
is pretty serious. The next morning a lawyer 
came to me and said this boy's mother had 
come to him to get him to go into court with 
the boy. He told me that he could get me 
maybe a fine ($5) if I'd let things go easy 
with him."'
I observed very similar interactions between lawyers and 
the police officials in Muzaffarnagar district and it is clear 
from the above analysis that the relationship between police (as
touts) and the accused (as litigant) is assymetrical, because a
policeman was in the position to insist on the litigants going 
to a particular lawyer. Other government officials also referred 
the litigants to particular lawyers but mostly on the basis of 
brokerage relationships (exchange of favours); very few had touting 
relationships with lawyers. A few successful lawyers received 
clients through touts when they themselves realised the touts' 
capacity for shifting clients from one lawyer's clientage-bank to 
anothers. Usually the leading lawyers did not require the 
'services' of touts.
Touts and brokers not only function as a bridge between 
clients and lawyers, they fill up the gap between two different 
worlds, the 'rural' one and the 'urban' one. They disseminate 
modern legal culture in the villages and a lawyer can easily 
extend the size of his clientage bank through their services. The
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munshi-lawyer dyad is legitimate from the point of view of professional 
ethics, the tout-lawyer dyad is illegitimate from the point of 
view of professional ethics and law.
I have discussed in the above section the role of the people 
as nodes in the linkage between lawyers and clients. Now, in 
the following pages, I will discuss the role of the qualities on 
which both lawyers and clients recruited each other. We can divide 
these qualities into two categories: the primordial ties, ie, 
fundamental or ascribed qualities such as caste, kinship, religion, 
region, and so on, and non-primordial ties or achieved traits of 
their personalities.
3. Caste, kinship and other primordial ties
I found that ties of caste and kinship (rishtedaari) were the most 
important factors in the linking of lawyers and clients. Other 
primordial ties such as the family network of kindred kin, ties 
of common religion, ties of common residence in the village and 
common ilaaka or ganwaand (region of surrounding villages of their 
common native village) were also important bases in the lawyer's 
professional recruitment-sets and clients' resource-sets. But if a 
litigant was involved in serious litigation, for instance, a 
murder case or when a large property claim was involved, the 
primordial ties were less important than the competence of the 
lawyer. As Khare (1972:93) also noted, 'serious criminal and civil 
cases... tend to go to more experienced hands, where there may be 
so much at stake that caste, kinship, and regional loyalties 
remain of limited influence'. One could almost 'measure' primord- 
iality by this and compare for different castes.
Cohn (1965:107), Khare (1972:92-3), Morrison (1972:106),
A Sikh lawyer with his two clients sitting behind him
A lawyer (wearing the spectacles) sitting in his office 
with his apprentices and clients
Gandhi (1982:122) and Sathe et_ al (1983:67) also found in their
field studies that at district level courts, caste, kinship and
regional loyalties were the main bases on which lawyers and
clients contacted or recruited each other. In contrast to this,
Kidder (1973:126) and Rowe (1968-69:223) noticed in their studies
of district courts that clients did not appear to choose their
lawyers according to caste and kinship ties. In fact, Boissevain
(1974:83) rightly pointed out that,
’The kinship segment of a network is important 
for in most societies the relationship between 
certain categories of kinsman tends to be 
morally sanctioned. These sanctions are 
particularly strong in societies in which 
persons are embedded in corporate groups.
Where a person'is part of such a kinship 
system he will have a number of ascribed 
relations with other members of the same 
group..,. If the kinship segment of his social 
network, even if not a formal group, coincides 
with the residential segment, he will have a 
social network with a high density and a high 
measure of multiplexity.1
And in this context, Indian society - where kinship, caste and 
other primordial ties are not only important in the legal process 
but in most of the activities of their social life - is an ’ideal’ 
society. I noticed that even these primordial ties played a 
role in the private doctor-patient relationship, though not to 
the same degree as in the legal situation.
I quote here one case to show the importance of primordial 
ties in the building up of a lawyer's practice. A young lawyer, 
who began his practice in 1979 in the kachahri, became a success­
ful lawyer within a few year of starting his practice in criminal 
law. This was not becuase he was a competent and intelligent 
lawyer, but because his father, who worked as a police station 
officer at various police stations of this district till 1982,
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had sent many litigants to his lawyer son. After the father's 
transfer from this district to another district, other police 
functionaries and the leaders of his caste who were his father's 
friends regularly sent clients to him. In this way he obtained 
his clientage.
When I asked the lawyers, 'Which caste do the majority of 
your clients come from?' (see Appendix A, Q.27), 273 out of a 
total of 510 (ie, 53.7 per cent) themselves accepted that they 
got the majority of their clients on the bases of caste and 
kinship, while 14.5 per cent denied this and the rest (31.8 per 
cent) state 'no comment' or failed to give a response. When I 
repeated the question in a different way to cross-check (Q.34), 
ie, 'on which grounds do clients come to you?', most of them 
stated that the majority of their clients chose them due to their 
competence and popularity, especially when clients watched them 
in courts when they appeared in other clients' cases. In fact, 
as I noticed through observation, informal interviews with munshis 
and clients, and through checking some lawyers' daily case- 
diaries, there was a discrepancy between what the latter revealed 
and what they had answered to the questionnaire. There is a 
general tendency in India, particularly among 
the urban educated, to show that they do not believe in particular­
istic values or primordial ties, but in practice the situation 
is different. The tendency among clients was to approach those 
lawyers who had a connection with the client's village via 
family or land first, although the factional politics of 
village life could restrict choice to only those belonging to the 
favoured faction (see Khare 1972:92-3). In this way the 
factional politics of the village was carried into the formal
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legal system. Host of the lawyers had clients from their own 
villages in those cases in which the clients' opponent party (ie, 
the opposing litigant) was the state'government. The lawyers 
from urban trading castes got clients from both places - rural 
and urban - but the lawyers with a rural background got almost 
all their clients from the villages.
The importance of religion as a basis of linking between 
a lawyer and client became clear to me when I noticed that all 
Muslim lawyers had more than 90 per cent of their clients from 
their own Muslim community. A Muslim client's first preference 
was to engage a lawyer from his own caste (Muslims are also 
divided into castes in India), then the second preference he 
gave was to choose a lawyer from any caste of the Muslim 
community. I noticed that primordial ties were more important 
in the case of the lawyer-client relationship concerning the 
criminal and revenue law than in the case of civil law. In 
spite of this fact, the primordial ties were more important for 
a beginner lawyer's professional recruitment-set, to help him 
build up his practice, than in the case of a leading or a success­
ful lawyer.
I shall now discuss the second set of ties, ie, achieved 
qualities, on which lawyers and their clients contacted each other.
4. Political and other ties
If a lawyer was active in district or Bar politics then he had 
a better chance for him to get to know people, not only from his 
own caste and ganwaand, but also from other castes and ganwaands.
If he could win an assembly, a parliamentary position or an 
important post in the Bar election, he would significantly improve
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his chances for getting such clients. Many would contact him 
in the hope that his political position could influence the judges 
and magistrates. On the other hand, if a lawyer had no political 
post and he had paid more attention to politics than his legal 
practice, he could lose some clients from his clientage-bank. So 
involvement in politics for a lawyer had both a positive and 
negative side. The lawyers got very few clients on the ties of 
friendship,- through friends of friends and neighbourhood relation­
ships, but it was common for a referred person to be from the 
lawyer's caste and have a friendship with the lawyer.
The tendency to engage a lawyer who had some type of con­
nection with the judge or magistrate concerned was on the increase 
among the litigants. One beginner, a non-specialist lawyer, told 
me that,
'Once a litigant came to me from another 
district to engage me. His case was being 
held in his district's civil court. The 
reason he came to me was that the judge 
for his case was my father-in-law. I however 
refused.'
Another lawyer who started his practice as a non-specialist lawyer 
about twenty years ago won many clients within a few months of 
starting his practice because his uncle was a popular political 
leader in his ganwaand and he was the only lawyer from his native 
village. However, he was neither competent in handling the 
cases nor gave much effort to their preparation, so after some 
three to four years the size of his clientage-bank had shrunk.
By chance he was able to strike up an acquaintanceship with a 
magistrate who dealt with cases from the lawyer's tehsil; again 
his clientage-bank rose. At the same time he entered into a 
partnership with one other lawyer who was considerably more 
competent, possessing a sound legal knowledge but who was poor
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and lacked the necessary professional recruitment-set to build 
up his own practice independently; he could not even afford to 
buy an office in the kachahri. So both realised they could 
benefit from the other's help. After having known the magistrate 
for a few months, the lawyer started giving him bribes to 'favour' 
his clients. Thus after five to six years of practice this 
lawyer had become successful. All his colleagues were jealous 
and talked about him behind his back. After a few years the 
magistrate was transferred to another district and again his 
fortunes suffered a set-back as he failed to deliver the goods.
His clientage declined and he later entered into district politics, 
became a full-time politician and finally gave up his legal 
practice altogether.
This kind of story was not unusual. Some lawyers reported 
that in 1975 a Muslim district judge was appointed at Muzaffarnagar 
and within a few months he had become a good friend of some 
lawyers from his own community. Naturally they got more clients 
during his tenure in the kachahri. The same thing happened two 
years ago. A Rajput district judge, as I was told by some 
respondants, also favoured in court some lawyers from his community.
In sum, links with the judiciary were also an important 
factor in getting clients. Another good source for obtaining 
clients was through any government official with whom the lawyer 
had any type of relationship. To see more clearly how a lawyer's 
socidl background, the nature of his practice, structure of his 
professional recruitment-set, and size of his clientage-bank were 
correlated, biographies of a small representative sample of 
eight lawyers can be found in Appendix B.
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5. How do individuals become leading lawyers?
On formal legal grounds Indian lawyers are divided into two 
categories, as found in the Advocate Act 1961 (Chp 3, 12-13),
'There shall be two classes of advocates, 
namely, senior advocates and other advocates.
An advocate may, with his consent, be design­
ated as senior advocate if the Supreme Court 
or a high court is of opinion that by virtue 
of his ability (standing at the Bar or special 
knowledge or experience in law) he is deserving 
of such distinction'.
From their own point of view, the lawyers and litigants 
of Muzaffarnagar's kachahri were placed in three main ranks: at 
the top, the 'leading' lawyers (top kaa-vakil or yadaa-vakil); 
in the next rank, 'successful' lawyers (beech kaa-vakil or 
achhaa-vakil); and in the third rank were the struggling beginners 
or old lawyers (ie, chhotaa-vakil).
The title of leading lawyer was given only to ten to twelve 
lawyers of this kachahri, while about a hundred lawyers were 
considered successful lawyers as they had a sufficient income 
from the legal practice and clients in their clients in their 
clientage-banks. I asked the lawyers to give the names of five 
leading lawyers from all branches of law (ie, criminal, civil 
and revenue; see Appendix A). The five top-ranked leading 
lawyers out of the total number of 510 lawyers, whom I drew from 
the questionnaires, possessed some common features. They were 
all born and had grown up in Muzaffarnagar city and belonged to 
rich families. Four were from the Bania caste and one was a 
Brahman. Therefore all of them were from upper castes, the upper 
class and had an urban background. They were all sons of former 
leading lawyers except for one, whose father was a small shop­
keeper, but eighteen years ago he had been working as a junior
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with a high ranking lawyer of criminal law and after the latter's 
death he had retained his clientage. The respondents told me 
that this leading lawyer's senior had been the only specialist 
in criminal law in this kachahri whom clients from other nearby 
district courts engaged. Among these five top-ranked leading 
lawyers, three had their sons in practice with them, one had no 
son, while the fifth leading lawyer's son was a doctor. All of 
these leading lawyers were in the fifty to sixty-five year age 
group.
All five leading lawyers had two to four munshis due to 
workload. The four leading lawyers who were sons of lawyers 
had one or two former munshis of their fathers and the fifth 
leading lawyer had his late senior's munshi. These old experienced 
munshis were very helpful to them in many ways in maintaining 
their 'reputation' as leading lawyers. Most of the litigants 
engaged these leading lawyers when they considered that their 
litigation was of a serious nature. They charged higher fees from 
their clients than the other lawyers of the kachahri. I noticed 
that they became leading lawyers due to the combination of four
main features: (i) A ready-made professional recruitment-set
with which to get clients; (ii) Their skills in, and a sound 
knowledge of the law; (iii) Their hard work and commitment to 
their legal practice and clients; and (iv) Their links with the 
judiciary.
Without a combination of the above-mentioned four features 
it would not have been possible for any ambitious lawyer to attain 
the position of leading lawyer. I observed, for example, that some 
lawyers were hard-working and sincere about their practice and 
clients and possessed a sound knowledge of law, but could not
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become leading lawyers due to lack of a large professional 
recruitment-set and links with judges and magistrates. On the 
other hand, some lawyers who had a large professional recruitment- 
set to get clients and links with the judiciary (see earlier 
quoted lawyer's case for details), but lacked a sound knowledge 
of the law and did not work hard, could not get labelled as 
leading lawyers. At the beginning of their careers the five 
men were ordinary lawyers and did not hesitate to use the 'services' 
of touts, but after they had become leading lawyers they were less 
inclined to make use of them. After they had built up a reputation, 
their primordial ties retained very little importance as a basis 
for recruiting clients to their clientage-banks. I would like to 
elaborate here on one of the five leading lawyers mentioned.
Mr 'X', who was the son of a leading lawyer, was an ordinary semi­
specialist lawyer at the beginning of his practice for three to 
four years, but he had his father's ready-made professional 
recruitment-set, clientage-bank and his father's munshi was 
helpful in retaining them. After he had been in practice a 
few years, a district superintendent of police (SDP) was 
transferred to this district from another one who was related to 
him, and at the same time the lawyer married the daughter of the 
chief justice of the high court. Both of his kinsmen helped him, 
through their influence on the judiciary and government officials, 
to get more clients. He also had to work hard and acquired a 
sound knowledge of law. So he became a leading lawyer.
Both lawyers and clients defined a leading lawyer as one 
who had more serious cases and a higher income through his practice 
than the other lawyers. He would be honest with his clients and a 
specialist in any branch of the law.
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In conclusion, I would mention that to become a leading 
lawyer one needed primordial ties and other non-primordial ties 
to get clients at the beginning, but after one's reputation as a 
leading lawyer was established, this base was unnecessary.
Without all four features, which I mentioned above, a lawyer could 
not become a leading lawyer. I will now look at to what degree 
the lawyers acted as professionals, especially within the lawyer- 
client relationship.
6. Lawyers as professional men
In discussing the issue of whether the lawyers of Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri were professional men, two questions arise. First, what 
lawyers should be in the ideal sense, and, second, what they 
actually do in their professional activities. I have already 
dealt with the first question in Chapter Two in general terms.
In this section I will analyse the actual professional behaviour 
of lawyers of the kachahri in how far and to what degree they 
followed the professional ethic, law, and the rules of their 
Association, especially in their relationship with clients.
At the apex there is the Bar Council of India, which lays 
down the standards of professional conduct and etiquette for 
legal practitioners and safeguards their rights, privileges 
and interests, and it also lays down the procedure to be 
followed by each State Bar Council which comprise it. All 
district Bars in a state are in turn a part of the State Bar 
Council. In this way these three Associations are hierarchically 
interconnected and follow the rules laid down in the Advocate 
Act 1961. To practice in the high court or any of its subordinate 
courts (eg, district and tehsil courts) a lawyer should be
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a registered member of the State Bar Council.
Before continuing, I would like to point out that the 
lawyers of Muzaffarnagar kachahri were to some extent familiar 
with what the ideal concept of their profession was. It is 
clearly laid down in the rules of their State Bar Council and 
the Advocate Act 1961 (1983, Chp 4-5) that,
'The legal profession is a para-public 
institution which deserves the special 
'confidence of and owe ones greater respons­
ibility to the community at large than the 
ordinary run of agency...'(p21)
'...the special and rigid rules of profes­
sional conduct expected of and applied to 
a specially privileged class of persons who, 
because of their privileged status, are 
subject to certain disabilities which don't 
attach to other men and which do not attach 
even to them in a non-professional character... 
he [a legal practitioner] is bound to conduct 
himself in a manner befitting the high and 
honourable profession to whose privileges 
he has so long been admitted; and if he 
departs from the high standards which that 
profession has set for itself and demands of 
him in professional matters, he is liable to 
disciplinary action.' (p23)
According to the rules of the State Bar Council (1982:6):
'...It shall be the duty of an advocate 
fearlessly to uphold the interests of his 
client by all fair and honourable means 
without regard to any unpleasant consequence 
to himself or any other.'
It is therefore clear that a lawyer should be service 
rather than profit oriented and that he should uphold the 
interests of his clients. But in practice the situation was 
different. It was observed that lawyers seemed little interested 
in serving the interests of their clients. They treated them 
as mere sources of income and sought to extort from them what­
ever they could. Gandhi (1982:153) found the same in his study
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of a district Bar in the Panjab and he called this behaviour 
'unprofessionality1. The lawyers recruited their clients through 
different types of intermediaries (eg, touts, munshis, government 
officials, brokers, etc) on the basis of money-transaction or 
favour-exchange (as I have discussed in earlier pages) which was 
in total contradiction to their professional ideology and the 
rules of their association, as mentioned in the rules of the 
State Bar Council (1982:14) where it states that 'An advocate 
[lawyer] shall not enter into a partnership or any other 
arrangement for sharing remuneration with any person or legal 
practitioner who is not an advocate.' In reality the lawyers 
cheated their clients in many ways. In the following dicussion 
.1 will describe some instances of this which I observed in the 
kachahri of Muzaffarnagar.
Both lawyers and litigants bargained over the fee. Although 
it was not prescribed in the rules of the State Bar Council or the 
Advocate Act 1961 as to how much should be charged for different 
types of cases, it is very clear from the rules and according 
to the professional ethic that the fee which a lawyer charged 
should not be seen as the 'profit' from his 'business'. It 
should be his 'remuneration' (mehantaanaa, from mehant, labour) 
for the 'services' which he had rendered the client. In this 
he should charge a reasonable fee. And if a client was not in 
a position to, pay the fee the lawyer should render his 'services' 
free of charge, as it is mentioned in the State Bar Council 
rules (1982:12),
'Every advocate shall in the practice of the 
profession of law bear in mind that anyone 
genuinely in need of a lawyer is entitled to 
legal assistance even though he cannot pay for
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it fully or adequately and that within the 
limits of an advocate’s economic situation, 
free legal assistance to the indigent and 
oppressed is one of the highest obligations 
an advocate owes to society.1
So they should charge their fees according to the paying capacity 
of a client and the labour involved; but in practice the lawyers 
charged their fees according to the client's paying capacity and 
the seriousness of the litigation (for the client).
According to the professional ethic lawyers should treat 
all clients in the same manner without consideration for the 
latters' socio-economic backgrounds. In actual practice they 
maintained a horizontal relationship with the rich clients and 
vertical ties with the poor ones and the interesting point is 
■ that both rich and poor clients paid the same fee for a parti­
cular type of case. To those clients whom they looked upon as 
of higher socio-economic status than themselves they paid respect 
while treating with contempt those lower on this scale. Kidder 
(1974:15-16) found the same for the Bangalore city Bar. In 
effect, the lawyer's position in the social system outside the 
kachahri determined the 'professional' relationships with clients 
inside the kachahri.
Clients usually paid in instalments, but lawyers were 
careful to collect the full amount of the fee before the final 
judgement since they did not trust the clients. They occasion­
ally extracted more than the due amount on the pretext of 
rendering miscellaneous services such as typing, submitting a 
new application to the court on behalf of the client, taking 
some copies of documents on a given case in progress, or giving 
'tips' to the court officials, and so on. Regardless of the
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outcome, on every hearing date they managed to charge a little 
extra, as did their munshis. Not only this, they frequently over­
charged for the presumed services. For example, one munshi on 
behalf of his employer and client paid Rs.15 (approximately £1.00) 
to the court clerk for stamps, but he told the client that he 
had paid Rs.30 (ie, some £2.00). The clients were often aware 
of this over-charging, but they did not wish to antagonise 
their lawyers becuase they needed the latters' expertise. If 
a lawyer was not able to attend the court on the hearing date 
of his client's case due to personal reasons then he sent an 
application for an adjournment to the court through his munshi 
and the 'tip1 was paid by the client to the court clerk.
According to the State Bar Council rules (1982),
"An advocate shall not adject fees payable to 
him by his client against his own personal 
liability to the client, which liability does 
not arise in the course of his employment 
as an advocate... [He] should keep accounts 
of client's moneys entrusted to him, and the 
accounts should show the amounts received 
from the client or on his behalf, the expenses 
incurred for him and the details made on account 
of fees with respective dates and all other 
necessary particulars...' (p7)
'...Where moneys are received from or on 
account of a client, the entries in the 
accounts should contain a reference as to 
whether the amounts have been received for 
fees or expenses, and during the course of 
the proceedings, no advocate shall, except 
with the consent in writing of the clients 
concerned, be at liberty to divert any portion 
of the expenses towards fees.' (p7-8)
.'...Where any amount is received or given to 
him on behalf of his client the fact of such 
receipt must be intimated to the client as 
early as possible ... the balance if any shall 
be refunded to the client ... a copy of the 
client's account shall be furnished to him on 
demand provided the necessary coping charge is 
paid.' (p8)
In actual practice, lawyers did not maintain any accounts.
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Neither did they give receipts to the clients nor did the 
latter ask for them since they did not realise they should be 
given. Even in the form of power of attorney (vakaalatnaamah) 
the amount of how much the lawyers were going to charge was not 
stated, although the form gave it as a requirement. It was 
rare for a lawyer to refund the balance owed to a client. During 
fieldwork, when I was one day at the office of a successful 
Chamar lawyer, a Chamar litigant told the lawyer how his 'own’ 
lawyer (also a Chamar) had cheated him. He said,
'I had been in jail on a theft charge, but 
before going into prison I had given Rs.400 
[about £26.00] to my lawyer for my bail.
While I was inside he asked my family for 
extra money towards my bail. When I came out
of jail I asked him why he had taken this
extra money and demanded to know what he had 
spent it on. My lawyer replied that he had 
spent it all on my bail (zamaanat), but he 
was unable to show me the accounts indicating 
where he had in fact spent the money'.
In this case, both client and lawyer were from the same socio­
economic stratum in their community. A poor client would never
have had the courage to approach the lawyer in this way.
In a situation where a plaintiff (muaddi; vaadi) and the 
defending litigant (mudaa; pretivaadi) agreed amongst themselves 
to settle out of court, the lawyers preferred that such a 
settlement would take place after two to three hearings (peshis) 
since they could then extract a fee from them. A lawyer might 
advise a client that a spot-inspection was necessary and in this 
way gain extra money for travelling expenses and so on as well 
as a chance to see other people at the site of the dispute (for 
impression management). One day I observed a lawyer insisting 
to a litigant before being engaged that,
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1 In your case, it will first of all be necessary 
to have a spot-inspection carried out in order 
to understand the facts of the dispute, and I 
would like to go by taxi, not by bus, to your 
village [the litigant had had the dispute with 
his neighbour concerning the joint wall to their 
houses]. It will cost you Rs.400, excluding my 
fee* .
The client argued back that he had already described the physical 
details of the site of the dispute and that, in any case, he 
could not afford the proposed expense of a taxi ride. Since the 
lawyer was obviously determined to inspect the site, the litigant 
left for another lawyer.
It was a common practice for the public prosecutors (PP) to 
take bribes from the opposite party in a dispute and consequently 
not pursue their clients' cases properly in the courts. Hence 
the government counsels lost an overwhelming number of cases. On 
one occasion I observed in a civil court that a government counsel 
was not participating fully in his client's case and after the 
hearing, outside the court, another (private) lawyer whom the 
litigant had engaged privately remarked to the government counsel 
that, 'You did not conduct your client's case properly because 
the opponent client's lawyer was from your own community'.
Some respondents told me how some lawyers, particularly 
'unsuccessful' lawyers, cheated their clients. When a litigant 
came to a lawyer to engage him, or after a number of hearings, 
the lawyer could notify the client that his case was very weak 
on certain legal grounds or that the judge concerned was corrupt 
and that the opponent party was in a position to offer him a 
bribe. So if the client was serious about winning the case, 
the lawyer would suggest, he could try to approach the judge. In 
this way the lawyer would take money in the name of the judge,
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keeping it, of course, for himself. If he lost the case then 
he returned the money to the client, deducting an appropriate 
amount for expenses, telling him that the opponent party had 
already offered to the judge more money or that the latter 
was not ready to accept it. In another situation, when two 
different lawyers had approached their clients (plaintiff and 
defendant) in the same manner as above but one had to win the 
case, the lawyer usually made a 'pact' with the opposing side's 
lawyer so that the winning lawyer would give 50 per cent of the 
money to the 'loser' while the 'loser' would then refund the 
bribe money to his client, minus expenses. It was common in 
the bribe-money transaction that when a lawyer gave a bribe to 
the judge or magistrate concerned, he usually took a cut without 
the knowledge of either the judge or the client since they had 
no direct transaction. Sometimes clients might be able to 
offer the judge a bribe through other connections and it might 
even be that a client upon engaging a lawyer asked him whether 
he had any connections with the judge or magistrate concerned.
When I asked the lawyers whether they thought some lawyers 
managed to give bribes to judges to win cases (see Appendix A), 
79.9 per cent stated 'yes', 13.9 per cent 'no' and 9.2 per cent 
stated 'no comment'. This practice was strictly against the 
Advocate Act 1961, the rules of the Bar Council and the ethics 
of their profession. Some lawyers when referring a client to 
another of their colleagues or to other courts might even receive 
a commission from the referral lawyer (as I have already discussed 
in earlier sections). Kidder (1973:126) also reported this 
malpractice in his study of Bangalore city Bar. In America people 
referred to a 'finder's fee' (see Johnstoke et al 1967), as when a
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lawyer got a commission from another lawyer. In the Muzaffarnagar 
kachahri the lawyer appointed by the state government to the 
position of court-marriage officer should have charged Rs.15 for 
each court marriage. However, he in practice charged the fee 
on the grounds of the paying capacity of the applicants and in 
accordance with the 'sensitivity' of the matter (because in India 
most parents do not allow their children to marry without their 
permission).
Delay in the workings of the machinery of the court is 
common at all levels of the legal system all over India. Besides 
the delays due to the shortage of judicial staff, political 
interference and mis-administration of the courts, the lawyers 
also were responsible for delay in the judgements of cases (see 
Kidder 1973:127, 1974:28). The lawyers participated in this 
enterprise mainly in order to extract more money from their 
clients. For after a settlement of fee they charged more per 
hearing, regardless of outcome. Sometimes a lawyer could insist 
that his wealthy client file another false case on a poor 
oppsoing litigant to delay the original case (ie, in a situation 
where they presumed they were going to lose the case) and in the 
meantime the opponent would come to an agreement out of court.
On one occasion, in observing the proceedings of a civil court 
(diwaani-adaalat), I noted that one lawyer had come with his 
client for the hearing of the client's case, but the opponent 
lawyer had already submitted an adjournment application to the 
court for a further date. Then the lawyer asked the judge, in an 
informal manner, when he was going to give a judgement in that 
case. The judge replied that it was not up to him, that it 
depended on the lawyer and his opposing lawyer.
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1 On one hearing you come, then your opponent 
lawyer sends in an adjournement application, and 
on the next hearing if your opponent came then 
you would send in an adjournment application, 
and this process has been going on for one year.
So whenever the both of you decide, the outcome 
will come.1
The lawyers often invited their clients for refreshments in 
the restaurants and expected the latter to foot the bills. When 
an announcement of a court decision in favour of a client was 
made, the lawyer expected (or would ask) to be invited to a big 
tea-party in which he could in turn invite his lawyer friends 
also. Munshis also reminded the winning client about their 
tips, and both munshi and lawyer insisted that the client give 
a 'tip' to the court functionaries (see Gandhi 1982:158).
What tactics did lawyers use for 'impression management' in 
the Muzaffarnagar kachahri? According to the ethics of the 
profession, if a lawyer thoght that he was not sufficiently 
competent to handle a particular case, or his 'permanent' client 
brought a case beyond his specialisation, then he should suggest 
another lawyer to the client whom he considered competent. In 
practice he took the case himself and the client probably lost 
it due to the lawyer's incompetence. According to the rules of 
the 5tate Bar Council (1982:9),
'An advocate shall not solicit work or advertise, 
either directly or indirectly, whether by 
circulars, advertsiements, touts, personal 
communications, interview not warranted by 
personal relations, furnishing or 
inspiring newspaper comments or producing 
his photograph to be published in connect­
ion with cases in which he has been engaged
or concerned. His sign-board or nameplate should 
be of a reasonable size. The sign-board or 
nameplate or stationery should not indicate that 
he is or has been president or a member of the 
Bar Council or of any Association or that he
has associated with any person or organisation
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or with any particular type of work or that 
he has been a judge or an advocate general'.
Again, in practice the situation was quite different. Some 
lawyers had a very large nameplate and usually they mentioned
on it their other statuses, their field of specialisation and 
their native village's name, all for impression management.
They advertised their names through touts, political links and 
brokers, etc. The physical location of a lawyer's court office 
was also important in catching the clients. The price for those 
offices which were located at the entrance gates of the kachahri, 
on the corners of streets and on the opposite sides of the courts, 
was therefore higher. This occurred despite the prohibition to 
sell the office, according to the rules of the DBA, because the 
Association had the exclusive right to allocate the offices.
So if a lawyer wanted to leave his office for any reason it was 
his duty to return the ownership of the office to the DBA.
Many lawyers stocked out-of-date law books and journals in 
their 'home office' solely for the purpose of impressing the 
clients. Some lawyers who owned cars and lived at a walking 
distance of five to fifteen minutes from the kachahri premises 
usually travelled there by car for the same reason (see Kidder 
1974:14-17, Ooman 1983:37-9). It was also not uncommon for 
the lawyers to present without relevance some very long arguments 
or to read the sections of law from the books and journals 
which they brought to support their arguments or to speak loudly 
in the courts to impress their clients and other onlookers into 
thinking that they were very competent and sincere - and thereby 
preventing clients from changing sides and also to attract 
potential clients. They would speak some sentences in English to 
impress the judge and the client (in north India knowledge of
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English is still a status synrbol). Some lawyers used vulgar language and made 
scurrilous attacks on the opposite lawyer in the courts. Some 
young beginner lawyers told me of their senior lawyers' attempts 
to harras them during the hearing of cases. For instance, they 
could say to a beginner lawyer that he didn't have a proper 
knowledge of the law and needed more training. Some old lawyers 
I saw used this tactic with the result in some cases of the 
younger lawyers losing their tempers and replying in an abusive 
language.
Although it is clearly laid down in the Advocate Act 1961 
(1983:23) that, 'An advocate will not be justified in making 
a personal attack upon the complainant or witnesses or matters 
not borne out by the record nor in using language which is abusive 
or obscene or in making obscene or vulgar gestures in court', 
only the young beginner lawyers used to wear the prescribed 
uniform and well established lawyers did not bother about it 
The young lawyers did it only to impress, rather than from a 
strict adherance to the rules and the ethics of their Association.
The leading and successful lawyers were not interested in 
giving apprenticeships to the beginner lawyers because they feared 
that one day an apprentice would come in competition and shift 
some clients from their clientage-banks to his own clientage- 
bank. (it was not necessary to take an apprenticeship according 
to the State Bar Council.)
Explanation of unprofessionality
It is clear from the above discussion that lawyers of 
Muzaffarnagar kachahri were more like businessmen that 'profes­
sionals'. They differed to a degree in structural features but
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from the functional aspect they were the same. For a lawyer a 
systematic education with a degree (LL.B) was a specific feature - 
but otherwise both businessmen and lawyers had a semi-autonomous 
association, written and unwritten ethical codes, a sub-culture 
and profit-oriented values. Lawyers used tact for impression 
management as a shopkeeper would for his customers (see Oster 
1982:19-61).
When I asked the lawyers if they thought a lawyer's services 
were meant for society (Q.32), out of a total of 510 lawyers 
79.2 per cent stated 'yes' and 20.8 per cent 'no'. One day, during 
field research, when an old lawyer was filling up the question­
naire, he remarked in the context of the above-mentioned question,
'You are asking me about a lawyer's service 
orientation? We are all like prostitutes.
A prostitute waits at her kottaa (a prostitute's 
residence) for her customers and we likewise 
sit here in our bistra for clients. They have 
dalaals to bring businessness and we also take 
services of dalaals.'
Two main explanations of the unprofessional behaviour of 
lawyers are possible. In the first, the legal profession is 
very competitive since entry into it is far easier to achieve than 
for other professions such as medicine or engineering. Therefore, 
when lawyers do not have a sufficient number of clients they do 
not hesitate to break the stated norms, rules and law of their 
profession. This is the reason why leading lawyers were less 
unprofessional than the rest. 'The legal practice in litigational 
context is an entrepreneurial activity creating an entrepreneurial 
career' (Kidder 1974:189). In the second explanation, the values 
of the traditional Indian culture are seen to be in conflict with 
the values of the modern legal culture. Therefore it is a
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result of 'culture conflict'. (This will be discussed in Chapter Six).
In conclusion I would like to say that in a society where 
the gap between its general value-system and the legal culture 
is small there will be less 1un-professionality' or malpractice 
in the behaviour of legal functionaries. But there is no country 
where we can see the 'ideal type' lawyer as an actual pattern of 
behaviour. It is a difference of degree. For instance, 
in America and in other Western countries lawyers overcharge their 
fees and cheat the clients in some way. Hale (1949:285) reported 
from her study, the Chicago Bar,
'Chicago is a corrupt town and in the courts - 
especially the municipal court - judges are on 
the "take". In the state attorney's office 
the same thing applies, almost all the 
municipal courts are corrupt. The judges 
take money, not directly from the lawyer, 
but through their bailiffs.'
One respondant lawyer told her (ibid:297),
'"...There are ways of getting fees from clients 
without them knowing it. You are entitled to 
money for your services and frequently the 
client can't see it. For instance I recently 
handed a $1000 tax for closure deal for an 
organisation. I included my fees and told them 
that the deal was for $1400. They never raised 
a whisper, but they'd have called me a robber 
if I'd told them my fee was $400".'
Even in England where the general value-system of society and 
the legal culture is very similar, in 1984 Parliament passed a 
law after receiving many complaints in the context of cheating, 
delay, overcharging, etc, by the barristers and solicitors 
of their clients that now the Law Society has the power to 
inspect the files of solicitors accused of bad performance. But 
in the Indian context the corruption and unprofessionality are 
part of the informal institution of the legal system. For instance,
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the DBA in the Muzaffarnagar kachahri has never received any 
complaint against a lawyer from his client in respect of 
unprofessional behaviour. The clients had a low opinion of both 
lawyers and court functionaries with-respect to their financial 
honesty. For the village client it was a mysterious world the 
corruption of which he could not escape.
7. The standing of the legal profession in India 
A number of scholars have pointed to the former high standing of 
the legal profession in India and its domination of public life 
before Independence, particularly during the years of the 
Independence movement. Since this period, however, its profes­
sional prestige and public influence have gradually declined 
(free, Schmitthener 1968-69:381; Dhavan 1977:6; Bastedo 1968-69:
286; Galanter 1984:515; Kidder 1974:17; Koppell 1968-69:419).
Even the fourteenth report of the Law Commission of India (1958:
556) refers to this.
It is, of course, well known that lawyers who took their 
legal education in England played a very important role in the 
anti-British rule movement and enjoyed great respect and public 
influence. But Levy (1968-69:418) has challenged the idea that 
the legal profession as a whole lost its prestige after 
Independence. Fie said that lawyers still dominate the Parliament 
and other significant realms of Indian public life, and he warned 
that statements about decline should be qualified. Recently, an 
Indian sociologist, Ooman (1983:3-9), submitted that the public 
position of Indian lawyers had not been on the wane since Independence, 
and he quoted M K Gandhi in his argument that lawyers facilitated 
British rule as much as they acted against it: "'My firm opinion is
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that the lawyers have enslaved India... and have confirmed 
English authority. But the greatest injury that they have done 
to the country is that they have tightened the English grip. Do 
you think that it would be possible for the English to carry on 
their government without law courts,"(1938:54-6).' Ooman's 
second point was that the lawyers' prestige had not derived from their 
professional status but their status as freedom fighters. Third, 
what was valued was not their technical expertise as lawyers but 
their 'spirit of sacrifice and service' in the freedom struggle. 
Fourth, the prestige accorded to them after Independence was due 
to their presence in legislatures and in ministries and thus as 
public, men. Fifth, Lawyers were well represented amongst those 
who fought the authoritarian impulses of the government during 
the internal emergency declared in June 1975. Lastly, and more 
recently, an increasing number of those in the legal profession, 
including lawyers, judges, legal journalists, and so on, have 
been acting especially through public interest litigations to aid the 
fight against exploitation and poverty and for change and development. He 
further added that their role as public men differed qualitatively 
in the colonial and post-colonial periods.
I would agree with Ooman, that the public influence of lawyers 
did not decline after Independence and go even further to suggest 
that the part they play in public life is increasing. In Muzaffar­
nagar, for example, there appeared to be no social or political 
agitation in which they were not involved or were not the leaders.
They were always ready to raise public issues and were the most 
influential members in all the political parties. In effect, a 
legal background is a very useful asset for those aspiring to 
political leadership since it providers a practical means for
-175-
solving public problems. However, my interpretation of the public 
image or standing of the legal profession differs from that of 
Ooman. He gives several reasons for why people treated lawyers 
ambivalently and with suspicion, that
'The legal profession deals with situations 
of conflict and ultimately only one of the 
contending parties can "win" while the other 
should "lose". The losing party invariably 
attributes the failure to the incompetence, 
indifference or even the strategy played by 
the lawyer.1
and also that
'The public image of the profession is reinforced 
partly because the profession is associated 
with certain classes or ethnic/primordial 
collectivities as disputes are more common 
among them. Not only that, even a person who 
offends the collective conscience can hire a 
lawyer. From the lawyer's point of view a 
person is not guilty until it is established 
that he has committed the crime. But from the 
perspective of the public the lawyers accept 
"any brief simply for the money". This adversely 
affects the service orientation image of the 
profession.'
My main criticism of Ooman is his lack of empirical 
study of the popular view of legal practitioners. From my 
own observations and informal interviews with the lawyers and 
the litigants in the district of Muzaffarnagar the public image 
of the legal profession did not seems as good as was enjoyed 
in the past, this due to greater public knowledge about court 
procedures arjd lawyers' actions because of better communications 
and wider education.
Previous chapters have discussed how lawyers displayed 
non-professional behaviour in their dealings with their clients.
The lawyers overcharged and instigated their clients to file 
false suits against their opponents. They produced false witnesses
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and facts and deliberately delayed the outcome of a case in their 
own interests. Thus if litigants are aware of the precise ways 
and occasions when their lawyers cheated them, they were hardly 
likely to consider them as ideal professionals. However, what 
alternative did they have to the technical-legal authority of 
the lawyer in the courts? Several litigants remarked that where 
the dacoits usually did their job at night, lawyers were the 
daytime robbers. Moreover 89.4 per cent of the lawyers stated 
themselves that the prestige of their profession was decreasing 
when asked the question, 'Do you think the prestige of the 
legal profession is decreasing? If "yes" then what do you think 
are the reasons?' (see Appendix A). The reasons for the 
decline which they mentioned reflect their social and professional 
prejudices. Lawyers from the upper castes, for example, blamed 
the declining status of the profession on the lower caste lawyers 
whom they considered uncivilised and poor practitioners. The old 
and successful lawyers blamed the newcomers on the grounds that 
they did not have enough patience, a proper knowledge of law and 
their unwillingness to work hard in preparing their clients' cases. 
Hence they engaged in non-professional activities. On the other 
hand, newcomers blamed old successful and leading lawyers since 
they were not ready to give them proper guidance and training 
and kept to themselves even the minor law suits which should 
have been lef^ t for the beginners.
Here I submit, that in a society where primordial ties play 
a crucial role in formal organisations, these organisations cannot 
function according to the ideal. In this situation it is dif­
ficult for the actors in a formal organisation to maintain their 
image according to that ideal. Von Mehren (1964-65:1184) rightly
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pointed out that,
'In societies in which the law in the books 
does not reflect fairly accurately the 
community's accepted and operative values, the 
lawyer tends to be looked upon as a manipulator. 
Individuals turn to law and to lawyers when 
their behaviour and their values are not those 
that are generally accepted. The law and the 
the lawyer provide official sanction and 
support for such deviant behaviour.'
Thus the litigants are also responsible in some degree for the 
decline in the image of the legal system and the legal profession.
In the next chapter I shall deal with the politics of the 
Bar in order to examine the bases of grouping amongst lawyers. There 
it will be shown that the lawyers' non-professional behaviour 
was not solely limited to the dealings with their clients but 
reached into both the organisation and the functioning of their
Association.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The politics of the district Bar
In this chapter I shall discuss the politics of the district 
Bar of Muzaffarnagar city, how different types of informal 
groups emerged and operated among the lawyers and how these 
informal groups were involved in the recent election of the 
managing (executive) committee of the DBA. This Bar election 
took place in March 1984 during my fieldwork, which provided me 
with a good opportunity to get a clear picture of informal 
socio-political relationships among the Bar members. Finally, 
the judiciary's involvement in Bar politics will also be 
discussed.
Studies of the Indian legal profession in the sociological 
and anthropological literature are rare; those discussing the 
internal political structure of the legal profession are scarcer 
still. Only Morrison (1968-69:251-66) has touched on the subject 
and I therefore think it is valuable to provide further data.
The issue is, however, a complex one and would need a separate 
thesis to do it justice. Given the lack of space available 
here I will restrict my discussion of the Muzaffarnagar city 
Bar politics to looking at what degree the lawyers followed the 
rules and ethical norms, that is, to what degree they acted as 
professional'men in their 1associational1 behaviour.
1. The District Bar Association: its organisation and rules 
Each year the members of the DBA elect a managing committee of 
twenty-five members from amongst themselves. This managing
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committee consists of nine office-bearers - one president, two 
vice-presidents, one secretary, four joint-secretaries and one 
treasurer - and sixteen ordinary members. This managing 
committee is responsible for all activities of the DBA. According 
to the rules of the DBA, the election should be held in the 
last week of March in each calender year. This managing 
committee usually meets once in a month for the executive and 
managerial business of the DBA, but in an emergency the president 
or the secretary can call a meeting at any time. It is also 
mentioned in the DBA rules that a member of the Association who 
is in arrears of subscription or other dues is not entitled to 
to participate in elections. If a member fails to deposit the 
dues of the DBA for three months his DBA membership is revoked.
The main aims and objects of the said committee which are 
laid down in the Rules of the District Bar Association are as 
follows:
1. To maintain a library, a reading-room and a 
common-room and to provide and maintain such 
other amenities for the members as may be 
deemed necessary.
2. To watch the state of law, the progress of 
legislation and the civil liberties of the 
people and also to take the necessary steps 
to safeguard the rights of the people.
3. To provide and maintain a high standard of 
professional conduct among the members of 
the Association; and
4. To safeguard the interests of the legal 
. profession.
Now I come to the point as to what degree the members of 
the DBA followed the ethics and rules of their Association in 
Bar activities. Morrison (1968-69:253-4) reported from his study 
of Ambala city Bar,
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1 In the day-to-day relations among member of 
the Bar, caste is unimportant as a determinant 
factor of social behaviour. It is, of course, 
a factor in recruitment to the profession. An 
urban Aggarwal [a sub-caste of the Bania caste] 
boy stands a better chance than does a rural 
Chamar [a lower caste] boy of coming from a 
family in which literacy is high and other members 
are in government service or professions and 
where opportunities for law study are possible.
But once bath Chamar and Aggarwal become lawyers 
their common professional identity tends to 
cancel the differences of caste identity.'
But this was not true in the case of Muzaffarnagar kachahri 
where, as I shall show, caste was the main determining factor 
in social relationships among the lawyers. For instance, an 
urban Aggarwal lawyer would maintain a social distance from a 
Chamar lawyer in the kachahri although not to the same degree 
as they would have maintained outside the kachahri.
The Bar politics of the Muzaffarnagar kachahri was based 
on caste-factionalism (jativaad). Each caste had its own 
caste-faction (gut), ie, the Jat faction, the Bania faction, 
the Muslim faction and so on. The main features of these caste 
factions were: They were paramount; the criterion for recruiting
the members was solely the caste tie; and each caste-faction 
had its own leader but it was not possible for a leader to get 
the support of all members in every conflict situation due to 
their personal interests and sometime due to personality conflict.
In the beginning, about twenty years ago, Bar politics were 
based on rural-urban ties and the cohesion of caste-factions 
was very loose. At that time all lawyers were from the upper 
and middle castes with both rural and urban backgrounds. When 
I had an interview with an old Jat lawyer (who came from a 
village) he told me that about twenty years ago when he started 
his practice he had one day gone to see the president of the
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DBA, who was from the urban Bania caste, to get an application 
for membership of the DBA signed. This took place during the 
lunch break, when the president was in the restroom of the DBA 
building. The president refused to sign and said that the 
lawyer was a ganwaar (ie, uncivilised, since he was a villager) 
and did not know the correct time to see the president. The 
latter asked the lawyer to return during office hours and with 
an appointment. Trading castes like the Bania, Jains, Khatri and 
the Brahman were considered urban castes by the people, and 
the rest of these castes’were considered to be rural based.
Now the situation has changed. Not a single lawyer from the 
urban Bania caste would have the courage to behave in this 
way to a Jat lawyer. The rurals from peasant castes have 
more members and influence and since they started settling in 
the city the rural-urban base of the social relationship has 
disappeared. Caste rather than urban residence has now become 
the strongest basis of social relationships amongst the lawyers.
The cliques
The main characteristics of a clique which have been 
described in sociological and anthropological literature (ie, 
Boissevain 1974:174-81; Mayer 1966:166; Sharma 198 :180; Cooley 
1909:23-31; Homans 1951:133) are as follows:
1. *A clique is a very small informal group.
2. It is based on a high rate of interaction 
among members which gives them a degree 
of organisation
3. Generally it is considered non ego- 
centred or leaderless.
4. It has no clear common goal other than 
the exchange of confidences, chit-chat
and other emotional experiences between its
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members but it may, however, become 
specifically goal-oriented in some situations.
(Eg, if all members decide to support a 
particular party or candidate in an election.
5. A clique normally shows little or no 
internal stratification among the members.
6. Members of a clique very often have similar 
interests and aspirations, are generally of the 
same age and sex and come from the same 
socio-economic background.
7. Members of a clique maintain a pattern of 
of norms in their behaviour and a sense of 
common identity.
8. Cliques are not necessarily rivals of or in 
competition with other cliques.
9. Compared with some other informal groups, a 
clique has a permanent nature.
In the muzaffarnagar kachahri a lawyer would most frequently 
interact with a very small group of about four to six of his 
colleagues in the kachahri during leisure time and in the evenings 
they would gather at the residence of one of them to share 
common feelings, chit-chat and to discuss politics from Bar 
level to national level. I call this small group of close 
colleagues a 'clique'. The members of such a clique were 
roughly in the same age-group and they very often had the same caste 
and class background and had similar hobbies and aspirations.
A very few lawyers, who had a 'modern, secular' outlook or 
could not get recognition from their own caste fellow-lawyers for 
personal reasons, formed cliques without caste and religious con­
siderations. Thus there were a few non-caste based cliques as 
well. If two lawyers were in competition to recruit the same 
clientage to their own clientage-banks they would not become 
members of a common clique due to their conflict of interests. 
Notwithstanding that they belonged to the same age-group, the 
same caste and class background and had similar hobbies and
12. The members of the Jat faction discussing electoral 
strategy amongst themselves
11. A clique of young lawyers sitting during lunch-time on 
the lawns of the DBA building
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aspirations.
Morrison (1968-69:259) observed that in the Ambala city 
Bar the classmate tie was the main base of cliques . But in 
kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city this tie had very little 
importance in the formation and maintainance of a clique. The 
reason for Morrison's observation may be that generally 
educated people do not want to show their caste feelings.
Throughout.India they tend to project themselves as 'secular- 
democratic' value orientated. For example, in response to the 
question, 'Please list your four colleagues' names' (see 
Appendix A; verbally I told the respondants that 'colleagues' 
meant their close friends among the lawyers), one young Rajput 
gave names of four lawyers from different castes. But I knew 
from observation that all members of his clique were from his 
own caste. So to confirm my observations, when one day he 
requested me to take his photograph I asked him to call all 
his close lawyer friends since I wished to take a photograph 
of them together in a group. The friends whom he called were all 
from his own caste, as well as being of the same age group and 
having the same class background. In the same way, Morrison’s 
lawyers may have said one thing, but acted differently. In sum, 
in the Muzaffarnagar kachahri, caste loyalty was important not 
only outside the kachahri but also in the social relationships 
among the lawyers in the kachahri.
Factions and coalitions
The factions were made up of cliques, and because cliques 
were usually of one caste, the faction was a single caste - though 
there were exceptions, just as there were a few multi-caste cliques.
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It is evident from the data on caste composition of the Bar 
(see Chapter Three) that a candidate could not be elected with 
the support of a single caste faction since no caste was in an 
overall majority. Hence pressure would come on a caste faction 
to form a coalition (gatbandhan) with other caste factions 
to win the Bar election. Thus above the cluster of caste- 
based cliques which formed a caste-faction was a coalition 
formed by several of these caste factions. A coalition has 
been defined (see Boissevain 1974:170-73; Thoden Van Velzen 1973: 
219-50) as a temporary alliance of distinct parties or groups 
for a limited purpose(s). It may disappear when a certain 
goal(s) is achieved, or it may convert into a formal group. 
Boissevain (ibid:171) said that alliance meant joint use of 
resources by the members of a coalition to achieve their common 
goals. But the resources remained linked with the persons or 
groups who brought them into a form of coalition and might even 
collapse the alliance. The rights and duties of the members 
of a coalition vary from member to member on the basis of their 
contribution to the coalition and the normative structure of the 
coalition. The groups which emerge in a coalition usually 
remain distinct and their specific identity within the coalition 
will not be replaced by the coalition identity.
The type of coalition with which I am concerned in this 
chapter, Thoden Van Velzen (ibid) called a 'levelling coalition'. 
The main features of this type of coalition have been described 
by Thoden Van Velzen on the basis of a study of a Tanzanian 
village as follows:
1. The levelling coalition will be target-
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orient ed because it becomes 'visible' through 
its activities against a target and the 
only basis for membership is shared 
aversion of this target.
2. The levelling coalition is not ego-centred 
at least not centred around an instrumental 
leader because no member will be in the 
position to take authoritative decisions.
3. It is a single-purpose unit and loosely 
structured because coalition members often 
have nothing in common except to achieve a 
specific target (eg, to win an election) 
when the target disappears, generally the 
coalition collapses.
4. A coalition cannot mobilise all individual 
members in every conflicting situation from 
its allied groups and cliques.
Now I would like to discuss the recent DBA election in 
Muzaffarnagar city in the conceptual frame of reference outlined 
above.
2. The Bar election: a case study
As I mentioned earlier, at the beginning of this chapter, Bar 
politics was based on caste factionalism. For over fifteen years 
the different caste factions formed rival coalitions for 
winning the most seats in the election of the managing 
committee of the DBA. A coalition would nominate the candidates 
from its allied members (caste factions) on the basis of their 
numerical strength. The caste faction would choose its 
candidates on the basis of an individual member's popularity 
in the kachahri, his loyalty to the caste faction and his
ability to attract cliques from the rival coalition. Generally
caste factions had shifted from one coalition to another in
past elections. But the two bigger caste factions, ie, the Jat
and Bania factions, had never made a coalition, and other caste 
factions joining and leaving these two. Thus the Jat and Bania
I
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factions were as two opposed 'core' factions, with shifting allies. 
These two castes had also opposed each other in parliamentary and 
State Assembly elections. But for the first time, in the Bar 
election held in March 1984, these two caste factions formed a 
coalition to win the election.
This happened because a leading Bania lawyer, who was the 
leader of the Bania faction, and some other members of his caste- 
faction felt that their faction was not well represented on the 
outgoing managing committee of the DBA. Notwithstanding that 
it was the second largest caste faction, it had only one officer 
and one ordinary member. Therefore the leader of the Bania 
faction bargained with the leader of the Jat faction - the biggest 
faction in the Bar - suggesting that a coalition between them 
would enable them to win all seats, and he offered the Jat 
leader the highest post, ie, the presidency. Both agreed and 
then contacted the leader of the Rajput faction to join their 
coalition. The latter also agreed, because he felt that if these 
two biggest caste-factions were going to contest the election 
jointly they would certainly win and, secondly, should there be 
any conflict between these two caste factions about the distribution 
of tickets for the election at the final stage then there would 
be a strong possibility that he would be chosen as a candidate 
for the presidency, a post which he had long sought. Some young 
Jat and Rajput lawyers who were very enthusiastic about election 
activities and who felt that their cliques were not well repre­
sented on the outgoing managing committee also supported the idea 
that their factions' leaders should join hands. In this way the 
Jat, Bania and Rajput factions formed the 'X' coalition and the 
'refugee' faction also joined it.
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The rest of the caste factions formed the ' Y' coalition, 
since if they joined the 'X' one it was unlikely that they would 
be well represented in the distribution of tickets and because 
the Jat, Bania and Rajput factions had already decided the tickets 
for high posts amongst themselves. It was therefore better for the 
rest of the factions to form another (the ' Y1) coalition, where 
a lawyer might then have more of a chance of getting a position 
later on. -Thus the Muslim, Tyagi and Gujar factions formed the 
1Y 1 coalition. Some members of the Brahman, Chamar and other small 
factions and multi-caste cliques joined the above coalitions.
Some caste-based cliques who were dissatisfied with the distri­
bution of tickets or the alliance of their caste faction in 
a certain coalition joined the opposing coalition. For example, 
some Brahman faction cliques were against the alliance of their 
caste faction with the 'X' coalition. They felt that in this 
coalition they would not get enough tickets, but because the leader 
of the Brahman faction had had his apprenticeship under the 
leader of the Bania faction and for whom he had great respect, he 
therefore followed him. The second in command of Brahman faction, 
who desired the post of secretary and who was a rival of the 
reigning leader, managed to mobilise some Brahman faction cliques 
who would support only Brahman candidates but without consideration 
of coalition membership. The Chamar faction had no single 
leader so they also allied themselves with one or other of the 
coalitions.
Thus there were many reasons for particular allegiences. A 
member of a coalition who greatly desired a ticket but who did not 
succeed in getting one and at the same time had enough support in his
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caste faction joined the opposing coalition after being offered 
a ticket. A coalition would use its tickets to attract votes from 
their own caste factions who were allies of the opposing coalition. 
Table 13 thus appears to indicate that candidates were not 
selected in either coalition on the basis of caste faction, but 
the majority were aligned on the basis of caste in a coalition.
The Brahman faction, which had divided, could not obtain enough 
tickets, i'e, candidates, for a position. Moreover, the Chamar 
faction did not get even a single ticket in either the 1X1 or the 
1Y1 coalition. In the last election, the Bania, Gujar, Rajput, 
and Brahman factions had formed one coalition and the Jat, Muslim 
and refugee factions formed the opposing one (see Table 14). The 
remaining smaller factions had joined either of them. The former 
coalition, 'A', then won all the posts in the last election 
except for the one of vice-president and two membership posts 
despite the fact that the president's caste faction was the 
ally of the opposing coalition, ie, 'B'.
Table 13. List of the outgoing managing committee of the 
DBA by caste
Post Caste (with numbers)
President Jat
Vice-president Rajput
Vice-president Sa ini
Secretary Tyagi
Joint secretary Rajput
Joint secretary Muslim
Joint secretary Gadaria
Joint secretary Tyagi
Treasurer (l) Bania
Members (16) Jats (3); Rajput (3); 
Muslim (2); Tyagi (2); 
Bania (1); Brahman (1); 
Gujar (1); Refugee (l)
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Table 14. The composition of the coalitions in the two 
Bar elections
Past election March 1984 election
Main allies of 
Coalition 'A1
Main allies of 
Coalition 'B1
Main allies of 
Coalition 'X'
Main allies of 
Coalition 1Y'
Bania faction 
Gujar " 
Rajput " 
Brahman "
Tyagi "
Chamar 
Other mino
Jat faction 
Muslim " 
Refugee "
faction 
r factions
Jat faction 
Bania "
Rajput "
Refugee "
Brahman 
Chamar 
Other mino
Muslim faction 
Tyagi " 
Gujar "
faction 
faction 
r factions
Note: The approximate sizes of the rival coalitions in the 
recent election were: Coalition 'X': 335; Coalition 1Y1:266.
In the March 1984 election, the Jat faction was the biggest, 
next in order were the Bania, Muslim, Tyagi and other factions, 
on the basis of their numerical strength in the DBA (see bottom 
of Table 15.
Table 15. The total number of candidates by coalition and caste
Post Coalition 'X' 
Candidate's caste
Coalition 1Y ' 
Candidate's caste
President
Vice-president
ii ii
Secretary
Joint-secretary
H
ii
it
T reasurer
Ordinary members (16)
Jat
Rajput
Sikh
Bania
Bania
Jat
Brahman
Rajput
Saini
Jat (5); Rajput (3); 
Bania (0); Jain (3).
Jat
Rajput
Tyagi
Muslim
Gujar
Jat
Brahman
Rajput
Tyagi
Jat (2); Tyagi (7); 
Gujar (3); Muslim (4).
One Independent candidate for secretary was from the Jat caste.
Approximate caste composition of all the voters: Jat (130), 
Bania & Jain (115), Brahman (60), Muslim (80), Tyagi (60), 
Rajput (35), Chamar (22), Gujar (21), Refugee (20), Others 
(58). Total number of voters: 601.
It was a responsibility of the outgoing managing committee
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to select two or three returning officers with the concensus of 
all the candidates at a general meeting of the DBA. The pres­
ident of the outgoing committee, who was in coalition 'Y', 
proposed three men whom he considered to be unbiased towards both 
rival coalitions, but many young lawyers from coalition 'X' 
objected to them and barracked the president. Some of them 
used abusive language and the meeting became a free for all with 
no holds barred. In fact this was common practice at these 
general meetings, as I observed on several occasions. Some lawyers 
from coalition 'X' suggested that the returning officers should 
be selected on the basis of the coalitions, alleging that the 
president had proposed his own men as returning officers. The 
situation became very tense, but finally the majority of 
lawyers from both coalitions accepted the president's proposed 
list.
The candidates
Coalition 'X' nominated Mr 'S', a Jat lawyer, for president 
and a Bania lawyer for secretary, Mr S was a semi-specialist 
(dealing with civil and revenue law) and a successful and leading 
lawyer in his community. He had been living in Muzaffarnagar 
city for about thirty years, but had maintained a relationship 
with his native village and ganwaand through land ownership, 
kindred and family ties. He joined this Bar in 1954 and had 
been president of the DBA for four terms, as well as having once 
had the post of secretary. He was leader of the Jat faction in 
the kachahri and had three young apprentices from his own caste 
who worked hard in his election campaign. He had once been 
general secretary of the district unit of the Communist Party,
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with his colleagues calling him ’comrade’ as a result, but 
during my fieldwork he was not a member of any political party, 
although he did support Charan Singh (ex-prime minister of 
India).
The candidate for the post of secretary was a successful 
non-specialist middle-aged lawyer from a business family in the 
city. He was not a popular figure in the kachahri, even within 
his own ca.ste faction. However, the leader of the Bania faction, 
a good friend of his, proposed his name to the combined leader­
ship of the 'X1 coalition which they accepted.
The leaders of the ' Y' coalition selected for their candi­
date of president Mr 1H1, who was the outgoing president of 
the DBA. Like Mr S he was a Jat, but his fallowing in his own 
caste faction was small since the Jat lawyers doubted in his 
loyalty to his caste. This was on account of his ’secular- 
democratic' outlook and his role as president of the outgoing 
committee. The majority of Jat lawyers belonged to Mr S's clan 
rather than his. He was offered a ticket for the highest post, 
ie, president, and so it profited him to remain in coalition 'Y1. 
Secondly there were personality differences between him and 
Mr S and as a result of them both belonging to the same caste both 
competed with each other for clients; Mr H always joined the 
coalition which opposed that one to which Mr S belonged. Both 
had a similaj? social background, Mr H belonging to a farming 
family from one of the villages of the district. He had been 
practising in the kachahri for about the last twenty years 
and was a successful, semi-specialist lawyer (criminal and civil 
law). He was a member of the Janta Party. Coalition 1Y1 had 
chosen him as their candidate in the hope that at least he would
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manage to attract some Jat lawyers from the rival coalition 'X',
or at least those who were his kind and came from his lineage
(gotraa). The second advantage in choosing him was that he had 
been elected in the previous election.
Coalition 1Y 1 had chosen a non-specialist Muslim lawyer as 
a candidate for the post of secretary. He too, like Mr H, was 
not a popular figure in the kachahri, nor in his community, as 
the candidate of a rival coalition. But the leader of the 
Muslim faction had recommended his name to the leaders of 'Y1 
coalition and the Muslim faction was the largest in 1Y'.
Both coalition 1X' and 'Y1 selected their candidates for 
other less important posts on the basis of their allied caste 
factions' and cliques' numerical strength within the respective 
coalitions. The posts were distributed to the allied factions
and cliques and it was the job of these to choose particular
candidates. A Jat lawyer of about thirty-eight years old, who 
had stood for secretary in the last two Bar elections, again 
stood for the same post as an independent. He had never before 
won an election because of his belief in non-caste based politics.
In this election he promised in his manifesto to abolish 
casteism (jativaad), factionalism (gutbandi), and corruption 
(bhrastaachar) in the Bar. But this time also he was unsuccessful.
The election scene
The whole scenario of the DBA election was like one for an 
assembly or parliamentary election. For example, both changing 
sides and forming coalitions went on. The main difference of course 
was that a Bar election was on a very small scale and there were 
not many transactions between candidates and voters. All the
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candidates and votes had at minimum a law degree and there were 
no outside middlemen amongst them.
Most of the candidates and their supporters put up 
posters and painted slogans at night on the walls of the 
kachahri premises. They distributed pamphlets to the voters.
In both coalitions the young lawyers were more enthusiastic 
than the older ones throughout the electioneering process.
The candidates and their stronger supporters went campaigning 
from door to door in all quarters (muhallas) of the city.
As I -have stressed before, all these activities were against 
their professional code.
Morrison (1968-69:293) observed in his study of Ambala 
city Bar that the personalities of the leading lawyers tended 
to be the main issue at the time of Bar elections and all the 
three candidates for the post of president were leading lawyers. 
But in the case of the Muzaffarnagar kachahri, the personalities 
of the leading lawyers were an unimportant issue and with only 
one exception the leading lawyers did not participate openly 
in the electioneering process but just worked behind the scenes. 
Moreover they rarely attended Bar meetings.
The day before the election both coalitions called 
election meetings of their supporters and candidates. Coalition 
'X' arranged its meeting at the residence of the leading Bania 
lawyer, who was the leader of the Bania faction. As I have already 
pointed out, he was in fact the moving force behind the format­
ion of this coalition. About seven to eight speakers addressed 
the meeting who represented different caste factions of 'X'.
All these speakers emphasised the issue of the unity of the 
coalition and outlined their election strategy - how they would
13. A general meeting of the DBA
14. The day before the Bar election at the home of one of 
the coalition leaders where electoral strategy is being 
discussed by the members of the coalition
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collect the votes from the different towns of the district at night 
or early in the morning before the election day: and they would check 
that voting went according to the rules and canvass the voters at the time 
of polling as well. The leaders of the coalition allocated 
duties to some members for the polling and vote-counting activities. 
Finally, before the customary tea party, the host Bania lawyer 
said in his valedictory speech,
1 This is the first time in the history of our 
Bar that the snake [the emblem of the Jat
faction] and mongoose [that of the Bania
faction] have formed a party [coalition].
I'm sure we'll win the election and I hope 
this party will continue even after it.'
However, most of the lawyers doubted that the coalition would
continue after the election, largely- due to the fact of the
opposing images the Jat and Bania castes had among the people in 
general. Where the Jats, a village-based cultivating caste, 
are considered courageous, hard working, but impolite by the 
other castes, the Bania, an urban trading caste, have the 
image of being soft-spoken, profit-oriented, but also selfish 
and cowardly in public life.
Coalition 'Y' arranged its election meeting at the residence 
of Mr H, the candidate for the post of president. The same 
issues were discussed at this meeting as at the meeting of coa­
lition 'X', ie, the unity of the coalition, how to mobilise 
votes and collect them before the election, the allotment of 
duties for election day, and so on.
Polling took place in the DBA building between 10am and 5pm, 
and vote counting began the same day at 7pm. It continued 
throughout the night and was completed in the morning. All the
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candidates and their supporters stayed up the whole night for fear 
that their rivals would steal ballot-papers or would engage in 
unfair practices in the vote counting. This had happened in 
past election, as I was told by some respondants. But the whole 
electioneering process on this occasion took place peacefully.
Coalition ’X’ won the election. Only the treasurer (Tyagi), 
and five ordinary members were elected from 'Y' coalition, which 
shows that,these could manage to get some votes from the 'X' 
coalition. Out of the total electorate of 601, 562 cast their 
votes and six votes were declared invalid. Coalition 'X1 
celebrated their victory with a procession which went around the 
kachahri. Mr 5 from coalition 'X' was elected president with a 
margin of 76 votes, and the secretary was also elected from the 
same coalition, though with a margin of only four votes. Some 
electors from both coalitions did 'cross voting', ie, gave 
their vote to the candidate(s) of the rival coalition, because 
the rival candidates belonged to their caste or clique. But 
most of the Jat lawyers voted in favour of their coalition's 
candidates as they do in assembly and parliamentary elections 
as well. A young Brahman candidate from coalition 'X' who lost 
the election for membership of the managing committee felt that 
he was only defeated because the leaders of his coalition had 
not bid his surname along with his name on the posters and 
pamphlets, agd for this reason many voters from his caste could 
not identify his caste. Otherwise he thought he would have got 
many votes from the rival coalition, as many Brahman lawyers 
voted only for candidates from their own caste without having any 
loyalty to either coalition.
The most popular daily Hindi local newspaper, Bulletin
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Samachaar, covering the Bar election results on the front page 
wrote (15/4/84),
'For the first time in the history of the Bar 
election, the two main most active rival 
guts [ie, Jat and Bania factions], after 
forming their gutbandhan (coalition), have 
defeated the third gut. As a result of this 
coalition a Bania candidate has been elected 
secretary for the first time after a fifteen 
year gap.... The Bar election has been conduct­
ed purely on the basis of jativaad (castism), 
so the majority of lawyers voted on the basis 
of their caste loyalty.' [My translation]
The advantages of being an office bearer
What did a lawyer gain from becoming a DBA office bearer?
He got honour and recognition from his fellow members of the 
DBA, and it implied that he was a popular and influential 
figure in the Bar to the judiciary (judges and magistrates).
This position automatically enabled a lawyer to recruit more 
clients, because many of them, especially the urban clients, 
realised that those lawyers who held the key posts in the DBA 
were successful in forging extra-judicial ties with the judiciary. 
The officials of the DBA often used to meet the judiciary in 
connection with Bar-Bench matters, which promoted their informal 
or extra-judicial relationships. For their part, the judiciary 
also used to try to maintain good relationship with Bar officials, 
mainly the president and secretary, because they were afraid of 
being criticised by them at meetings of the DBA, and also of 
being transferred to another place, as the DBA could request the 
government to do this. Thus the relationship between judiciary 
and Bar officials was reciprocal. Not only the judicial officals 
but also other government officials did not like to be trans­
ferred from this district to other ones in the State since 
their sources of 'extra income' (bribes, commissions, etc) were
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higher in Muzaffarnagar. The prosperity of this district 
enabled people to pay out more to government officials.
For these reasons the judges and magistrates used to 
participate in Bar politics but indirectly. For instance, some 
of them would try to influence the voting pattern of the Bar 
elections through their close friends or fellow caste members 
among the lawyers, taking into cognizance their official position. 
During meetings of the DBA, I observed that whenever a judge 
or magistrate came in for criticism, he was safeguarded by 
his fellow caste members and his close friends (mostly those who 
had business relations). All such activities involving the 
judiciary in the Bar or in forming extra-judicial relations 
were of course totally against the rules of the DBA and the ethics 
of their profession.
Another consequence of attaining office is a better 
possibility of gaining political positions in the government: for 
instance at the time of writing this thesis I heard that Mr 5, 
president of the DBA, stood at the recent parliamentary election for 
the Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party headed by Charan Singh, although 
he could not succeed. And a Gujar lawyer who had been president 
of the DBA at one time in the past stood for MLA (member of the 
legislative assembly) in the recent State Assembly election for the 
Congress party and won the election to become a Minister in 
the State Assembly.
The importance of the caste factor
Now I would like to cite three examples which will illustrate 
how the caste factor was dominant in the relationships of Bar 
members and how these were influenced by judicial authorities.
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A female Brahman lawyer had her own law case in the district 
judge's court. The case was about.the repossession of her own 
house. The tenant was from the Bania caste and a close friend of 
one local MLA, who was also from the same caste. The MLA in turn 
was a good friend of the district judge, who was also a Bania.
The basis of this triad lay in their common caste tie. So the 
female lawyer suspected that the issue would not be decided in 
her favour’, although her case was strong on legal grounds. One 
day, at the hearing, she felt that her suspicions were confirmed 
when the district judge asked her why she had not come to a 
compromise with the tenant. She replied that he had no right 
to make such a suggestion, that she was in court to gain 
possession of her house on legal grounds, and that, if she wished, 
she could take the case to the high court too. After this event 
she contacted the president, secretary and some other members 
of the DBA, asking them to convince the judge that he should 
give a fair judgement on her lawsuit. But the DBA officials 
ignored her. Then the members of her clique suggested to her to 
enter for the Bar election, which was only one month away. If 
she could become an office bearer of the DBA she would easily 
be able to mobilise the other office bearers to put pressure on 
the district judge. At the time of the Bar election her clique 
approached their caste faction (ie, the Brahman faction) to 
nominate her 'as a candidate in the election and so the Brahman 
faction proposed her name for a membership ticket to the leaders 
of 'X' coalition, as the majority of the Brahman faction's 
members belonged to it. Finally she got a ticket and won the 
election with the largest margin - in spite of the fact that
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only two female lawyers, herself included, were members of the DBA. 
It was a historical event in the history of the DBA that a 
female lawyer should contest the election and defeat her rival 
with the biggest ever margin . Along with her photograph it 
made front page news in the local daily Hindi newspaper, the 
Muzaffarnagar Bulletin (issue dated 1/4/84). There were three main 
reasons for this success. First, being a female, people had 
sympathy with her. Second, she worked very hard throughout her 
election campaign; she was the only candidate who stood near 
the booth and who asked every voter to cast a vote in her favour. 
Third, both coalitions thought she would not cause problems 
in Bar politics, being in a minority, hence many voters from 
both coalitions voted for her without consideration of the caste 
factor and coalition loyalty.
Before the final judgement was given on her lawsuit I left 
the field, but she had been very optimistic that now she would 
be able to win the case.'
The second case involved a dispute which took place a few 
months before my visit to the field between the Jat and Gujar 
factions. The Jat faction accused the chief judicial magistrate 
(CJM) of givin undue favour to the lawyers and clients of his 
caste (he was a Gujar). The Jat lawyers shouted slogans 
critical of him outside his court. In turn the Gujar faction 
shouted slogans against the Jat faction and alleged that in 
the past Jat judicial officials likewise always favoured Jat 
lawyers and clients.
The third event concerned a member of the DBA practising 
at tehsil level in a town of the district who complained to the 
president of the DBA that he had been arrested by the police
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while on a criminal case, handcuffed and forcibly removed from 
his residence to the police station. In the ensuing furore, the 
president immediately called an emergency meeting of the DBA.
All members condemned the behaviour of the police inspector 
concerned and decided to protest to the district police super­
intendent (SP) that he should be suspended. In the meantime, 
during the meeting, some members of one particular caste 
faction insisted that they should first know the caste of the 
police inspector before taking any decision because their past 
experiences suggested that in such cases the lawyers from the 
caste of the police officials or judges did not co-operate against 
these officials.
The above three events clearly reveal how caste loyalty 
was important in the Bar and how the judiciary was also involved 
on the basis of caste. After the Bar election, coalition 
identity had little importance in relationships among the Bar 
members. Afterwards the important factors in their social 
relationships were their personal interest, clique and caste 
loyalty and membership of a political party.
The Bar members were not only concerned to safeguard the 
interests of their Bar, but the interesting point is that they 
used to launch strikes concerning public problems only to 
further their own vested interests and not in order to serve the 
public. For,instance, if they decided to hold a strike in 
favour of farmers getting higher prices for their crops, only 
those lawyers would participate who were from farming families. 
During my fieldwork, all opposition political parties launched 
combined demonstrations in different parts of the country against 
the ruling Congress Party on the issue that during its regime
some vegetable oil manufacturing factories had been found guilty 
of adulterating their products with beef fats. The lawyers of 
Muzaffarnagar kachahri also went on strike on this issue, but 
only lawyers who belonged to the opposition political parties 
participated in the strike.
It was a historical event when in March 1981 all lawyers 
without regard to caste and affiliation to political parties 
agitated for the establishment of a Bench of the State high court 
in the western part of UP. Because everybody was going to 
benefit if they achieved their goal, they all courted arrest and 
staged hunger strikes. They suspended their work for nearly 
five months and were still suspending their work every Saturday, 
normally a working day, when I was there. In connection with this 
demand a suit was pending in the court, which was filed by the 
State government over this agitation against some members of the 
DBA.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to show on what basis the 
three informal groups, ie, clique, caste faction and coalition, 
operated in Bar politics and in the social relationships among 
the lawyers and the judiciary. A clique was a very small and 
highly interactive informal group of lawyers. The caste, age, 
and class links, and that of similar personalities, were the 
main bases of clique formation, although a few cliques were 
non-caste based. A caste faction was an ego-centred informal 
group with the caste tie as the single criterion of its 
membership. Both clique and caste factions were of a permanent 
nature and without any specific goal. The coalition was a
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temporary alliance of different caste factions and multi-caste 
cliques with a combined leadership. The coalition had a specific 
goal - to win the election. Caste was the most important element 
in the formation of all these three informal groups, even when 
voters cross voted due to caste loyalties and for personal 
reasons. It was difficult for a candidate to win the election 
on the basis of secular-democratic values without caste consider­
ation.
To become a key office bearer in the DBA gave a member the 
opportunity to make a reciprocal relationship with the judiciary, 
gave his clients the impression that he was popular, and an 
influence in the DBA. Approaching the voters on the basis of 
primordial ties, advertising oneself, exchanging favours with 
judges and so on in Bar politics were totally against the ethics 
of the legal profession.
The next chapter will be concerned with the relationship 
of the lawyer's law (ie, modern court system) to the people's 
law (ie, traditional panchayat system) in the context of the 
ideas held about the provision of justice and on what grounds 
people choose a particular type of system.
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CHAPTER SIX
The relationship between the traditional panchayat 
and the modern legal system
Anthropologists and sociologists have been studying the informal 
legal systems of tribal and peasant societies ever since both 
branches of the social science became established. For example, 
the nature of law, procedures of dispute settlement or conflict 
resolution were looked at through the structural-functional 
approach (eg, Hoebel 1964, Gluckman 1955, Malinowski 1962,
Beattie 1957, Bohannan 1957, Cohn 1955). It has been observed 
thatmost of the newly independent countries, particularly in 
Asia and Africa, which have adopted formal modern legal systems 
based on English common law still retain the 'informal' methods 
of dispute settlement which are operated in disregard of or 
without any outside or government interference. India 
provides just one such example of different types of informal 
dispute settlement operating beside the formal legal system.
Many studies have been conducted on the informal dispute 
settlement methods in the context of village India by political 
scientists, sociologists and anthropologists, and some of them 
have written on the interaction between lawyer's law (the modern 
legal system) with customary law (eg, Cohn 1965, Mayer 1960,
Singh 1976, I.shwarn 1964, Khare 1972, Srinivas 1955, Berreman 
1963, Rudolph & Rudolph 1964-65, Gough 1955, and Pradhan 1966).
Several questions are of interest here, some of which relate 
to my own observation and some which test the veracity of the 
findings of other field researchers in the different parts 
and communities of India.
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First, what is the relationship between the traditional 
panchayat and the modern legal system? Are they opposed or 
complementary to each other in the context of ideas about the 
provision of justice. Second, who are those who are prepared to 
take their disputes to the courts rather than to the panchayats 
and who are those who prefer to settle their disputes through 
the latter ? Third, in what situations and on the basis of what 
values does a disputant go to a particular legal system? These 
three questions are interlinked. Unfortunately a detailed dis­
cussion of them would require a separate thesis and as I have 
limited room my discussion will therefore be brief. Primary 
data were mainly collected through informal interviews with the 
village litigants when I visited their villages in connection 
with gathering information on their opinion of their lawyers.
I also discussed these issues with a number of judges, magistrates, 
lawyers and with several government officials. However, before 
I start tackling the above questions I shall first describe the 
different levels of panchayat which operated in the district of 
Muzaffarnagar.
1. The different levels of panchayat 
Like in other parts of India, many levels of traditional 
panchayat exist in the countryside of Muzaffarnagar. Functionally 
their tasks are very similar - to dispense justice and maintain 
law and order, (see Mayer 1960, Cohn 1959, Pradhan 1966). In 
addition some panchayats discharge social, political and economic 
roles. ' In the villages of Muzaffarnagar district the system 
operated as follows.
If both parties (ie, defendant and plaintiff) belonged to
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the same family or tchaandaan then the panches (judges) were 
also appointed from the same joint-family and khaandaan and 
sometimes kin from other villages were also included. This 
type of panchayat is called a khaandaan-ki panchayat (lineage 
council) and if only the panches were relatives then it is called 
rishtedaro~ki panchayat. If the disputants did not belong to 
the same family or khaandaan but were of the same caste, then 
the panches were chosen from that particular caste and this 
panchayat is called jati-ki panchayat or biradari-ki panchayat 
(caste council). If the disputants belong to different castes 
of the village then the judges would be from the different 
castes and this is called gaon-ki panchayat (village council). 
When the disputants belong to the different villages and castes 
then the judges would be from the ganwaand and this panchayat is 
called ganwaand-ki panchayat (council of the province).
It is feasible for disputants from the lower and middle 
castes to request influential persons (badaa-aadmi) from the 
dominant caste to settle their own disputes or the latter may 
themselves offer to settle them, but this does not work the 
other way round and in disputes among the dominant or middle 
castes panches from the lower castes were never chosen to sit 
in their panchayats. Cohn (1959) observed that the Thankurs 
as a dominant caste were important in settling disputes of all 
castes in the Banares region and Srinivas (1955) tells us about 
the role of the dominant caste of Rampura village in south 
India in the social life of the village and in settling disputes 
due to its socio-economic and political dominance in the village. 
'The elders of the dominant peasant caste in Rampura administer
,
-208-
justice not only to members of their own caste group but also 
to all persons of other castes who seek their intervention,1 
(Srinivas 1955:18). In the past, in the region of Muzaffarnagar 
district, if the peace was in danger or the disputants themselves 
petitioned the local ruler or zamindaar, he could intervene to 
settle the problems.
Pradhan (1966) accounted in detail for the above-mentioned 
panchayats of Muzaffarnagar district with reference to the 
political system of the Jat caste. However, the sarv-khap 
panchayat (supreme body of the Jat council) can be said to have 
less influence nowadays. My own observations suggested that 
selecting the panches from the same group of disputants was 
not a hard and fast rule. Any person could be asked to be a 
panch ,or an influential person from within the village or even 
outside it could himself offer to act as such and he would be 
acceptable provided that both parties were satisfied that he 
had the capacity and ability to resolve their dispute. If 
either party objected to the appointment of a person chosen by 
the opponant to act as judge, then in this situation there 
were two options: the party who objected could ask his opponent 
to suggest another person (in whom he had the confidence that 
he would act in his favour) or the objectionable person would not 
be appointed as panch. The ideal number of judges was five:
'The ideal,"panch panch-parmeshwara"("five panches or council 
members are like five Gods or where five panches are 
sitting there is God"), epitomizes the ethos of Jat society' 
(Pradhan 1966, p.ix).
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2. The panchayats and the modern courts 
In the 18th century, during British rule, the government 
established a uniform modern legal system which was based on 
the English legal system under the necessity of maintaining 
law and order and for revenue collection purposes (see Singh 
1976:18). This was essentially different from the traditional 
panchayat system. Where customary law was considered sacred 
and personal, the modern law was secular and universal (impersonal). 
Therefore customary law can be said to have belonged to the 
people while this modern law was alien. The attitude of the 
people towards the two legal systems was different. The modern 
legal system was formulated, controlled and enforced by those 
who were unfamiliar with the villages. Consequently people 
suspected and often avoided going to the modern courts. Where 
in a panchayat the dispute was settled on the basis of compromise, 
in a modern court one party had to 'lose' and another had to 
'win'. The panchayats reflected the harmony and unity out of 
the diversity of the society. The modern courts on the other 
hand, aiming at universality, might ignore some of the local 
customs and institutions. The machinery to enforce modern law 
was formal and organised and there was no question of 
spontaneous mobilisation of public-opinion on the decision 
and enforcement of it. In the case of the panchayats, public 
opinion was a basic element in the decision-making process. In 
the panchayats there was no room for legal practitioners, whereas 
they were a necessity to the modern legal system. The whole 
idea of the panchayat was based on the wider concept of dharma 
(righteousness) which comprises rules of morality, good behaviour
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and customary rules, whereas the modern legal system was mainly 
based on rational, democratic and universal principles.
In this way the two legal systems were based on opposite 
values. And both systems still exist side by side in India. The 
government does not usually interfere in the functioning of 
the panchayats when they deal with petty cases relating to 
personal law,
3. The nyaaya panchayats: A middle way
After Independence in 1947 the big issue of debate in the 
Constituent Assembly of the Indian government was what type of 
legal system would suit Indian society. The legislators had 
seen the weaknesses (eg, expensive, encouraging corrupt practices, 
etc) of the British legal system. MK Gandhi, the father of the 
nation, and some socialist-minded congressmen were in favour 
of including the panchayat system in the national legal system 
at the village level. As Galanter (1972:56) writes,
'Restoration of panchayats was proposed as one 
phase of the reconstruction of India's villages, 
in which faction and conflict, bred by colonial 
oppression, would be replaced by harmony and 
conciliation. Critical discussion focussed 
almost exclusively on adjectival law - on court 
administration (delay, expense, corruption), 
complexity of procedure, unsuitability of rules 
of evidence, the adversarial rather than 
conciliatory character of the proceedings 
and (occasionally) the nature of penalties.'
However, the lawyers and judiciary were not in favour of 
restarting the panchayats. For them, the modern legal system - 
notwithstanding its foreign roots and origin - was absolutely 
Indian in outlook and operation (see Galanter 1968-69:215-6).
Even the president of the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambadkar,
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was not in favour of introducing the panchayats in a formal way 
in the villages. He held the opinion that the panchayats would 
create factional politics at village level. However, Gandhi and 
his supporters' suggestion was accepted. Basically the British 
legal system was kept with slight changes and at village level 
a new form of panchayat system called nyaaya panchayat (nyaaya 
meaning 'justice') was also included in the national legal 
system in the hope that ‘the nyaaya panchayats could remove 
many weaknesses of British legal system. It was thought that 
since they would be administered by local people, who had know­
ledge of local customs, habits and attitudes of the disputants, 
people would not feel that they were alien to them. The idea 
visualised them as media for the effective delivery of modern 
justice rather than as a means to revive the traditional 
panchayats (see Galanter 1978:44-5).
Structural and functional aspects of the nyaaya panchayats 
The nyaaya panchayats were introduced under the local 
self-government scheme of 1947 in all States. In Uttar Pradesh, 
according to the Panchayat Raj Act 1947, the nyaaya panchayats 
were established in the villages. According to this Act, each 
district was divided into electoral gaon-sabhas (village councils). 
At present a gaon-sabha consists of a minimum of 775 members on 
the basis of adult franchise. Its executive committee (gaon- 
panchayat or adalati-panchayat) is formed from ten to twenty- 
five members according to the population of the gaon-sabhas. The 
gaon-panchayat is a formal administrative body for development 
programmes in the gaon-sabha. A nyaaya panchayat consists of 
the members of surrounding gaon-panchayats (usually seven
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villages). At least two members must be selected from each 
gaon-panchayat in a nyaaya panchayat. The membership of a 
nyaaya panchayat may vary between fifteen to twenty-five members. 
The members of a nyaaya panchayat elect two officials, the sarpanch 
(chief judge) and sahyak-sarpanch (assistant judge) from amongst 
themselves.
The judicial power of a nyaaya panchayat is very limited.
It can settle only very minor disputes and cannot give a 
sentence of imprisonment. Moreover a nyaaya panchayat may impose 
only a maximum five or Rs.100 and on the civil side a nyaaya 
panchayat can only settle disputes in which a maximum of Rs.5Q0 
claim lawsuit has been filed. The DM in the whole district and at 
■tehsil level the SDM have the power to withdraw a case from a 
nyaaya panchayat and dispose of it himself. The decision can 
be overturned or recommended for retrial or transferred to other 
courts. A lawsuit is presented before the nyaaya panchayat in 
writing and far hearing the case the sarpanch nominates a bench 
of five panches of whom at least one should be from the plaintiff's 
gaon-panchayat and the defendant may petition the sarpanch for 
one of the panches on the Bench to be from his gaon-panchayat.
The plaintiff presents the case before the nyaaya-panchayat 
under oath and the proceedings of the case are recorded by the 
secretary, who is the only government salaried member of the 
nyaaya panchayat. Both parties may cross-examine (ji reh) each 
other and present witnesses (gavaah)' and other evidence to 
support their claims. The decision is taken on the basis of a 
majority vote. Legal practitioners are not allowed to plead the 
case. The procedure of the proceedings is governed by the Indian
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Penal Code (IPC) and Civil Penal Code (CPC), but the local 
customs are also considered (see Robins 1962, Singh 1976, Misra 
1961:310, 1983:305).
Studies which have been conducted on the functioning 
of the nyaaya panchayats reveal that this institution has 
failed in its aims (Robins 1962:245, Galanter 1972:59, Srinivas 
1964, Berreman 1963:271-82, Baxi & Galanter 1979, Merschievitz 
& Galanter 1982, Derrett 1982:135). The main criticism is that 
the panches tend to be elected on the bases of caste, religion, 
kinship and factional politics of the village and therefore 
favour their own people. Second, as the nyaaya panchayats 
have very limited judicial power, the people themselves are 
reluctant to take their disputes before them. 1 noticed in the 
Muzaffarnagar district that it was usually those disputes which 
had already been settled by the traditional panchayats which were 
brought to the nyaaya panchayats at the request of its officials, 
just so they could demonstrate to government officials that their 
nyaaya panchayats were in fact working well - so the result was 
to give the latter a good image. To become a panch or sarpanch 
of a nyaaya panchayat was a socio-political status symbol rather 
than to be a judge for the people. Very few disputes were brought 
before the nyaaya panchayats. The panches were elected on a 
factional basis and in most of the cases were members of both the 
nyaaya and the traditional panchayats since only an influential 
person could be elected to the nyaaya panchayat.
The failure of the modern legal system: Culture conflict
The disputants preferred either the traditional panchayats 
or modern courts. But though the nyaaya panchayats are
-214-
ineffective in settling disputes in Muzaffarnagar district 
people still considered them as an alien system since they did 
not fit in with their socio-cultural system.
It has been pointed out that the ineffectiveness of the 
modern legal system in India is due to the cultural-conflict 
between indigenous and British culture (see Cohn 1959, Rowe 
1968-69:235, Van Muhren 1964-65:1180, Iswaran 1964, Rudolph & 
Rudolph 1967:234, Galanter 1966:153-7; Singh 1976, Kidder 1973, 
Derrett 1984:124). For instance Cohn (1959:90) rightly 
pointed out that on the basis of his field data,
'It is my thesis that the present attitude 
of the Indian peasants was an inevitable 
consequence of the British decision to 
establish courts in India patterned on British 
procedural law. The way a people settles 
disputes is part of its social structure and 
value system.. In attempting to introduce 
British procedural law into their Indian 
courts, the British confronted the Indians 
with a situation in which there was a direct 
class of the values of the two societies; and 
the Indians in response thought only of 
manipulating the new situation and did not 
use the courts to settle disputes but only 
to further them.1
However, Mendelsohn (1981:823-63) stressed in a long article 
that Cohn's argument is not sufficient to explain the 'pathology 
of the Indian legal system'. He says (ibid:860), 'The relevant 
clash was not over values to do with status and culture and 
between native and alien judicial procedures, but an economic 
clash'. And the basis of this economic clash was the new land 
policy which was introduced by the British government in India, 
and which changed land-relations in Indian village society. 
Therefore the failure of the modern legal system in India must 
be explained within the sphere of the structure of land relations.
i
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In support of his argument he mentioned a case history of 
Jagat Singh's lawsuits in connection with land disputes from 
the Alwar district of Rajasthan state - how one Jagat Singh was 
forced to get involved in at least ten lawsuits during the years 
1965 to 1972 concerning land disputes with his kin and neigh­
bours .
My observations in the Muzaffarnagar district lead me to 
disagree with Mendelsohn's treatment of the 'pathology of the 
Indian legal system'. He overemphasised one factor, that is, 
material values in the context of disputes. I agree with him that 
the majority of lawsuits are filed in the courts in relation 
to land disputes, but the number of lawsuits related to other 
matters is also very significant, as it can be seen from 
Appendix B. Second, the British government and later the 
indigenous Indian government interfered more in land related 
law than in personal law. The law of sastras and the law of the 
Koran were administered in the courts in matters of marriage, 
adoption, succession, joint-family, maintenance, religious and 
caste-related disputes, guardianship and other closely allied 
matters. The Indian government have also maintained the same 
system with Hindu law for Hindus and Muslim law for Muslims in 
relation to socio-religious matters. The new land-related law 
did not fit in the socio-cultural value system. Land disputes 
are not a new phenomenon in Indian village society, but in the 
past the elders of the villages, castes and families were able 
to resolve the disputes according to their local value-system.
Even the British government after realising the difficulties in 
administering the modern legal system introduced in 1920
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statutory panchayats in some provinces to bring back some 
features of the traditional administration of justice. However, 
these panchayats were structurally different from the traditional 
panchayats, because judges were formally elected and selected 
by the government and the latter could also intervene in them. 
Third, were Indian peasants as material minded as Mendelssohn's 
theory suggests, they would not have spent more money in 
litigation than the actual cost of the land in dispute. I 
witnessed many such cases in Muzaffarnagar district and I found 
that several peasants spent more money on court cases than the 
actual cost of the land, and many more peasants were ready to 
follow suit rather than give up their land. When I asked some 
peasants whether they were ready to sell a small piece of their 
land to start a business or to buy another type of 
property, they were not ready to do it. For a farmer to sell 
land is still, nowadays, to court loss of prestige in the eyes 
of other villagers.
In Indian village agriculture is still a 'way of life' 
rather than a business. However, profit-oriented values are on 
the increase due to Westernisation and modernisation processes. 
If ’Jagat Singh1 went to his village with modern values, after 
having spent many years outside, and challenged the status-quo 
of his kin and neighbours, then it was naturally a clash between 
him and his kin and neighbours. But if he was living in the 
village then there was a greater possibility that he would have 
been involved in a lesser number of lawsuits. In one place 
Mendelsohn (ibid:835) himself accepted that 'beyond these 
material factors there are elements on individual psychology and
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culture which have also shaped the conflict'. So here my 
submission is that the cause of the failure of the modern legal 
system in Indian village society is because it did not fit in 
with the indigenous socio-cultural value system.
It was observed in the Muzaffarnagar city kachahri that 
most of the lawsuits filed in the courts resulted from village 
factional politics and sprang from the hope of one person to 
teach a 'costly lesson' to another. In this way courts were 
being considered more an arena to harass the opponent rather 
than a place to get justice. In other words, the litigants 
used the modern courts with both value orientations: to get justice 
and to harass their enemies. The people had the feeling that 
lawyers' law was a game for the rich (see Rudolph & Rudolph 
1967:262, Kidder 1973, Khare 1972:126, Bailey 1957:254, Sharma 
1982:43-6, 1982a). As Kidder put it, 'Without spending money, 
one is not sure of getting justice' (Kidder 1973:126). This 
phenomenon is indicated particularly in criminal cases. The 
party involves not only the accused but also members of his family 
who had nothing to do with the litigation in an effort to prevent 
the consolidation of the opponent's case against him and thus 
force the party by such harassment to come to a compromise. 
Counter-suits are filed with this aim in mind as well. An 
instance of this is indicated in the' rivalry existing between 
two peasant families for generations. Both families tried to 
create situations in which they could teach a costly lesson in 
the courts to each other. For example, in 1982 the head of one 
family on catching red-handed a Chamar stealing the wheat crop 
beat him up. Thereupon the rival family instigated the Chamar
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to file a lawsuit against their opponent. The Chamar refused, but 
two months later, when his wife had a miscarriage, he was again 
instigated to bring a suit falsely accusing the rival family of 
beating up him and his wife. Financial and other aid was 
provided, false medical certification procured and false witnesses 
also brought in, with the result that the accused was given a 
sentence of six months by the court. This particular episode 
typifies the socio-political rivalry rampant in the villages, and 
I have evidence from many of them of the chain of lawsuits in 
which iival families were involved.
4. Choosing a particular system
It was observed that the disputants used both legal systems 
(traditional panchayat and modern legal courts) in accordance 
with their own calculations of propriety and benefit (see Srinivas 
1964, Ishwarn 1964, Berreman 1963:271, Cohn 1965:108-9). I 
found that a disputant preferred to go to the courts rather than 
panchayats if he felt that his case was strong from the point of 
view of lawyer's law, if he had the capacity to afford the court 
expenses and lawyer's fees, had the moral support and approval 
of his well-wishers, and had the feeling that the traditional 
panchayat would not be able to give the decision or penalise his 
opponent as he desired. Naturally in this situation his 
opponent favoured the settling of the dispute through the panchayat. 
A person who had acquired the reputation of being litigious and 
going to the courts lost his prestige in the village and people 
called him a mukadmah baaz. Of course the situation was different 
when a person was forced to involve himself in many court cases 
by others and when people considered him in the right on the 
basis of customary law. In cases where both parties were
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really desirous of getting justice and they succeeded in finding 
the right persons as panches and whom both considered impartial, 
then they preferred to settle the dispute by traditional panchayat. 
Those people who settled their disputes in the villages through 
panchayats were appreciated by the people. I quote here one 
example.
I observed in a village that when a temporary farm 
labourer lost his right arm in the wheat threshing machine, he 
did not file a lawsuit against the farmer for compensation as 
he knew that on legal grounds he was not entitled to it. On the 
other hand he was entitled to compensation according to customary 
law, and accordingly he approached the influential persons of 
the village who decided the amount of compensation through the 
gao-ki panchayat and both parties were satisfied with the decision. 
In another case a few years ago, in two villages the farm 
labourers refused to work during the rice-planting season 
because they wanted a 25 per cent increase in their wages. But 
as the farmers were not ready to increase their wages they brought 
farm labourers in from the other villages to work on the field. 
Consquently the disputants managed to call a gao-ki panchayat and 
in the panchayat (in which all castes were included) both the 
farmers and labourers agreed that they would abide by the 
panchayat's decision. The panchayat declared in its decision 
a 15 per cent increase in the wages which both parties accepted.
So there are many situations when lawyer's law cannot help 
but customary law can succeed in providing a solution.
I found that litigants did not like to go to the courts 
for disputes related to personal law. This was because they 
thought that to bring such types of dispute to the courts would
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be to lose their social prestige. Moreover the lawyers also 
would usually suggest to their clients that such type of cases 
should be settled through informal ways, though this was only 
after two to three hearings, ie, after they had extracted their 
fees. I would like to quote another example here. A person 
filed a law-suit in a district court against his son-in-law and 
his parents on the grounds that they had harassed and caused 
physical harm to his daughter on several occasions one year after 
the marriage. Moreover they were now demanding extra dowry 
which he could not afford. His daughter as a result wanted a 
divorce from her husband. Both parties engaged lawyers from 
their common caste and their witnesses were from common kin.
A counter lawsuit was filed from the son-in-law's side on the 
basis that his father-in-law threatened to kill him. After 
three hearings the lawyers of both parties suggested to the 
disputants and their witnesses that they settle their dispute 
through a traditional panchayat. Afterwards both parties and 
their witnesses sat under a tree in the kachahri premises and 
discussed the issue. They blamed each other according to their 
customary law and in the meantime the father of the boy pointed 
out the folly of the quarrel which would bring their daughter 
or wife to the kachahri. It would bring shame and indignity 
not only to both families but to all kin, caste and the village 
too. As it was a question of prestige he further suggested 
that if reconciliation between husband and wife would not be 
possible, he was willing to take back the girl as his daughter 
to live with him. In the end both parties reached an agreement 
to withdraw the cases from the courts and they were subsequently 
decided by a panchayat in which the panches would be from their
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kind and the lawyers of both sides would also be asked to become 
panches (as members of the caste rather than as lawyers). Later, 
after intensive investigation I found that the real story was a 
little different. Extra dowry had not been demanded after the 
marriage and nor had his father-in-law as was also originally 
alleged threatened to kill him. The fact was that the 
husband had had doubts about his wife's virginity on marriage and 
suspected that whenever she visited her parents after the marriage 
she resumed her sexual relations with the original boyfriend.
The husband confirmed his doubt through a female maternal cousin 
who had married into his wife's native village.
It was observed that in many cases lawsuits were often 
withdrawn from the courts and settled through the traditional 
panchayats. In one case, a law suit was pending for eight 
years in a civil court in connection with a land-boundary 
dispute between two cousins and it was then withdrawn from court 
and settled through the traditional panchayat. On the other 
hand it was also found that whenever a disputant was not satisfied 
with the decision of a panchayat he brought his case from the 
panchayat to the court. In this way, the legal systems are not 
in opposition but are complementary to each other in the context 
of the dispensing of justice and the satisfaction of the 
disputants. The number of disputes which are brought to the 
courts from the traditional panchayats is less than the number 
of disputes which were withdrawn from the courts to be settled 
through the traditional panchayats.
I observed that traditional panchayats were less effective 
in those villages which are situated near the urban centres
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because of the impact of the urbanisation, education and 
communication facilities. On the other hand the traditional 
panchayats were more effecitve in those villages which had little 
contact with the outside world. In the east the river Gangaa 
and in the west the river Yamunaa separates the district from 
the nearby districts to the city of Muzaffarnagar. Those villages 
which are situated on both sides of these two rivers have very 
little influence from urbanisation and most of the people are 
non-literate. In these villages the majority of disputes, 
particularly those related to personal law, are settled on the 
basis of customary law. Cattle-lifting was a common practice 
in these villages because the thieves could cross the boundaries 
of this district across the rivers with the cattle. The 
cattle owners were averse to taking these cases to the courts as 
they had learnt through experience that whenever they filed a 
lawsuit against the culprit they never recovered their cattle. 
Either the thieves were acquited by the courts due to lack of 
evidence or they were sent to jail if found guilty but the cattle 
was never recovered from them. So people always tried to 
negotiate with the cattle-lifters through influential persons of 
the region and their kin. Another reason for avoiding a court 
case in this respect was also because it would simply result 
in making the thief an enemy of the initiating litigant with the 
threat of harm in the future.
5. Recent trends and conclusion
I would like here to make a few points in regard to the 
changing nature of the traditional panchayats.
First, the effect of modernisation has been to reduce the
.
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effectiveness of the traditional panchayat. Second, where in the 
past the binding force to follow the decision of a panchayat 
was a desire to preserve the 'group sentiment' or 'collective 
responsibility' nowadays utility and social pressure are the 
main forces. Third, in the past in some villages there were 
some permanant panchayats where the panches could be appointed 
on the basis of heridity, age, and elected by the people (see 
Pradhan 1966) but, at present, after the settlement of disputes 
these panchayats are dissolved and there is no permanent 
traditional panchayat for settling disputes in this district. 
Fourth, any person can be appointed as a panch in a panchayat 
when both parties agree to his selection. Fifth, in the past 
the traditional panchayat had adjudicative authority (ie, the 
panches possessed a degree of authority to impose their decisions). 
At present, however, the panch's role is only as negotiator or 
mediator between the disputants. Sixth, sometimes the lawyer's 
law is also taken into account in a traditional panchayat, 
especially if any person in a panchayat has knowledge of lawyer's 
law. For instance, whenever a lawyer or educated person is 
selected as a panch he can explain the lawyer's law. The terms 
used in the latter are often used as well. For example, in one 
village when three brothers wanted to partion their parental 
property after the parents' death, their widowed sister also 
demanded her-share as she was told by the people that she had 
the right of share on modern legal grounds. The brothers refused 
to give her her share and she then threated to file a lawsuit 
against them. In this case the brothers agreed to settle 
the dispute through the kinship-panchayat. The panchayat
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decided to her 75 per cent of her share - the lawyer's law 
here prevailing, if only to 75 per cent of the legally required 
share.
In sum, while the prestige of the legal profession is on 
the decrease, the popularity of the modern legal system is, 
overall, on the increase. We may also conclude that where the 
panchayats are based on particularistic attributes, it is also 
clear from the evidence that the workings of the modern legal 
system and the Bar - as seen in the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar 
city - are also kin and caste based.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion
This thesis has largely dealt with a comparison of the ideal of 
legal professionalism and legal behaviour actively carried out, as 
exemplified by the lawyers of a north Indian kachahri, that of 
Muzaffarnagar city, Uttar Pradesh. The lawyers of this kachahri 
have been shown to be 'profit-oriented' rather than 'service- 
oriented', the latter a basic element of the ideology of profes­
sionalism. They did not hesitate to break the written and 
unwritten codes and the ethics of their profession. They 
cheated their clients in many ways. They bargained and over­
charged the fees and were ready to offer bribes to the judicial 
officials in order to get court decisions in their favour.
Many of them used the services of touts. They encouraged 
their clients to take out further litigations and presented 
false witnesses and facts in the courts. They used many 
tactics to impress and therefore attract clients by means which 
were totally against the rules of their Association and the 
ethics of their profession. In sum, the lawyers behaved more 
like businessmen than professional men.
There are two main explanations for this 'unprofessionaltiy'. 
First, since entry into the legal profession is far easier to 
achieve than for other professions such as medicine and engineer­
ing it is as a result very competitive. When lawyers do not have 
a sufficient number of clients or income they do not therefore 
hesitate to break the norms and rules of their profession to gain 
them. This was just one reason why leading lawyers were less
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likely to indulge in these activities than the others. The second 
explanation is that the values of traditional Indian culture 
conflict with those of the modern legal culture and we can 
summarise this reason for the existence of 'unprofessionality' as 
culture conflict. Where the standing of the legal profession has 
deteriorated in the district of Muzaffarnagar, the popularity of the 
modern court system has been on the increase due to dissemination 
of legal literacy. Whereas in the past the litigants tended to 
take their disputes to the traditional panchayats due to 'moral' 
values, nowadays 'utilitarian' values predominate in the decision­
making process about where to take their disputes. Where the traditional 
panchayats are based on particularistic attributes the Bar is 
also based on the same. With regard to dispensing justice, both 
systems are complementary to each other rather than in opposit­
ion. And from the point of view of the litigants modern courts 
are used with both values, to get justice and to harass their 
enemies.
The general recruitment pattern into the profession was 
based mainly on particularistic values rather than universalistic 
ones. As a whole the peasant castes numerically and politically 
dominated the district Bar and, among the peasant castes, it 
was the Jats who dominated; this was in spite of the numerical 
dominance of the Chamars in the district. Thus no posititive 
correlation pan be said to exist between the numerical dominance 
of a caste at the Bar and its numerical dominance in the district.
In the beginning the district Bar was in fact dominated by the 
urban trading castes of Bania and Jains, but gradually, due to 
the modernisation of agriculture and the extension of education
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and communication facilities, the sons of the peasants entered 
the profession. The majority of lawyers in the kachahri (during 1984) 
were Hindus, young and usually having arts degrees, from joint 
families and with a rural background. Civil law specialist 
lawyers were almost all with an urban background and in criminal 
and revenue law the majority of lawyers were from villages. It was 
also found that there was a positive correlation between the 
number of specialists in a particular field of practice and the 
number of court cases in that particular field of law. There 
was a positive correlation between the lawyer's field of 
specialisation and their caste background. The majority of lawyers 
were semi-specialists. They were generally unwilling to send 
their children into the profession.
It was found that to become a leading lawyer a combination
of four main features was necessary:
i) He should have a ready-made professional 
'recruitment-set' to get enough clients 
when starting the practice.
ii) He should have skill in handling cases in
court and possess a sound knowledge of law.
iii) He should be prepared to work hard and
have a commitment to his legal practice 
and his clients.
iv) He should maintain the 'links' with 
judicial officials and the judiciary 
should recognise his professional and 
socio-political status.
All of the leading lawyers in the Muzaffarnagar kachahri 
achieved their position on the basis of the above-mentioned 
combination.
To become an office bearer of the DBA enabled a lawyer to 
get to know the judiciary and create possibilities of obtaining 
favours from them in court, gain popularity among fellow members,
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acquire influence within the Association, and attract more 
clients.
For the lawyers their munshis played a very important role 
set - as a manager, clerk, public-relations officer, mediator, 
business promoter, servant, advisor, information officer, and 
so on. In this way munshis could be considered 1role- 
dischargers' for their employers. The brokers, such as expert 
litigants amd witnesses, old clients, village-level leaders and 
government officials, played a more important role as linkage 
nodes between the lawyers and their clients than did the touts 
and chronic litigants because these two types of persons had 
a bad public image. Despite this, toutism was still active in 
the kachahri of Muzaffarnagar city.
Three types of informal groups operating among the lawyers 
in their Bar politics were identified in the thesis - the 
clique, caste faction, and coalition. A clique is a very small 
and highly interactive informal group of close lawyers. Caste, 
age, class and having similar personalities were the main bases 
of formation of a clique, although a few were multi-caste based.
A caste faction was an ego-centred informal group and caste tie 
was the single criterion of its membership. Both cliques and 
caste factions were of a permanent nature, without any specific 
goal. The coalition, on the other hand, was a temporary alliance 
of different caste factions and multi-caste based cliques with 
a combined leadership. The coalitions were formed for a specific 
goal, ie, to win the Bar election. After this they were to all 
intents and purposes disbanded. In the formation of all of 
these informal groups, caste was the most important factor.
- 229-
It was clear after a consideration of the three main 
approaches used in the study of professional groups - those of 
the processual, power and structural-functional approaches - that 
in the Indian context these were inadequate. It was the network 
approach which proved most useful in studying the legal profession 
and the links between lawyers and clients. Through this approach 
I identified a part of the social network of lawyers which I 
called the ■'professional recruitment-set'. It means a set of 
people whom a lawyer (ego) mobilises on different bases for a 
specific purpose (practice or business). Those clients, whom 
he was able to retain for future business, I called his 
'clientage-bank'. The main features of a professional recruitment- 
set which the present study showed were as follows:
In a lawyer's professional recruitment-set both parties 
(ie, the lawyer and the client) were known to each other 
directly or they were in contact through intermediaries 
(eg, touts, brokers, kin, etc). Therefore this professional 
recruitment-set had a known boundary. There were many bases of 
linkages between ego (lawyer) and alter (client), for example, 
caste, kinship, region, religion, and so on. Sometimes the 
linkages could be based on group membership, for example, 
lawyer and client could belong to the same village or political 
party. But the main role was played by primordial ties. The 
features of professional recruitment-sets were very similar to 
those of Mayer's (1966) 'action-set', but the main difference 
was that normally an action-set was deemed to have formed at a 
specific time, for example, at the time of an election when ego's 
purpose was met (eg, after winning the election) the relation­
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ship was broken. However, in the lawyer’s case, the lawyer 
recruited his clients for a specific purpose - to get business - 
but not at any specific time, and he continued to recruit his 
clients and tried to retain them in his clientage-bank through­
out his whole professional life. Therefore, whereas an action-set 
was a temporary phenomenon, the professional recruitment-set was 
relatively permanent. However, some components of the professional 
recruitment-set and the clients from the clientage-bank could 
leave it; but it could not exist without the ego around whom it 
was formed, as with an action-set. The people who remained for 
a long period in the lawyer's professional recruitment-set and 
the clients in the clientage-bank depended on to what extent 
ego was able to satisfy their needs.
In general, this study reveals that to understand the 
functioning of a formal organisation in a complex society, 
it is necessary to study the role of informal groups. These 
informal groups play both a functional and dysfunctional role 
but their effect is mainly dysfunctional to the workings of a 
formal organisation. The recognition of such groups as the 
lawyer's professional recruitment-sets and their clientage-banks 
not only adds to our knowledge of the Indian legal system as it 
actually operates, but can also give us the basis for further 
comparative work. Just one example would be the use of these 
concepts in an analysis of how the businessman operates, for 
example, with the business recruitment-set and the customer-bank, 
or, even for doctors, with the doctor's professional recruitment- 
set and his patient-bank. All could be usefully compared to 
enlarge in a more specific manner our knowledge of the social 
networks of one society.
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire for lawyers
Dear Sir,
The number of lawyers is rapidly growing in India. But 
there is a scarcity of studies on the legal profession. 
So I have undertaken a research project on the legal 
profession as a part of my research degree in Social 
Anthropology. In this connection, you are requested 
to go through this questionnaire and give your most 
genuine response for each question. If you find any 
ambiguity, please let me know before giving your 
response. I assure you that the information given by 
you will be kept confidential and it is to be used for 
research purposes only. You may answer questions in 
Hindi or English.
Thanking you.
1- Name: 2. Age: 3. Caste:
4. Religion: 3. Education: (pre-legal) (legal):
6. Where did you receive your primary education? 
Village/Town/City:
7. Where did you pass your law degree ? (University):
Year:
B. Who decided you should become a lawyer?
9. What is/was your father's occupation?
10. Are/were there other lawyers in your family?
11. Are you a member of a joint family?
12. Are you a member of any political party? If 'Yes’, which one?
13. Why did you start practice here?
14. Where do ypu get most of your clients? rural/urban:
13. How did you get your first client?
16. Do you have an income from other sources also?
17. What is the nature of cases that you get?
18. Please write your Munshi1s name & address:
19. Do you think some lawyers use touts or brokers?
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20. Are you happy being a lawyer? Please mention reasons:
21. Do you think the prestige of the legal profession is
decreasing? If 'Yes' then what do you think are the
reasons:
22. Would you like your son to become a lawyer? If 'No’
then what would you like him to be:
23. Please list five leading lawyers in this court compound:
24. How have they become leading lawyers?
23. How would you define a leading lawyer?
26. Please’list your four colleagues' names:
27. Which caste do the majority of your clients come from?
28. Do you think there is any difference between 'occupation' 
and 'profession'? If 'Yes' what is it:
29. Do you think some lawyers manage to give bribes to judges
to win cases?
30. Do you think that the rise and fall of sugar-cane prices 
control a number of court cases in this district?
31. Please give a list of any five of your clients?
Names, castes & addresses.
32. Do you think a lawyer's services are meant for society?
If 'Yes',in what ways:
33. Please give Numbers 1 to 9 to the following professions in 
order of priority basis?
Lawyer/Police Inspector/Bank Manager/Degree College Lecturer/ 
Bank Clerk/Income Tax Inspector/PCS Officer/Sales Tax 
Officer/Defence Service Commissioned Officer.
34. On which grounds do clients come to you ?
35. Have you tried any other profession or occupation? If 'Yes', 
what type of job? If 'No', why do you like this job?
THANKING YOU FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION
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APPENDIX B 
Biographies of eight lawyers
This sample was selected on the basis of caste, religion, nature 
of practice, age, rural or urban origin, and position as leading 
or beginner lawyer. Those who volunteered the most reliable 
information about their professional life were chosen. The 
information of those new and pending cases that they had 
attended in different courts in the kachahri during January 
1984 were collected from their daily-case diaries for the same 
month.
This sample revealed that political membership and social 
background were very important factors in the recruiting process 
of clients and for the lawyers' field of specialisation. The 
majority of their clients were obtained through primordial ties.
Although I have detailed data about these lawyers' cases 
for January, due to lack of spcae I will mention them only in 
brief. Most clients were obtained in different ways, but I was 
able to identify the premier link governing the client's engage­
ment of a lawyer through interviews with munshis, lawyers and 
clients.
Case no. 1. Mr 'A '.
Mr A was a 38, year old Jat lawyer who held BA and LL.B degrees. 
He was a resident of a village in the Muzaffarnagar district and 
belonged to a rich farming family. He started his practice in 
1969. He had been active in student politics and during my 
fieldwork he was also active in district and Bar politics.
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He had originally wanted to become an army lieutenant, and 
although the chance to do this was open to him his father had 
directed him to become a lawyer, which he did. He served his 
apprenticeship under a successful lawyer from his own caste and 
his munshi was also from his community and performed his domestic 
duties. Previously his munshi had worked with his [Mr A's] senior, 
but after the senior's death the munshi continued to work with him 
and therefore shifted some of the clients of Mr A's senior with 
him to Mr A's clientage-bank. Most of his clients were obtained 
from his own caste, kindred, and from his ganwaand. He had a wide 
family network in his community and the ganwaand and at weekends 
he often visited his home village to see his (extended) family
and farm and then had the chance to meet other villagers.
In 1975, a Jat deputy superintendent of police (DSP) was 
appointed in the district who had become a friend of Mr A on the
basis of class within the caste boundary. He helped in many ways
to extend the size of Mr A's professional recruitment-set and 
clientage-bank. At the same time Mr A did not hesitate to use 
the services of touts. His preference overall, he said, being for 
poor clients, because they did not bargain over fees and they paid 
respect to lawyers. His practice was mainly in criminal law, 
but if he got petty civil and revenue cases he was prepared to 
take them. His performance in court, however, was very poor.
Indeed, on one occasion I was able to witness him losing his 
client's case through poor representation.
During the last eight years he had been an active member 
of the Lokdal Party, but had recently left and joined the Congress 
Party in the hope of getting an MLA ticket in the forthcoming 
assembly election. All his friends who were lawyers were also from
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his own community and from the same class background. After 
courtwork he would spend his free time in district politics.
During January 1984 he attended the courts in 24 criminal, 
two revenue and two civil old and new lawsuits. He obtained 
20 clients on the basis of primordial ties, four via touts, 
three through his political ties, and one by his munshi.
Case no. 2. Mr 'B' .
A 36 year old Gujar from a very rich farming family and a native 
resident of a village from the neighbouring district, Mr B had 
joined the district Bar in 1973 after completing his B.Sc and LL.B 
degrees. He had wanted to become a medical doctor, not a lawyer, 
but did not pass his entrance examination for the medical course. 
During his student days in Muzaffarnagar City he had been active 
in student politics and sports and after joining the legal 
profession became involved in the district, Bar and caste politics.
He was joint-secretary in 1978 and secretary in 1979 and in 1980 
of the DBA. During my field research he was scretary of the 
Motor Operator's Union, president of the district gymnasium club, 
and a district panel lawyer of criminal law, apparently obtaining 
this post through his high level links (see below). He owned a 
transport business, a life-insurance company and a share in a rice 
factory.
Mr B had a partner from the same community and in the same 
age-group. He was in fact a former classmate from his LL.B course, 
but was from a poor family of a status lower than that of Mr B's 
family within their own community. The relationship between them 
was, therefore, assymetrical; Mr B's partner could not even 
smoke in his presence. In this way their social relationship outside
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the kachahri affected their professional relationship. Mr B gave 
30 per cent commission to the partner and 20 per cent to his 
munshi for each case. His munshi was from a lower caste, that of 
the Nai (barbers). Both Mr B and his partner had got their 
training under the same successful lawyer of criminal law who was
also from the same community. Mr B mainly handled the criminal
cases but he had started to take civil cases also as he had a 
relative who was also the district civil judge.
It is clear that most of Mr B's dealings were done on the 
bases of primordial ties. When I asked him why he had started 
his practice in this district as opposed to his own, he replied 
that,
'One of my cousins and I passed the LL.B in 
the same year and I wanted to join the district 
Bar in my home district. My cousin, however, 
suggested to me that it would be better for both 
of us if we started in different districts since
we would be getting our clients from the same
sources. Thus if we had started practising 
at the same Bar there would have been competition
between us. I followed his advice, and because 
I had had all my education in this city I there­
fore knew many people in this district,
particularly from my own caste, and I have many 
relations here' as well. So I started my practice 
here, and my cousin started his practice in 
our native district Bar.1
The main bases upon which he got clients were caste, kinship,
family-network, and socio-political. He also usually insisted that
clients of his life-insurance company bought an insurance policy
through him, even though lawyers were prohibited by the rules of
the District and State Bar Associations from carrying out any
other business. During fieldwork the district civil judge, the
relation of his rishtedaar, apparently favoured him in court,
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according to the complaints of other lawyers. For this reason 
he had acquired many clients from other castes and ganwaands.
This tie (according to the same sources) had also enabled him to 
increase the size of his clientage-bank over the last two to 
three years, despite his poor court performance. In spite of these 
feelings about him, however, Mr B was a very popular and 
influential lawyer amongst the younger lawyers; out of a total of 
20 lawyers from his community in the kachahri I estimated that 
some 18 of them were related to him.
During January 1984 he attended the courts in respect of a 
total of 34 pending and new cases (30 of them concerned with 
criminal law, three with civil and one with revenue). Out of the 
total of 34 cases, he got 26 litigants on a primordial basis, four 
by his munshi, two by touts and two on the basis of political 
links.
Case no. 3. Mr 1C 1.
A specialist lawyer in civil law, Mr C was by caste a Bania, 
nearly 55 years old, and came from a rich old zamindaar family of 
Muzaffarnagar city. The son of an ex-leading lawyer himself, he had 
his own son doing his apprenticeship under him, one of his 
brothers was a notary lawyer, and his father- and a brother-in- 
law were also practising in criminal and revenue law. All these 
kin helped eaqh other in the recruiting of clients for their 
clientage-banks. His graduate degree, however, had been in 
chemical engineering (the only lawyer in the kachahri to have such 
a one) and he had not originally been interested in becoming a 
lawyer. Health reasons though had encouraged his decision to join 
the legal profession, in addition to which he now had a money-
lending business, a share in a factory and was a landlord over 
several buildings.
His clients were acquired mainly on the bases of his repu­
tation as a leading lawyer in civil law, his father's old clientage 
his family network, kinship and urban background. This last was 
due to most of the civil law cases he had (and their connection 
with the urban sector). Mr C had four munshis due to his workload, 
two of them having worked previously with his father and were 
helpful in retaining his father's old clients for Mr C's clientage- 
bank. He had been a part-time lecturer in the law department of 
a local college for the past 15 years. Most of the younger 
lawyers were his ex-students and they paid respect to him in the 
kachahri as well as outside it as an ex-teacher (the traditional 
teacher-student bond is considered to be akin to the father-son 
relationship). Sometimes they referred clients outside their 
field of specialisation to him and those complex cases which they 
could not themselves handle.
Mr C was a non-active member of the Janata Party and had 
membership of some reputable social clubs, where he got the 
opportunity to befriend judges and other administrative officers 
from the district administration. His contacts with judges were 
good, particularly with those from his own community.
During January 1984 he attended the civil courts in 15 
pending and new cases. Among this he obtained 10 on the basis 
of the popularity he had as a leading lawyer and five were 
concerned with ex-clients. Except for two of the clients, all 
were from the city. He had been elected president of the District 
Civil Bar Association many times and without opposition.
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Case no. 4. Mr 'D' .
By caste Mr D was a Chamar (a scheduled caste), 58 years old, 
and a native resident of a village of the district. While his 
father was a farm labourer, he himself now owned a farm.
He had started his practice in 1973 after serving in various 
jobs in government offices. Now he was classed a successful 
lawyer and a popular political leader of the Chamars in district 
politics. He had stood on three occasions for the State Legis­
lative Assembly (MLA) on different party tickets. During fieldwork 
he was in the Lokdal Party in the hope of getting a ticket for the 
MLA seat. He was also president of the district Harijan Association 
and the chairman of the district Harijan hostel. Most of his 
time, it appeared to me, was spent with people from his own 
community at his home-office and court-office, and was concerned 
with non-legal work.
He practised criminal law and had two young beginner lawyers 
as partners, one from the Bania and the other from a low Muslim 
caste. They dealt with civil cases and miscellaneous legal work.
His munshi was only a boy of eighteen years old, from the Mai caste, 
and was very skilful in court proceedings and in bargaining with 
clients about fees. He coached them and their witnesses on behalf 
of Mr D before they appeared in court. He also maintained the 
lawyer's daily case diary.
His clients came from all parts of the district, from his 
community due to his popularity as a political leader and as a 
successful lawyer. The general bases of recruiting clients for 
him were caste, kinship, chronic litigants, political links, 
touts, and so on. Having partners from other communities had 
enabled him to get clients from these places. Should his client
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lose in court he would encourage the latter to file other 
cases against their opponent, thus assuring himself a more 
prosperous business. He also got the benefit of his professional 
recruitment-set and clientage-bank in the political elections.
He helped his clients in various ways, for example, by going to 
the government office or police stations with them. However, few 
of his clients were from the upper castes.
During January 1984 he attended the courts for a total of 
73 pending and new cases (68 were concerned with criminal law, 
one with revenue, and four civil cases) and of these he got 14 
clients due to his political ties, 10 on the basis of caste and 
kinship ties, four by touts, three by his partners and two by his 
munshi.
Case no. 5. Mr 1E 1.
Mr B was a Brahman, 58 years old, with an urban background.
His father had been a schoolteacher. He had graduated in biology 
subjects and had wanted to become a medical doctor, but was not 
able to. Then he did an MA in Political Science and an LL.B 
and so joined the legal profession.
Mr B was active in district politics and spent more time 
in this, in fact, than practising at the Bar as a semi-specialist 
lawyer. During fieldwork, he was general secretary of the Congress 
Party at district level and administrator of the District Co­
operative Bank for a couple of months, these position held by 
favour of a local State Cabinet Minister. During the past fifteen 
years he had worked as the chief election agent of the Congress 
Party. So even without a rural background he had enough contacts 
with leaders at village level to get most of his clients, mainly
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for cases concerning election petition disputes. Many people, 
such as government officials and police officials who owed him 
a favour through patronage, would refer clients to him and thus 
act as brokers. It is important to mention that the political 
leaders who referred clients to him were only from the Congress 
Party. He was the personal legal advisor to the local State 
Minister and therefore had a further link to acquire village 
clients on .the Minister's residence.
Most of the clients engaged him because of his political 
position and they hoped that he would be able to influence the 
judges and especially the magistrates. However, he denied that 
he got most of his clients on this bpsis, telling me that due 
to his involvement in politics he was not able to get sufficient 
clients. His munshi, who had been working with him for the last 
thirteen years, was also from his community.
During January 1984 he appeared in the courts in connection 
with a total of 29 pending and new cases (23 concerned with 
criminal proceedings, six with civil) and of these cases he 
acquired 19 clients on the basis of political ties, three through 
primordial ties, four from ex-clients, and three from government 
officials.
Case no. 6. Mrs 1F ' .
Mrs F was 35 .years old and a Jat. She had MA, LL.B., LL.M (PG 
degree in law) degrees. Apart from her, only two other younger 
lawyers possessed the LL.M degree. Born into a business family 
in Muzaffarnagar city, she married a medical doctor from the nearby 
Meerut district when she was 15 years old. During my field 
research her husband had a post in a local government hospital,
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where he had been for the past four years. At that time she was 
therefore living in the city.
Mrs F had joined the profession in 1981. At the beginning 
she started her apprenticeship in criminal law under a success­
ful Jat lawyer, but after a few months she left criminal law 
because she found that the conversations between the lawyer and 
his clients were conducted in very abusive language and she did 
not like to talk to clients who were involved in crimes. So 
she decided to take up the practice of civil law under another 
Jat lawyer. During my fieldwork she was still doing her apprentice­
ship in civil law. She had only five clients, who contacted 
her through her husband and a tenant, and she offered them to 
her senior.
When I interviewed her she emphasised the issue of the 
status of women in the professions more than other issues. She 
told me that she was involved in legal practice because her 
husband had a 'modern outlook'. If this had not been the case 
there would have been a great deal of opposition to her entering 
such a profession. She took care over her meetings with colleagues, 
she said, so that people could not make the wrong assumptions 
which could have harmed her family life and her prestige.
'My husband has the final say in whether I go to 
practise from one day to another. If he ever 
gets a transfer from this district, I shall 
give up my job. In fact I cane here just to 
pass my- time. I never attend any Bar meetings 
although I am a member of the DBA.'
She told me that whenever a female client came to her senior's 
office with her guardians (local custom dictated that a woman 
should not go into public places alone) then she felt very com­
fortable about talking to her. She got 50 per cent commission
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on the cases she brought to her senior.
Case no. 7. Mr 'G 1.
Mr G was 32 years old and a Jat-Sikh lawyer from a farming 
family of a village in the district. His family had migrated 
from Pakistan to where they now were in 1946. He had originally 
wanted to join the army after his graduation in Arts, but one 
of his father’s friends, who was in the police, suggested that 
he join the legal profession. This he did in 1977 and was now 
a member of the executive committee of the DBA.
The main bases on which his clients were engaged were 
caste, religion, kinship, ganwaand, and through ex-clients. Most 
of them were, in fact, from his own community and from different 
ganwaands of the district. He was the only lawyer who repre­
sented the Jat-Sikh community in the kachahri. The Jat-Sikh 
people who were living in the border villages of the district had 
a reputation for being drinkers of alchohol and illigal distillors. 
As a result most of his clients were concerned with Section 
(60-63), Making Illegal Liquor, for which he used sub-specialist 
lawyers since he himself was a semi-specialist, and Section (25), 
Arms Act and the illegal possession of arms or ammunition.
Some of his regular clients contacted him to seek advice on 
matters concerning visas, passports and arms licences. He 
charged fees .indirectly for this service.
During January 1984 he attended the courts in connection 
with 35 pending and new cases (20 concerned with criminal law, 
three with civil, and two with revenue). All these cases came 
to him through primordial ties such as caste, religion, region, 
and so on.
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Case no. 8. Mr 1 H' .
Mr H was a successful lawyer and one of the leading Muslim 
lawyers. He joined the profession in 1949 and belonged to a 
rich Muslim Saiyid farming family of the district. He had been 
active in student politics in his university life and after 
joining the legal profession became active politically in the 
district and Bar politics. In 1981 he contested a parliamentary 
election but was unsuccessful. His loyalty lay not towards any 
particular political party, but to a Jat friend who was a well- 
known political leader at State level politics in the district 
and who had in fact been a lawyer in the kachahri before going 
into politics. In 1983 both friends were in the Congress Party 
and in 1984 they both joined the Lokdal Party. Mr II was hoping 
to get a ticket for the State Assembly from the Lokdal Party 
and was the party’s district president. He had been secretary 
of the DBA in 1965, its vice-president in 1967 and its president 
in 1973. He was the leader of the Muslim faction in Bar 
politics and he was associated with some Muslim welfare institut­
ions.
Mr H had a good reputation amongst his colleagues and clients 
due to his honesty in dealing with the latter as well as due to 
his successful practice, which dealt mainly with revenue and 
civil cases but with a few criminal cases also. He was well-known 
amongst the Muslims from all parts of the district and more than 
95 per cent of his clients were from his Muslim community.
Three juniors trained under Mr H and received a monthly 
salary. Of these two were Muslims and one was from the Kayasth 
caste. His munshi, who only spoke Urdu, was from his own
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village and community and lived at his residence like a family 
member, both were the same age and held a great respect for 
each other.
During January 1984 Mr H attended different courts in 
connection with 36 pending and new cases (23 concerned with 
revenue law, ten with civil and three with criminal). His 
clients mainly engaged him on the basis of caste, religion, 
political and ganwaand links, as well as on the basis of his 
reputation as an honest and competent lawyer.
Conclusion
It is to be hoped that this description of a small representative 
sample of eight lawyers present a clear picture of the lawyers 
of the Muzaffarnagar kachahri, particularly with respect to the 
correlation between a lawyer's social background, the nature of 
his practice, and the bases for recruiting his clients.
The above studies revealed that primordial ties had a very 
significant role in linking lawyers with clients.
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GLOSSARY
Achhaa-vakil (beech-kaa-vakil) ..
Adaalat
Bhrastaachar .........
Bichaulia .............
Bistra .............
Chakari .............
Chauki .............
Chhotaa-vakil .........
Dalaal .............
Diwaani-adaalat
Dliaab ................
Faislaa .............
Faujdaari-adaalat
Ganvaar
Ganwaand (goawand) ..
Gavaah ............
Gut
Gatbandhan
Gutbandi ........
Hukkaa (hookah)
Ilaaka
Inaam . . . .
Jativaad
Jireh
Kaam
Khaandaan
Kaanun (quanun)
Kanungo (qanungo)
Kachahri (katchehri)
Kasbaa
Maal
Mamaa
Mehantaanaa
Mowaakkil (muakkil)
Muaddi (va£di)
Mudaaleh (pretivaadi)
Mukadmah .............
Mukadmah-baaz
successful lawyer; middle-ranked 
lawyer 
court of justice 
corruption 
mediator
bedding; lawyer's office
lower-ranked job
low square or rectangular seat;
a post; check-post 
lowest-ranked lawyer 
tout; broker; commission agent 
court of civil and revenue 
jurisdiction 
basin formed by the Gangaa and 
Yamunaa rivers 
decision; judgement; settlement;
resolution 
criminal court
an uncivilised person (applied to 
a villager 
a group of neighbouring villages 
witness
clique; faction
alliance, a coalition of factions
factionalism
'hubble-bubble' pipe
area
gift
castism
cross-examining; cross-questioning 
work; job; occupation; function;
performance 
minimal lineage; clan; genealogy 
law
official in charge of a group of 
patwaaris
court compound; "a court of justice; 
tribunal; a public-office; a 
town house - the people assembled; 
the business proceedings in a 
court or in an office" (A dict­
ionary of Urdu, Hindi and 
English by JT Platts, London: 
Crosby Lockwood & Son, 1911.) 
a small district town 
revenue, goods, commodity; cargo;
wealth; property; produce 
maternal uncle; mother's brother 
remuneration of a lawyer; wages 
client 
plaintiff
defendent; respondent 
litigation; law-suit 
chronic litigant
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Mukhaal.if
Munshi
Munshiyanaa
Naukari
Netaa
Nyaaya
Nyaaya-panchayat
Ranch ........
Panchayat
Pardaah
Pargana
Pesaa (vdhandaa)
-karnaa
Peshi .........
Peshkaar
Patwaari (lakhpal)
Pradhaan ..................
Rishtedaar ..............
Rishtedaari ..............
Riswat ..................
Sarpanch ..................
Sukrianaa ..................
Tehsil (teshil) .........
Top-kaa-vakil (badaa-vakil) . 
Vakaalatnamah ..............
Yayasay ..................
Zamanat ..................
Zamindaar ..................
Zila (zilla)
opponent
lawyer's clerk; teacher 
remuneration of a munshi 
official or non-official 
service; job 
leader 
justice
judicial-council in the local self- 
government system 
five; member of a judicial council 
Skt. "Coming together of five
persons", hence council meeting; 
court consisting of five or more 
members of a village, caste, 
clan, etc., assembled to judge 
disputes or determine group 
policy. Each member is a panch. 
seclusion of women 
administrative and revenue sub­
division of a tehsil 
a profession; vocation; an occup­
ation ;
(said of a woman) to take up 
prostitution 
hearing of a law-suit; presentation 
a court-official; head clerk of 
a judge or magistrate 
'village-accountant1 who collects 
land revenue and is in charge 
of land records 
elected head of a village; chief 
kin
kinship
bribe
president or chief judge of a 
nyaaya-panchayat 
tip from sukria, ie, thanks 
administrative and revenue sub­
division of a district 
leading lawyer
credentials; a letter of authority 
from client to lawyer 
occupation, profession, work; job 
surety, bail, security; guarantee 
landlord 
district
